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I.1. Introduction  
Africa has the highest rate of poverty in the World, and despite tremendous progress, many 
countries will not meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) owing to many factors such 
as the instability and the non-inclusiveness of the slight growth observed in the 2000’s1. Given the 
relation between poverty and growth, especially in the agricultural sector, there are timely research 
questions on these central issues and a necessity to find out the most efficient development 
strategies. More specifically, there is a real need to carry out comprehensive analyses of the 
impacts of governmental policies on growth and ultimately on poverty. It has been widely 
recognized that there is complementarity between growth objectives and poverty reduction 
strategies. However, setting-up efficient policies requires identifying the adequate growth profile, 
as the size of poverty reduction pay-off following an average income increase might depend on 
the sector that leads growth and on the extent in which it is related to poor individuals. Efficient 
policies also require focusing on optimal sectoral policy instruments within the ongoing 
development agenda. The identification of key sectors with regards to a range of policy goals, 
including poverty reduction and growth in per capita income, and key sectoral policy programs, 
can provide guidance to the authorities regarding the orientation of scarce financial resources. 
Many authors have investigated the growth-poverty nexus (Diao et al 2005, Christiaensen et al. 
2006, Dorosh and Thrulow, 2014), but have not explicitly investigated the prior relation (the 
policy-growth linkage) that should determine the amount of public spending leading to a specific 
level of growth. Some other authors (Fan and Zhang, 2008; Fan and Rosegrant, 2008; Benin et al., 
2009 etc.) have provided evidence that public agricultural expenditures are efficient to promote 
agricultural growth, but using more simplistic tool that the ones proposed in this dissertation. For 
a more complete impact assessment, there is a need to develop an analytical framework that can 
clearly provide guidance to reach growth and poverty reduction targets by dealing with the 
complexity of the relationships between disaggregated agricultural and non-agricultural public 
spending and the productivity of the different sectors, especially in the agricultural sector. The 
latter has been given priority in the development agenda with the Comprehensive African 
Agricultural Development Program (CAADP), an African leaders’ collective vision, set in order 
to promote agricultural-led growth. In fact, the member states of the African Union committed to 
achieve at least 6% growth in the agricultural sector and to devote 10% of their national budgets 
                                                 
1 In the 2000’s six of the world’s ten rapidly growing countries were in Africa (ADB, 2012).  
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to agriculture development. Within sectors there is a need to identify intervention options that are 
likely to generate more technical progress and higher poverty reduction. The ongoing agricultural 
policy framework, namely CAADP, is a good illustration and needs to be technically supported 
for a successful implementation of its agenda. 
In a world of limited resources, there might be a trade-off between investing in economic policy 
programs that promote growth in the productive sectors and providing public goods, especially in 
social services. Thus, there is a trade-off between promoting future growth and the provision of 
public goods today. The latter results from the fact that promoting future growth demands for 
public investments. These investments are done via different economic policy programs, which 
reduce the total budgetary resources available for public good services. However, more recent 
research points to a potential positive trade-off effect between public good services and future 
growth. In this regard, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on how the government might 
meet the social services needs while, at the same time, getting significant growth externalities from 
the resulting investments in social services, particularly in health.  
This cumulative dissertation encompasses 5 contributions that deliver novel insights on these 
development issues and can be understood independently. 
Chapter II and IV focus on the analysis of potential impacts of public health expenditures on 
productivity and hence future growth. In particular, chapter II provides an empirical analysis of 
the impact of public health expenditures on farmer’s productivity using the Tanzania case study. 
In fact, in a context of tight budget constraint prevailing among the government agencies, 
reinforcing the synergies between the different sectors can help to maximize growth and poverty 
reduction. This paper combines a traditional agricultural household model with a health production 
function and shows evidence that health affects productivity. Heterogeneous impacts are found 
across disease types, productivity of agricultural inputs, categories of expenditures and Tanzanian 
districts.  
Likewise, I investigate the potential impact of out-of-pocket health expenditures on agricultural 
productivity and poverty in Chapter III and IV, respectively. Beyond public spending, private 
expenditures, especially out-of-pocket health expenditures, also have an impact on productivity, 
although having an impoverishing effect on households and constraining the productivity 
generating process when they became catastrophic because crossing a critical share of household 
total income. The issue on the impoverishment of out-of-pocket health expenditures is largely 
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discussed in chapter III, which additionally used a conditional mixed process to estimate their 
determinants 
Chapter V provides the second major contribution to this dissertation by analyzing the policy-
growth linkages in addition to the growth-poverty linkages. This chapter deals with the essential 
identification pre-requisite by considering the cost issue of generating growth through technical 
progress; an issue that is often overlooked when determining the key sectors and key policy 
programs. Many studies have analyzed pro-poor-growth through the comparison of growth-
poverty linkages across the economic sectors without assessing the cost of generating poverty 
reduction (Diao et al., 2005; Dorosh and Thurlow, 2014). In an innovative way, this paper 
combines empirical and expert data in order to estimate a Policy Impact Function (PIF) that ensures 
the linkages between sector specific technical progress and public spending in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors. As pointed out by Headey et al. (2009), previous authors warranted 
the need to use country specific survey data instead of cross-country regressions that may yield 
too much broad insight and do not integrate idiosyncratic factors. (See Palaniswamy and Birner 
2006; Bezemer and Headey 2008). A specification under a two-stage approach is adopted for the 
estimation of the PIF. At the lowest stage, policy programs are combined and lead to an effective 
budget; while at the upper stage, a sigmoid function shows how the resulting effective budget 
generates technical progress in each single sector. In turn, technical progress impacts on various 
political outcomes like population welfare. The PIF is intended to analyze a full range of 
agricultural policies while keeping economic non-agricultural policies at the aggregated level. It 
allows the estimation of the optimal allocation for an efficient implementation of the CAADP in 
the aim of generating the highest productivity improvement. We also show that considering the 
cost issue might lead to rankings of the sectors different from those resulting from the most 
commonly used approaches based on indexes of the responsiveness of poverty to exogenous 
sectoral growth. In addition, this contribution can be directly linked with the political economy 
models explaining the role of political incentives and policy beliefs of a government investing in 
agriculture and non-agricultural sectors. 
Beyond all the identification of economic and political solutions, the implementation of the budget 
allocation between the different sectors and the different policy programs is a crucial point in 
achieving targeted growth and poverty reduction. Chapter VI analyzes the impact of a Medium-
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) – a multi-year budget programming tool for a good 
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implementation of the budget across sectors and policy programs - in Africa, with a special focus 
in Senegal. In particular, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of the MTEFs in allocating 
resources to priority sectors in the budget process and in improving budget discipline. The analyses 
show despite having the potential to make public expenditures more efficient and effective the 
adoption of the MTEFs still remains incomplete.   
At a methodological level this dissertation approaches policy-growth linkages by conducting 
theoretically and empirically well-grounded analyses in order to better understand the African 
economies and policies, particularly in the agricultural sector, as more than 70 percent of the 
region’s poor live in rural areas and are engaged in farming activities (IFAD, 2012). The presented 
chapters are evidence based and tackle policy-growth-poverty linkage and allocation of public 
spending in Africa through varying quantitative approaches. In fact, conducting the research with 
applied and quantitative methods allows dealing with the complexity of the investigated factors 
and the relationships and, at the same time, provides statistical methods to evaluate the validity 
and the credibility level of the different findings. Econometric approaches are used throughout the 
contributions. Besides, Chapters IV and V integrate simulations and are based on linked micro-
macro approaches. In these chapters macroeconomics and microeconomics modeling are 
combined in order to better understand the growth and poverty effects of specific agricultural and 
non-agricultural policy interventions. As pointed out by Bourguignon et al. (2008), linked micro-
macro modeling can help deal with the limitations of single and pure micro model (or macro 
model) that, when taken solely, only provides partial responses of policies at macro (or micro) 
level. The integrated micro-macro approaches are based on a quasi-dynamic and micro-simulated 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that I constructed for the application to Senegal 
and calibrated using an agricultural and regional focused Social Accounting Matrix that has also 
been built within this dissertation.  
A Bayesian Alternative to the Entropy method (Heckelei et al. 2008) is used to econometrically 
estimate the PIF specified in Chapter V due to the indeterminacy of the resulting equation systems. 
This method uses expert data to get prior information on the levels and the ranges of the different 
parameters. Based on the pioneering work of Mundlak et al. (1989, 1997, 2008), Grossman (1972), 
Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986) and Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) chapters II and IV used conventional 
econometric methods to assess the impact of health spending on agricultural productivity and 
poverty. Control function approach through a two-stage residual inclusion - 2SRI (Garen, 1984; 
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Vella, 1993; Terza et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2010) and general covariance structure model often 
called Structural Equation Modelling – SEM (Fox, 2002) are applied to control for endogeneity of 
health related variables, which has been identified as being a major cause of the controversy of the 
previous researches exploring health and productivity nexus. Besides, Chapter IV considers the 
non-automatic adjustment of health investment and productivity by using a CGE modeling that 
integrates the spillover effects in the economy, especially accounting for the bi-directional linkage 
between health and productivity. Both chapter II and IV emphasize the need for greater and 
efficient investment in the non-agricultural health sector in order to both meet the social demand 
and generate productivity growth under the extremely tight budgetary conditions and given the 
trade-off between growth and social services. 
The Table I.1 provides an overview of the dissertation by classifying the chapters according to 
their contents and their methodology. 
 
Table I.1: Overview of the contributions  
 Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V 
Chapter 
VI 
 
Theory   ✓ ✓ ✓  
Empirical 
Econometrics ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Non-Parametric 
tests 
    ✓ 
Simulations   ✓ ✓  
 
 
Economic 
Policies 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Social Services  
Health 
 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Budget 
Allocation 
 ✓   ✓ ✓ 
 
 
Micro level 
data 
 ✓ ✓ ✓   
Macro level 
data 
   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Integrated 
Micro Macro 
   ✓ ✓  
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Note  
Chapter II: Government Expenditures, Health Outcomes, and Marginal Productivity of 
Agricultural Inputs: The Case of Tanzania  
Chapter III: Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus: evidence from 
Senegal 
Chapter IV: Out-of-pocket health payment: a catalyst for agricultural productivity growth, but with 
potentially impoverishing effects  
Chapter V: Identifying key sectors and key policies of a Pro Poor Growth strategy: A new approach 
Chapter VI: Harmonized Budget Programming Reforms in Africa: Senegal’s experience with 
MTEF 
 
The different contributions are summarized in the following chapter.  
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I.2. Summary  
 
Government Expenditures, Health Outcomes, and Marginal Productivity of Agricultural 
Inputs: The Case of Tanzania 
 
In Sub-African countries as it should be in many other developing economies, increasing the total 
agricultural government spending might not be easy due to the resource limitation and one 
alternative option for agricultural growth can be the promotion of indirect effects from non-
agricultural expenditures and the change of their mix such in an optimal way. This paper analyzes 
the impact of health on agricultural productivity by allowing heterogeneity in the agricultural 
function with the functional parameters affected by the technology changing nature of morbidity. 
Using data from the 2008 Household Budget Survey and the 2007/08 Agricultural Census in 
Tanzania, we estimate the impact of household health status on productivity and the impact of 
disaggregated effect of public health spending on health outcomes. The link between health, 
spending, and productivity has been explored by numbers of author without a strong evidence and 
consensus on the nature of the linkages. This paper controls for the measurement errors, household 
heterogeneity, and endogeneity in order to bring an appropriate answer to the question. The results 
highlight the fundamental importance of health good of farmers to boost agricultural productivity. 
Efforts should be undertaken in this direction to avoid the loss of productivity that can result from 
illness.  
 
 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus: evidence from Senegal 
 
Out-of-pocket payments are a major source of funding for household healthcare in Senegal. These 
payments are financial burdens leading to impoverishment when they become catastrophic, as 
households must reduce their expenditures on other necessities.  
The objective of this paper is to explain the possible factors that determine the severity of 
catastrophic health expenditures by using a conditional mixed-process estimator procedure applied 
to the 2011 poverty monitoring survey. Besides, the impoverishing effects of such expenditures 
are investigated through the computation of an SPM-like estimate (Supplemental Poverty 
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Measure) that measures more accurately household resources. The paper also provides knowledge 
about both the occurrence and the intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures.   
The results show that many individuals are pushed into poverty due to the burden of catastrophic 
payments. The level of overall health spending, the progressivity of household health expenditures, 
the expensiveness of health services and the characteristics of health facilities are among the causes 
of catastrophic health payment. These findings provide insight for efficient Government action to 
fight poverty by tackling the impoverishing effects of catastrophic health expenditures.  
 
 
Out-of-pocket health payment: a catalyst for agricultural productivity growth, but with 
potentially impoverishing effects 
 
In a context of limited resources, a budget allocation process integrating direct as well as indirect 
effects across the economy can help to increase the impact of policies. Out-of-pocket health 
payments have an impact on household health and in return for welfare and productivity as 
underlined in the Grossman theory of demand for health care. However, there is evidence that at a 
certain threshold, these expenditures can become a burden because they account for a large share 
of household budget. In fact, out-of-pocket health payments might increase agricultural 
productivity, but when catastrophic, they can make households impoverished by lowering their 
disposable income and by constraining them to sell their productive assets to afford medical goods 
and necessary services. Unlike the previous studies, this paper investigates the impact of household 
health payment on agricultural productivity by considering some impoverishing effects that 
beyond productivity gains can also push people into poverty. It provides a valuable contribution 
by assessing the linkage between the health sector and the agricultural sector using the most recent 
household survey data in Senegal and a dynamic recursive Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) model that has been run from 2011 to 2020. 
Health is considered as an investment good, meaning that its consumption is expected to provide 
productivity gains. The responsiveness of agricultural productivity to household consumption 
level of health inputs is captured through the elasticity parameter ϑ which is estimated using 
household level data, but also depends on the magnitude of catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments. 
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Results show a positive impact on poverty reduction when the Government finance catastrophic 
payment overshoots. Lower health costs also appear to improve households’ well-being, especially 
in the case of agricultural households. Simulations show that an introduction of catastrophic 
coverage programs will reduce impoverishing effects of the households that experienced financial 
hardship owing to the high health expenditures. 
 
 
Identifying key sectors and key policies of a Pro Poor Growth strategy: A new approach 
 
This paper develops a framework that assesses poverty-growth linkages, e.g. economic potential 
to reduce poverty via growth and growth-policy linkages, e.g. the costs to promote growth in a 
specific sector, in order to better understand and evaluate Pro-Poor Growth strategies. It combines 
empirical data on sectoral input and output, and country expert data collected in personal 
interviews with an innovative methodology to estimate a Policy Impact Function (PIF). The latter 
links spending on agricultural and non-agricultural policy instruments to technical progress in each 
economic sector. 
There is a crucial need to better understand African economies and the existing potentials for 
poverty reduction. This should start with the identification of key sectors and key policy programs 
for an efficient use of the resources. Recently, some authors pursued exploring toward this 
direction by assessing and comparing the CGE multiplier impacts of each specific sector-led 
growth on poverty reduction (Diao et al., 2005; Christiaensen et al. 2006; Dorosh and Thurlow, 
2014). Still, there has not been sufficient and complete work in the sense of investigating the 
growth-linkage for the different economic sectors in a broad range of policy concerns and 
considering the cost issue of generating sectional growth.  
The use of CGE multipliers might lead to contradictory conclusions and distorted picture in 
comparison to the CGE elasticities that account for sector size among the criteria determining the 
fact of being a key sector, in addition to the interdependence of the sectors to the rest of the 
economy2. However, both multiplier and elasticity concepts are partial as they don’t consider that 
                                                 
2 The CGE multiplier normalizes by the size of the sector being shocked and therefore looks at the impacts of 
additional unit of the output while CGE elasticity analyzes the impacts of the shift of sector output by 1% (e.g. 
realized from investment to raise technical progress). 
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growth through technical progress is costly and does not require the same public resources in the 
different sectors. Therefore, through the PIF framework, the paper brings an approach integrating 
the final and crucial question for the identification of key sectors that is: how costly is it for a 
government to promote technical progress in each single sector? Key sectors are finally those with 
relatively high growth-poverty linkages induced by the unit of public budget expenditure used to 
promote technical progress. Besides, the proposed Policy Impact Function (PIF) allows the 
derivation of the optimal agricultural policy programs within the CAADP framework. Finally, this 
framework can be linked to the political economy to see whether the observed political 
performance gap is explained by the knowledge gap, e.g. lack of evidence that identifies the 
optimal policies or whether it is due to the lack of incentive to apply the optimal policies that are 
already identified. 
 
Harmonized Budget Programming Reforms in Africa: Senegal’s experience with MTEF 
 
Strategic budget management has been shown as being an important contributor to poverty 
reduction. The emergence of the results oriented management paradigm in the 1990s led to the 
adoption of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as a program and budgeting tool 
in several African countries. The MTEF is designed as a multi-year budgetary programming tool 
for improving budget discipline, predictability, and enhancing the link between the budget 
formulation process and development strategies. In June 2009, the countries in WAEMU adopted 
an additional legal stage in order to place the tool at the core of the budgetary process. The 
implementation of the harmonized public finance framework guidelines for WAEMU3 member 
states contributes to the achievement of the convergence criteria and provides guidance on 
macroeconomic management by ensuring efficient financial and economic policies. These 
guidelines help increase integration of economic policies and accelerate the spread of good 
practices in budget management. Adoption of the MTEF approach by Senegal and several African 
countries stems from a desire to improve budget performance. We used non-parametric statistics 
due to the unknown distribution of the series and the limited number of observations to conduct a 
midterm review of the MTEFs. The impact of MTEFs on budget management and efficiency in 
Senegal is assessed by comparing the approved and executed amounts in matching fiscal years, 
                                                 
3 West African Economic and Monetary Union  
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their budget variations, and their sector allocations. The data cover the period of 2000–2009 and 
are mainly sourced from the Senegalese government’s Integrated Public Finance Management 
System database. To determine budget predictability, Spearman and Kendall tests are conducted 
on the MTEFs, budget projections, and on budget implementation under schedule. The results 
indicate that budget predictability in ministries with or without the MTEFs did not improve. 
However, an increase in some priority areas such as education, environment, and transport is noted. 
This contribution concludes that MTEFs neither improve budget discipline, assessed with fiscal 
balances, nor encourage resource allocation to priority areas. Notwithstanding, the MTEF 
implementation in Senegal has yielded improved budget programming and consistence in 
projections. It appears that even if there has been no redistribution in favor of some priority sectors, 
there has been a gradual increase in their allocations since the inception.  
In a nutshell, the MTEF is a useful resource with untapped potential; this reality will remain 
stagnant as long as reforms in Africa remain incomplete. The main challenge for government 
authorities is to complete the implementation process with the establishment of a comprehensive 
MTEF in order to ensure that all the ministries adhere to planned allocations.  
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Abstract  
 
This paper examines the impact of health expenditures on agricultural labour productivity, to 
inform the necessary policy decisions about targeting scarce public resources towards their most 
effective uses. We link health sector expenditures in rural Tanzania to health outcomes and 
agricultural labour productivity using data from the 2008 Household Budget Survey (10,975 
households) and the 2007/08 Agricultural Census (52,594 households) across 113 districts in 
Tanzania. The results indicate that the marginal productivity of labour as well as land and fertilizers 
respond significantly to health expenditures. However, the magnitude of the response varies across 
types of disease, categories of expenditures, and agricultural inputs. These findings suggest both 
the need and scope for targeting public expenditures in the health sector to achieve better 
agricultural growth outcomes. 
 
 
Key words:  Tanzania, health, marginal productivity, social expenditures, state variable 
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II.1. Introduction 
 
Achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty would still leave the average 
poverty rate for many African countries at 30 percent. For the foreseeable future, these countries 
face a double challenge of finding sufficient resources to invest in growth and meeting the cost of 
social services for a large number of poor and vulnerable people. In the face of the budget 
constraints faced by most of these countries, the pace of future economic growth will depend on 
the ability of governments to find ways to maximize the impact of their large and increasing 
expenditures in social sectors on agricultural labour productivity. One way to do that is to first 
recognize that the mix of social expenditures is not growth-neutral and then, to try and target such 
expenditures to areas where they have the biggest and most immediate impact on productivity.  
Over the past decade, African countries have made efforts to increase public expenditures in 
agriculture to support more rapid economic growth. Results from recent studies on long term 
growth and poverty trends among African countries suggest that most of these countries would 
have to raise public sector expenditures in agriculture by double-digit rates of growth on an annual 
basis in order to significantly reduce poverty during the current decade (Badiane and Ulimwengu, 
2009). Such a rapid expansion of public investment in agriculture is beyond the means of many of 
these countries and even with that level of investment, average poverty rates would still remain 
high at around 30 percent.  
High rates of poverty coupled with increasingly open political systems will lead to increasing 
pressure on governments to raise future spending on social services in an effort to address the 
burden of widespread poverty. In fact, public expenditures in each of the social sectors (health, 
education, and social protection) not only already exceed expenditures in agriculture but have also 
risen much faster over the last three decades. Given the tight budget constraints faced by African 
countries, future success in accelerating agricultural growth and reducing poverty will depend on 
the ability to maximize the impact of resources spent in the social sectors on labour productivity 
among farm households. This is only possible if countries shift from treating social services as 
entitlements with possible long-term effects on growth to treating them as public investments that 
can yield significant short-term impacts in a variety of sectors, including agriculture. This in turn 
requires the recognition that the mix of public expenditures on a given social service is not growth 
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neutral and that different categories of expenditures may affect labour productivity differently 
(Badiane and Ulimwengu, 2013).  
In this paper, we examine the relationship between health expenditures, health outcomes, and 
agricultural labour productivity among rural households in Tanzania. Administratively, Tanzania 
is sub-divided into 21 administrative regions and 133 councils (both district and municipal) with 
10,342 villages (MOHSW, 2009). Local Government Authorities (LGAs) at the district level are 
responsible for delivering public health services, primary education, agricultural extension, water 
supply systems, and local road maintenance (United Republic of Tanzania, 2006). As in many sub-
Saharan African countries, the majority of the poor population in Tanzania is located in rural areas 
and depends upon agriculture for their livelihood. In Tanzania, around 80 percent of people are 
employed in agriculture4 and economic growth has not translated into a steep decline in poverty 
(Pauw & Thurlow, 2010). The government has striven to address poverty through investments in 
various social services including public health and education, agricultural extension, and 
infrastructure, and it appears some changes have taken place. For example, the Primary Health 
Care Service Development Programme increased primary health service provisions through staff 
and supply increases and upgraded facilities (MOHSW, 2009).  
The Centre for Research on Poverty Alleviation (REPOA), a Tanzanian non-governmental 
organization, noted that from 1978 to 2005, infant mortality was halved, with similar reductions 
in under-five mortality, partially as a result of prevention and treatment of malaria, increased 
Vitamin A supplementation, immunization, and better nutrition (REPOA, 2006). For future health 
and development strategies, it is important to know the extent to which broader improvements in 
health outcomes are associated with higher levels of productivity among poor rural households 
and what role different categories of public expenditures on health have played.  
In an extensive review, Paternostro et al. (2007) note that despite the analyses of the linkages 
between expenditures and growth or poverty, a lack of empirical validation (due to both the time 
lags associated with the impacts and the data constraints) limits the ability to identify poverty-
focused public policies. Estimating these relationships is also complicated by endogeneity (Headey 
et al., 2010). This often leads to inconclusive results that are difficult to use for formulating policy 
and funding actions. For example, previous studies note that while better health capital indicators 
                                                 
4 United Republic of Tanzania Website: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/agriculture.html; accessed October 9, 2013. 
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can increase growth rates in Africa by 22 to 30 percent, results have been mixed when looking at 
health care expenditures and outcomes (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2007).  
We analyze the impact of public health expenditures on health outcomes among farm households, 
and in turn how changes in health outcomes affect agricultural productivity. We use household-
level data on agricultural production and health outcomes as well as public expenditure data at the 
district level. We use a novel approach that tackles both heterogeneity in production technologies 
and endogeneity of the marginal productivities of inputs. The paper also addresses the challenge 
of measuring overall household health status as well as the heterogeneity in the link between health 
and agricultural factor productivity. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
II.2 describes the model that is used to assess the impact of health expenditures on household level 
health status and productivity. It is followed in Section II.3 by a description of the dataset. Section 
II.4 discusses the findings showing how different categories of district level health expenditures 
impact health outcomes among farm households and how that in turn affects the marginal 
productivity of labour and other inputs in the same households. Section II.5 concludes with policy 
implications and suggestions for the future research agenda.  
 
II.2. Modeling Social Expenditures and Agricultural Productivity in Tanzania  
 
Empirical studies provide evidence of how health constraints can impede agricultural productivity, 
both in the short and long term. In addition to directly impacting the quantity of labour available 
for agriculture, illness also lowers the quality and productivity of labour. Health issues and 
constraints, particularly malaria, have been found to have a negative and significant impact on 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in Africa (Cole & Neumayer, 2006; Strauss & Thomas, 1998). 
Health constraints have also been shown to lead to a shift in cropping patterns (Asenso-Okyere et 
al., 2009) and can influence adoption decisions for new agricultural technology (Ersado et al., 
2004).   
While public expenditures represent the primary vehicle through which public policy impacts 
health outcomes, there are few studies that capture linkages between expenditures, health 
outcomes, and productivity. Where they exist, such studies evaluate expenses and health outcomes 
at the macroeconomic level (see Anganwu & Erhijakpor, 2007 and Benin et al., 2009 for detailed 
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reviews). Examples include the study by Baldacci et al. (2004), which shows that an increase in 
health spending of 1 percent of GDP translates into an increase of 0.6 percentage points in under-
five child survival, especially in low-income countries. Others have analyzed the impact of public 
expenditures on mortality or morbidity or, at the aggregate level, on rural poverty through effects 
on total factor productivity and incomes (Fan, Hazell, and Haque, 2000; Fan, Hazell, and Thorat, 
2000; and Fan and Zhang, 2008). A few studies have explicitly modeled either the relationship 
between health and agricultural productivity by incorporating a health variable into the production 
function (Pitt & Rosenzweig, 1986), or the link between public expenditures and productivity 
(Benin et al., 2009).   
The relationship between agricultural efficiency and health has also been investigated in the 
literature using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Ulimwengu, 2009; Phillips & Marble, 1986). 
While estimating efficiency in production can provide additional information about the production 
constraints, there are some weaknesses associated with these approaches. The models require 
specification of a functional form that can be too restrictive to mirror the actual conditions. Without 
this implied structure, they can be very sensitive to measurement error (Saradifis, 2002). This type 
of efficiency analysis can also ignore important farm-level differences between technology and 
production possibilities by assuming a homogeneous production frontier for all households 
(Mundlak, 1988). Others have augmented the human capital portion of the production function 
and/or allowed changes to labour efficiency (Teal, 2011), used social indicators as determinants 
of an unobservable latent variable (Baldacci et al., 2003), or estimated government expenditures 
as direct determinants of agricultural growth and poverty (Fan et al., 2002).  
Expanding empirically on these previous estimation methods, we develop and implement a model 
to link directly different categories of public expenditures on health services to household health 
outcomes, and estimate the resulting impact on the marginal productivity of labour and other 
agricultural inputs. The approach is novel in that it accounts for both heterogeneity in production 
technologies and endogeneity of the marginal productivities of inputs. It is based on the assumption 
that government expenditures on social services such as health affect agricultural production 
directly but also indirectly through decisions regarding the use of inputs and adoption of 
technology. To try to capture both, we first adopt the framework developed by Mundlak et al. 
(1997) used to model farmers’ decision processes. Mundlak et al. (2008) argue that the wide 
variation in the estimation results of agricultural production functions may be partially due to the 
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exclusion of factors representing the political, economic, or physical environment (“states”), which 
have both direct and indirect effects on farm production and decisions. 
We also account for the challenge in measuring overall household health status as a latent variable, 
which cannot be observed directly. We use observable proxies for health (the number of household 
members without the common illnesses of malaria, diarrhea, fever, and long-term illness in the 
past month) to capture overall household health status, which is not directly observable. To account 
for possible measurement error, a confirmatory factor analysis is used to estimate the relationship 
between the set of observed health indicators (the proxies) and the latent health variable using the 
structural equation model (SEM) approach. 
We use the generalized mixed linear model (GMLM) to implement empirically the state variable 
approach. The GMLM estimation procedure allows for technological heterogeneity and 
endogenous marginal productivity of agricultural inputs. Technological heterogeneity within a 
country is particularly important for countries that have transferred management of public 
expenditures to lower levels of government (Gupta et al., 2002), as in Tanzania. To address issues 
related to potentially endogenous inputs (including health), a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) 
approach is used, following Wooldridge (2010) and Terza et al. (2008), as discussed in more detail 
later in the paper. 
To implement the state variable approach, input elasticities can either be calculated from observed 
factor shares (assuming allocative and technical efficiency) or from fitting a production function 
that is simultaneously determined by both observed inputs and state variables (Fulginiti & Perrin, 
1993).  As the assumption of efficiency is likely too restrictive for rural households in Tanzania, 
we take the second approach, discussed in more detail below.   
To efficiently estimate the health production function, following Baldacci et al. (2003), we model 
health status using a latent variable approach in the form of a general covariance structure model 
or SEM:  
                                                                    𝐻 = 𝜑𝑀 + 𝜁                                                            (1a) 
 𝐷 = 𝜗𝐻 +   𝜀                                                 (1b) 
where 𝜑 are parameters linking the latent health status variable (H) to the exogenous variables 
(𝑀), including categories of district level government expenditure on health services, with 𝜁 
specified as random disturbances. The observed heath proxy variables (D) are linked to the latent 
health variable through the matrix of parameters 𝜗 as specified in equation (1b). 
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Following Mundlak et al. (1997), we assume that each farm chooses a production technology 𝑌𝑗(𝑋) 
with production techniques (j), where (X) is a vector of constrained (k) and unconstrained (v) inputs 
so that 𝑌𝑗(𝑋) ∋ 𝑣, 𝑘. Depending on the choice of (j), each farm selects the profit-maximising 
optimal level of inputs (X) for each technique (j). Assuming that the production function is 
conditional on the state variables, in our case the health status variable (H), implies that changes 
in (H) will lead to changes in the optimal level of inputs (x*) as well as the chosen technology Y 
(x*,H). It then follows that the slope (𝛽) and intercept (Γ) are both determined by (H), as shown 
in Equation 2, where the dependent variable (Y) represents agricultural production and 𝜀 the 
stochastic component (Mundlak et al. 1997). 
                                              𝑙𝑛 𝑌 = Γ (𝐻) + β(𝐻, 𝑥) + 𝜀                                                            (2) 
Assuming heterogeneity in production technologies across locations, our empirical model takes 
the form described below, in which h and d represent the household identifier and district location, 
respectively, and 𝑙 the different inputs that are used. In order to capture the impact of the natural 
environment on household production, we have added precipitation (𝑝𝑑) to the list of exogenous 
variables. The parameter 𝛾1𝑙 reflects the impact of state variables, in this case the health status of 
households in a given district, on the marginal productivity of individual inputs. 
                 𝑌ℎ = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽ℎ𝑙𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑙 + 𝑏?̂?𝑑 + 𝛽𝑑𝑝𝑑 + 𝛿𝑑𝑝𝑑
2 + 𝜀ℎ                    (3) 
  
     𝛽ℎ𝑙  = 𝛾0𝑙 + 𝛾1𝑙?̂?𝑑 + 𝑢ℎ𝑙                                                                  (4) 
 
The health data used to estimate equations (1a) and (1b) are from the 2008 Household Budget 
Survey and the production data used to estimate equations (3) and (4) are from the 2007/08 
Agricultural Census. Because the two data sets, although from the same districts, are not based on 
identical household samples, district-level expected values of health outcomes (?̂?𝑑), calculated as 
the average factor scores5 of household members living in the district, obtained from (1a) and (1b) 
above, are used as the state variables in equation (4) to estimate the marginal productivity (𝛽ℎ𝑙) of 
each input (𝑥ℎ𝑙). 
                                                 
5 This calculation method is an analogous to regression scoring where the means of the latent variables are 
conditional on the observed variables. 
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II.3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
The agricultural production data we use is from the 2007/08 Agricultural Census, a nationally 
representative survey covering 52,594 households in Tanzania for the agricultural year that ran 
from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010).  Given the 
variety of crops produced on a single plot in Tanzania, we estimate the value of production as 
shown in Equation (5): 
                                                          𝑌ℎ = ∑ (𝑦ℎ𝑐
𝑛
𝑐=1 ∙ 𝑃𝑐 ∙ 𝑎ℎ𝑐)                                                                   (5) 
Here, (𝑌ℎ) is the value of aggregate production for each household (h), where 𝑦ℎ𝑐 is the quantity 
of production of crop c, 𝑃𝑐 is its price, and 𝑎ℎ𝑐 is the share of land allocated to that crop.
6 We 
account for differences in land use and price heterogeneity by computing the value of aggregate 
production as the weighted sum of the value of all crops produced by the household, using the 
share of acreage for each crop as weights.7  
We treat aggregate agricultural output as defined here as a function of weather or the natural 
environment (represented by the level of precipitation), labour (measured by the number of adult 
household members that are involved in agriculture as their main activity), the number of traction 
animals, the amount spent on inorganic fertilizer, and the acres of land planted. In order to address 
endogeneity issues, labour and fertilizer are instrumented as discussed in detail in the next section. 
We use satellite-collected daily precipitation data (in millimeters per day) from the Climate 
Prediction Center of the US National Weather Service (NOAA, 2010) that have been averaged 
over the district observation points for the agricultural year. We only have data on quantity of 
organic fertilizer used for 25 percent of households, so we use the amount spent on inorganic 
fertilizer. 
In addition to the agricultural variables, data on health and household location are taken from the 
2008 Household Budget Survey (National Bureau of Statistics, 2011). For the latent-variable 
approach, the numbers of household members not affected by malaria, diarrhea, fever or long-term 
                                                 
6 Prices were not available for Tanzania for the range of crops produced. To be able to aggregate across all crops, we 
created the value of production for crops without Tanzania price data using an average of the prices from 
surrounding countries that produced these crops (Burundi, Cameroon, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, and Tunisia) (FAO, 
2012).   
7 The weights are crop prices but these prices are not location-specific; to account for heterogeneity among prices, 
we multiply the price for each crop with the area share of the respective crop and use the resulting adjusted price 
as weight in calculating aggregate production for each household.  
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illness over the past month were used as health indicators. These illnesses are the most documented 
illnesses in this dataset as well as in previous studies for Tanzania (Koestle, 2002). Summary 
statistics for these household-level variables are presented in Table II.A.1 in the Appendix.  
Data on district expenditures for a range of categories are compiled and available online from the 
National Bureau of Statistics (Local Government Finance Working Group, 2011). For health 
expenditures, we use only those categories which are likely to be directly related to service delivery 
(personal salaries for employees and development grants that are funded).8 As districts vary greatly 
in size, we calculate the district-level average expenditures per capita for 2005 and 2006, using 
population data from the Population Census for 2002/03, the most recent compiled source of 
population data for Tanzania (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006). Table II.1 presents the amount 
of spending in Tanzanian shillings (TSH) per capita.9  
 
Table II.1:  District Expenditure Data 
District Expenditures (TSH) per Capita (Mean 2005 & 2006) 
Expenditure Category Mean Standard Deviation 
Health Personal Salaries 7,107 14,550 
Health Development Grants 2,576   7,556 
Health Total Spending 13,433 30,524 
 Source:  Local Government Finance Working Group (2011) 
 
II.4. Results 
 
We first present the findings regarding household health status outcomes, followed by a discussion 
of the results from the estimation of the production function and its determinants, including health 
outcomes. We finish with a discussion of the linkages between health expenditures, health status, 
and the marginal productivity of labour, land, and fertilizer. 
                                                 
8  In Tanzania, past research has estimated that 88 percent of charges in health that are not directly for development 
or salaries (termed ‘other charges’) are diverted away from the intended purposes (Sundet, 2004). 
9 On March 28, 2013, TSH 1,577.42 = $1 (OANDA, 2013). In the estimations, millions of TSH per capita are used for 
scaling purposes and interpretation.   
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II.4.A. Impact of Health Expenditures on Health Status Outcomes 
 
As mentioned above, we use all proxy indicators concurrently to estimate households’ health 
status. To account for possible measurement error, a confirmatory factor analysis is used to 
estimate the relationship between the set of observed health indicators (the proxies) and the latent 
health variable, which is presented in the lower half of Table II.2 using the structural equation 
model (SEM) approach. The top half of Table II.2 links the exogenous variables, including 
categories of district level government expenditure on health services and household 
characteristics to the latent health variable. 
In addition, because we need to set at least one loading parameter to one (1) (the one chosen to 
define "health status"), we fix each of them alternatively, as shown in the lower half of Table II.2. 
This constraint is necessary to scale the latent variable, making it equal to each disease indicator 
in the absence of measurement error. We also allow controls for other factors that may influence 
health outcomes, including access to a health center, education, and household infrastructure 
characteristics (floor material, toilet, garbage disposal, and water access). Given the fact that some 
of these variables may be correlated, we tested for multicollinearity but found no evidence of it.10  
The results presented in Table II.2 indicate that all health variables have a significant effect on 
overall household heath status, thus justifying our use of several health indicators instead of a 
single symptom or disease. On the expenditure side, the results suggest that only salary 
expenditures have a significant impact on health outcomes. The perhaps surprising insignificance 
of development spending may reflect the currently low expenditure levels, which may not have 
reached a critical level in order to have a significant impact on health status. Our results for salaries 
suggest a quadratic relationship between health status and expenditures (the existence of a 
minimum amount from which health expenses start improving farmers’ health).11 That threshold 
is TSH 57,351 per capita (approximately US$3612 per capita per year) for long-term health, and is 
similar for the other diseases: TSH 57,323 for malaria, TSH 57,308 for diarrhea, and TSH 57,317 
                                                 
10 We do this using the Klein Variance Inflation Factors criterion and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix. The 
condition number (the square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest eigenvalue) of 6.4 is far below the 
threshold values of 15, when concerns about multicollinearity arise, and 30, where multicollinearity concerns 
become serious (see Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000). Also, the largest value of the variance inflation factors is less 
than 10, with a mean value of 1.2. There is thus no evidence of multicollinearity. 
11 The maximum/minimum is the value of x that solves 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
= 0.  
   In this specification (y=a+bx+cx*x), the solution is given by 𝑥 = −
𝑏
2𝑐
. 
12 All dollar amounts are in US dollars.  
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for fever. Because each of the diseases contributes differently to overall household health status 
and salary expenditures are not disaggregated by disease, we had to compute a composite 
minimum health salary expenditure threshold, using the rescaled values of the coefficients for the 
four disease indicators in Table II.2 as weights. The results yield a threshold amount of TSH 57,325 
per capita, which is exceeded by observed salary expenditures only in two urban districts, Musoma 
and Iringa, accounting for about 10% of all households. However, more than a quarter of all 
households are located in districts that have per capita salary expenditures that are only 4% below 
the threshold. This suggests that there are still important funding gaps that need to be filled if the 
country is to reach the point where health expenditures start yielding significant impacts on 
farmers’ health status.  
The results in the top half of the table also highlight the importance of many other factors in 
determining the health status of rural households. These include the positive relationship between 
the accessibility of health centers and health outcomes, as shown in the literature (Schoeps et al., 
2011; Lavy et al., 1996). Similarly, the results also show that improvement of housing conditions 
such as purchasing mosquito nets and sanitation measures in the home (proper disposal of garbage) 
tend to improve health status. Education (household members who have completed secondary 
school) is also shown to have a positive impact on health, as pointed out in the literature (Berger 
and Leigh, 1989; Grossman, 1975; Schultz, 1990). We now turn to the estimation of the production 
function linking health status to productivity, the next step in assessing the role played by health 
expenditures in determinant productivity levels among farm households. 
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Table II.2:  Health Expenditures and Health Outcome  
Variables No Long-Term   
Illness 
No Malaria No Diarrhea No fever 
Health Development/capita 3.619 2.803 3.826 2.369 
 (5.76) (4.46) (6.08) (3.77) 
Health Development/capita² -83.380 -64.580 -88.140 -54.570 
 (104.60) (81.02) (110.60) (68.47) 
Health Salaries/capita -12.17*** -9.43*** -12.86*** -7.97*** 
 (3.65) (2.83) (3.85) (2.39) 
Health Salaries/capita² 106.1** 82.21** 112.2** 69.47** 
 (51.23) (39.68) (54.16) (33.54) 
Rural 0.138*** 0.107*** 0.145*** 0.090*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Time to nearest Dispensary/ 
Health Center/Hospital 
-0.017** -0.013** -0.018** -0.011** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Dispose of garbage (dummy for 
use of rubbish bin) 
0.055* 0.042* 0.058* 0.036* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Education 0.054** 0.042** 0.057** 0.035** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Floor material (dummy for earth)  0.024 0.018 0.025 0.015 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Housing improved (mosquito net, 
proper floor, etc.)  
0.293*** 0.227*** 0.310*** 0.192*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
No toilet  -0.024 -0.018 -0.025 -0.016 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Time to water for consumption -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Table II.2 continued     
Variables 
No Long-
Term Illness 
No 
Malaria 
No 
Diarrhea 
No  
Fever 
Measurement Model /Health Status Indicators 
Members without long-term 
health problems 
1 1.291*** 0.946*** 1.528*** 
0 (0.009) (0.003) (0.013) 
Members without malaria 0.775*** 1 0.733*** 1.183*** 
 (0.006) 0 (0.005) (0.012) 
Members without fever 0.654*** 0.845*** 0.619*** 1 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 0 
Members without diarrhea 1.057*** 1.365*** 1 1.615*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) 0 (0.013) 
Variances     
Health status 0.962*** 0.577*** 1.075*** 0.412*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) 
No long-term health problems 0.0947*** 0.0947*** 0.0947*** 0.0947*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
No fever  0.282*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
No malaria 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
No diarrhea 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
chi² 1778 1778 1778 1778 
Log Likelihood 121082 121082 121082 121082 
N 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Standard errors in parentheses   *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
II.4.B. Determinants of Agricultural Production not related to Health 
 
We estimate the production function first without state (health) variables, allowing us to compare 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates with the random effects (RE) estimates. The OLS 
estimation is done with and without precipitation. To correct endogeneity problems in inputs, the 
likely endogenous inputs (labour and fertilizer) are instrumented. We use both two-stage prediction 
substitution (2SPS) as well as two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approaches when estimating the 
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production function. The two-stage instrumental variable method of replacing the endogenous 
variables with their predicted values obtained from a first and separate regression (2SPS) can lead 
to incorrect standard errors and in case of nonlinearity, cause inconsistent estimations. The (2SRI) 
approach includes the first-stage residuals in the second stage to help control for this (for more 
details see Terza, Basu, and Rathouz, 2008; Vella, 1993; Garen, 1984 and Wooldridge, 2010). We 
first estimate versions of the model without state (health) variables and without interaction terms, 
as shown in Table II.3.13 We then estimate versions that are nonlinear in the endogenous variables 
(regressions in Table II.4), applying the (2SRI) approach.  
In all versions of the model, labour is instrumented as men 15-55 years old and male household 
head. Fertilizer is instrumented as: distance to the source of fertilizer; the village price index for 
fertilizer (computed as the mean of the prices faced by individuals in the village); literacy of the 
household head. These instruments are good predictors of the endogenous variables in the first-
stage equations (R-squares around 0.25 and 0.36 respectively for labour and fertilizer, with all the 
coefficients significant). We applied several diagnostic tests which confirm the appropriateness of 
instrumental variables, as reported at the bottom of Table II.A2.14 The Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald 
F statistic eliminates concerns that instruments used are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous variables and the Hansen J eliminates concerns that instruments are correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest, which would yield estimates that are biased in the same 
direction as OLS and possibly not consistent.   
The same instrumental variable approach is also used to correct for the possible endogeneity of 
health variables (as geographical allocation of health expenditures may be associated with health 
outcomes). In this case, the corresponding residuals from the structural health equation in the SEM 
are included in the production function along with the district-level expected values of health using 
factor scores from the SEM. The results of the first-stage regressions and the relevant tests are 
presented Table II.A2 in the Appendix. Results of the estimations of the production function are 
reported in Table II.3 with additional results in Table II.A3 and II.A4 where all inputs and outputs 
                                                 
13 In these linear cases, like 2SPS, 2SRI is identical to the popular two-stage least squares (2SLS) (or linear 
instrumental variables (IV)) method and is, therefore, consistent (Terza, Basu, and Rathouz, 2008). 
14 The Hansen J test of over-identification provides information on the relevance of the instrument and it fails to find 
evidence of violation of the exclusion restriction with p-value well above 0.1. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) F statistic 
performs a weak identification test (in contrast to the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, which performs an under-id 
test) and is appropriate in the case of heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in regression (See Stock and Yogo, 
2005 and Baum, Schaer and Stillman, 2003 for details).   
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are logged values and estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. The results show that all input 
elasticities are significant and positive. Compared to other inputs, the elasticity of production with 
respect to land is the highest (0.660). The value of the land elasticity is consistent with the 
proposition that agricultural growth in sub-Saharan Africa is driven primarily by land expansion 
(Dethier and Effenberger, 2011). The elasticities with respect to labour and other inputs are also 
significant and positive across all models. 
Precipitation appears to have a nonlinear relationship with production (too much precipitation in 
one area during a season can be detrimental to crop production). The results suggest a tipping point 
of 851 millimeters of precipitation15 using the preferred RE model (Table II.3) beyond which 
additional precipitation begins to have negative effects on agricultural production. This tipping 
point is based on aggregate output and thus does not take into account crop specific responses to 
rainfall, nor does it address issues related to rainfall variability. Two thirds of all households in the 
districts covered by the study fall between the minimum level of precipitation of 451.2 mm and 
the tipping point. This nonlinear and significant relationship between climatic variables and 
agricultural productivity has been documented elsewhere in the literature (Maddison et al., 2006; 
Gommes, 1999). The results here highlight the necessity of controlling for agro-climatic conditions 
as well as other sources of heterogeneity when estimating input elasticities. In the next section, we 
expand estimates of the production function to include health indicators as state variables, in line 
with equations (3) and (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The tipping point is the value of rainfall for which agricultural production reaches its maximum level. It is the value 
of x that solves 
𝑑𝑦
𝑑𝑥
= 0. In our specification (lny=a+blnx+clnx*lnx), the solution is given by 𝑥 = 𝑒
−𝑏
2𝑐 . 
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Table II.3: Production Estimation 
VARIABLES 2SLS 2SPS 
RE Model with 
Precipitation 2SRI 
Land 0.62*** 0.66*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) 
Labour  0.28*** 0.15** 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Fertilizer  0.04*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Animals 0.17*** 0.26*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Precipitation  31.34*** 
  (1.57) 
Precipitation²  -2.32*** 
  (0.12) 
Labour residual  -0.03* 
  (0.02) 
Fertilizer residual  -0.05*** 
  (0.02) 
Constant 11.80*** -93.96*** 
 (0.06) (5.29) 
District FE/RE YES  
Observations 47582 41,968 
Number of groups  107 
Adj R² 0.360  
Chi² Wald  1305 
Log Likelihood   -79666 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
2SPS: labour and fertilizer instrumented (specification in Table II.A2 in appendix 1); standard 
errors adjusted;  
2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion  
  
 
II.4.C. Health Status and Agricultural Productivity  
 
Following Equations (3) and (4), the agricultural production function at the household level was 
estimated using a generalized mixed linear model, with the results presented in Table II.4. The 
estimation incorporates the expected values of health measures estimated from equations (1a) and 
(1b), together with the intercepts and indirect effects for health. To allow for comparison, the 
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results without state variables (the RE model from Table II.3) are also presented in the first column 
of Table II.4 (No State). As noted above, a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach is applied, 
but the interaction terms between residuals and the inputs were not significant and did not improve 
the quality of the model, so they were not included.  
The results in Table II.4 confirm the impact of health outcomes on the magnitude and significance 
of input elasticities, both separately and when interacted with state variables. It appears that all 
health indicators have direct and indirect effects on productivity. These results are significant even 
after controlling for variation in precipitation. In addition, there are significant differences among 
most inputs when it comes to the influence of particular diseases. 
 
Table II.4: Production Function Estimation with and without State Variables 
VARIABLES No State No Long-Term 
Health 
No Malaria No Diarrhea 
Land 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Labour i 0.15** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Fertilizer i 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Animals 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Precipitation 31.34*** 34.61*** 35.74*** 34.33*** 
 (1.57) (1.67) (1.67) (1.67) 
Precipitation² -2.32*** -2.55*** -2.63*** -2.52*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Health Intercept  2.50*** 3.62*** 2.28*** 
  (0.15) (0.21) (0.14) 
Land*Health  0.05 0.06 0.04 
  (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) 
Labour i *Health  -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 
  (0.17) (0.21) (0.16) 
Fertilizer i *Health  -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04*** 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Animals*Health  0.04 0.05 0.03 
  (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) 
Health residual  -2.42*** -2.70*** -2.35*** 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) 
Labour residual -0.03* -0.05** -0.05*** -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fertilizer residual -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
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 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -93.96*** -106.0*** -109.9*** -105.0*** 
 (5.29) (5.64) (5.65) (5.64) 
Observations 41,968 38,799 38,799 38,799 
Number of groups 107    
Wald Chi² 1317 1511 1522 1507 
Log Likelihood -93240 -73943 -73929 -73946 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
i :instrumented using the specification shown in the appendix 
Fever is excluded because it appeared to be strongly correlated with all other health variables 
 
To further understand the results in Table II.4, we employ a series of metrics developed by Fulginiti 
and Perrin (1993). The first metric, presented in Table II.5, is the average production elasticity 
with respect to inputs from Equation (3). The production function elasticities add up to around 
1.15 in the version of the model without state variables and 1.18 based on the different models 
with state variables (Table II.5), suggesting the possibility of increasing returns to scale.16  Sarris 
et al. (2006), for instance, found some evidence of increasing returns to scale using survey data 
from Ruvuma and Kilimanjaro, two cash crop growing regions of Tanzania. Their findings suggest 
marginal products that are higher than factor cost for capital and intermediate inputs. They found 
the same for land in Kilimanjaro17 but not in Ruvuma. In contrast, they found the marginal products 
of labour used on farms to be much lower than prevailing market wages. 
We see that all elasticities shift when we account for health status. In general, better health 
(especially no malaria) has a positive impact on labour productivity as well as on fertilizer and 
animal productivity. The labour elasticity, estimated at 0.18 with no state variables included, rises 
to 0.22 with inclusion of the long-term health indicator, 0.22 with the no-malaria indicator, and 
0.21 with the no-diarrhea indicator. The results, however, suggest a negative impact of good health 
on land productivity, which is not what one would expect a priori. To exclude the possibility that 
the negative impact may result from interaction between variables, we estimated the production 
function using a translog function that controls for interaction effects between inputs. We still find 
a negative impact of good health on the marginal productivity of land, as shown in Table II.A3 in 
the annex.  
                                                 
16 The hypothesis of constant returns to scale was tested and rejected, but not strongly (the probability value of 
0.082 is not considered low enough to justify absolute rejection), suggesting a certain ambiguity with respect to 
returns to scale. 
17 In this region, productive and cash crop land is in short supply. 
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One possible explanation may be that households with poorer health status are obliged to reduce 
the scale of activities, which may lead to the prioritization of higher productivity plots, while 
healthier households would be tempted to expand land use beyond the limit of what they can 
manage efficiently or into less fertile areas. In other words, this result may be a reflection of 
diminishing returns to land. Another possible but less likely explanation is that households with 
better health status would tend to diversify more and thus farm less intensively at the margin, 
leading to lower productivity. However, if correct, this hypothesis implies that good health is a 
major determinant of income diversification.     
 
Table II.5:  Marginal Productivity of Inputs   
Model Land Labour Fertilizer Animal 
No State 0.665 0.178 0.050 0.254 
No Long Term Health Problems 0.649 0.216 0.054 0.257 
No Malaria 0.647 0.218 0.056 0.256 
No Diarrhea 0.651 0.214 0.054 0.259 
Test for return to scale: Model with no state variable from Table II.3 
H0: Land+Labour+Fertilizer+Animal  = 1 Land+Labour+Fertilizer+Animal -1 Std. Err. P-value 
Chi2 = 3.03 0.113 0.065 0.082 
Source:  Author’s calculations;   
Note:  Square roots of variances for all elasticities presented are less than 0.005  
 
Overall the results show that there is bias in the estimation of production elasticities if no account 
is taken for state variables such as household health outcomes and factors that affect them, such as 
public expenditures, as well as other household and location characteristics. A more complete 
picture of the impact of health status on production is provided by the elasticity of production with 
respect to the individual health variables. Following Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), based on 
equations (3) and (4), with both (Y) and (H) in log form, and where (H) represents health status 
variables, the elasticity is: 
                                                 
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝐻
= ∑ 𝛾1𝑙𝑥𝑙𝑙 + 𝑏                                              (6) 
The production elasticities (calculated at the mean point) are 2.4 for long-term disease, 2.2 for 
diarrhea, and 3.5 for malaria. The elasticity estimates are all positive (overall production increases 
with improvement in health status) and the effect is highest for malaria. The values of the estimates 
suggest that agricultural production among the households covered by the study increases by 3.5% 
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for every 1% increase in the number of household members not affected by malaria.  A 1% increase 
in the number of household members not suffering from long-term illness raises production by 
2.4%.  
These findings suggest both the need and scope for careful targeting of public health expenditures, 
in particular, and the implementation of health programmes in general, to improve their impact on 
agricultural productivity. However, there is substantial variation in the productivity impact of 
health status variables across districts, shown in Figure II.1. The same pattern of district 
heterogeneity is observed in the elasticities of the marginal productivity of land and fertilizer with 
respect to health (see Figures II.A1 and II.A2 in the Appendix). It appears from the maps that the 
impact of health on the marginal productivity of land and fertilizer tends to be highest in the 
Eastern and Southeastern as well as Western and Northwestern regions, whereas the impact on 
labour productivity seems to be highest in the Central and Southwestern regions. The reasons for 
the variations could be linked to variability in knowledge of, or access to, technologies, which in 
turn could be the effect of institutional, infrastructural, and/or agro-ecological differences across 
Tanzania. Availability of data does not allow us to investigate the real reasons behind the 
technological diversity across regions here. But these findings highlight the shortcomings of the 
homogeneous technology assumption and, at least in the case of Tanzania, of policy 
recommendations based on national averages. 
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Figure II.1:  Elasticity of Marginal Productivity of Labour with Respect to Long-Term 
Illness 
        
                         Source: Authors’ calculation 
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II.V. Conclusion 
    
Combining the most recent nationally representative data on agricultural production and household 
characteristics available for Tanzania, we evaluate the impact of changes in specific categories of 
health expenditures at the district level on health status among farm households and the resulting 
effect on the marginal productivity of labour and other agricultural inputs among the same 
households. Overall, our findings suggest that the farm productivity responses to changes in the 
use of agricultural inputs are in part determined by the health status of farm households, and that 
such status is impacted differently by different categories of government expenditures on health 
services. In particular, the results suggest that salary expenditures (possibly through more 
personnel or better incentives) have a greater impact on health outcomes among rural households 
than expenditures on health development grants, at least to date.   
The findings show variation in effects for different health variables and expenditure categories, 
and across particular agricultural inputs. Overall, production elasticities respond more positively 
to the absence of malaria than long-term disease or diarrhea. These differences suggest that 
targeting malaria control may be more effective than focusing on overall morbidity or health status. 
In addition, looking at particular inputs and health indicators, it appears that the marginal 
productivity of labour is most affected by malaria incidence. In other locations, the significance of 
particular diseases may be different, implying that more investigation and analysis is necessary to 
target interventions and government spending appropriately. This is extremely important for 
countries needing to accelerate agricultural growth in the context of tight budget constraints and 
large-scale poverty. It is often the case that in these countries, government expenditures in the 
social sectors are considered lost to agriculture and budget allocation is perceived as a zero-sum 
game.  
Our findings indicate that, on the contrary, agriculture can benefit considerably from resources 
invested in the health sector. For that to happen, however, more attention needs to be paid during 
budget negotiations to the quality of health sector investments and their synergy with productivity 
goals in the agricultural sector, rather than the absolute level and share of the health sector budget. 
Such an approach would allow countries to exploit the significant potential suggested by our 
findings in leveraging investments in the health sector to effect greater impact on productivity 
growth among vulnerable farm households and thereby reduce poverty and improve food security, 
II. Government Spending and Productivity  
39 
 
not just in the rural areas. The large number of poor consumers that spend a large fraction of their 
incomes on food would also benefit from a rise in agricultural productivity through lower levels 
of, or slower increases in, local food prices. 
Finally, the geographical distribution of input elasticities with respect to health variables, even 
after controlling for variation in precipitation, seems to confirm technology heterogeneity across 
districts. As noted, this might reflect institutional, infrastructural, and/or agro-ecological 
differences not related to rainfall variations across Tanzania. It may also reflect differences in how 
the Tanzanian central and local governments have prioritized their infrastructure expenditures 
across districts to develop economically competitive regions. Given this, there may be estimation 
bias when marginal productivities of inputs are assumed to be constant across locations or farming 
households. Technology heterogeneity also means that technology policies and programmes based 
on national averages are likely to fail. 
To generate more comprehensive policy-making guidance, the analysis presented in the current 
paper could be expanded to include other types of diseases as well as more categories of 
expenditures in the health sector (in particular by households themselves), but also expenditures 
and outcomes in other social sectors such as education and social protection.  
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Appendix 
Table II.A1:  Summary Statistics 
 
Production  obs mean std dev min max 
production (area-weighted tsh) 51534 883,586 1,919,735 0 141,000,000 
labour 52594  2.05 1.44 0 22 
land (acres) 51534 3.9 5.1 0 160 
fert (tsh) 51534 18,527 76,550 0 1,767,000 
animals 52594  1 2.58 0 100 
Annual precipitation (mm) 42363 844 250 452 2115 
      
Instruments for labour and 
fertilizer       
Men between 15-55 years old 52594   2.54 1.60 0 31 
Distance to source of fertilizer 
(km) 52594   8.34 1.44 <1 9 
Sex of the head                                 52594 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Village fertilizer price index  52594 762 2400    - 34000 
Literacy of the head 52594 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Latent variables indicators (households) 
No malaria  10972 0.48 0.85 0 11 
No fever  10972 0.53 0.93 0 11 
No diarrhea  10972 0.72 1.07 0 13 
No long term health problems 10972 0.69 1.06 0 14 
Health equation variables      
      
Time to the nearest 
Dispensary/Health     
center/Hospital (minute) 
9819 9.42 10.42 - 98 
Rural  0.31 0.46 0 1 
Dispose of garbage (use of 
rubbish bin) 
9819 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Floor material (earth) 9819 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Improvement of housing 
condition (mosquito,   proper 
floor etc.) 
9819 0.22 0.41 0 1 
No toilet 9819 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Time to water for consumption 9819 1.94 1.20 0 4.07 
Education (# members who have 
completed secondary school) 
9819 0.14 0.44 0 5 
Source:  Authors’ calculation from NBS 2010 and 2011 
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             Table II.A2: Instruments for Labour and Fertilizer 
     
VARIABLES Joint  test  Labour Fertilizer 
Men between 15-55 years old  0.51*** 
(0.00) 
 
    
Distance to the source of 
fertilizer 
  -1.80*** 
(0.01) 
    
Village price index for 
fertilizer (/100) 
  -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
    
Sex of the head  0.18***  
  (0.00)  
Literacy of the head   0.42** 
(0.13) 
    
Constant  -0.11*** 17.43*** 
  (0.01) (0.09) 
    
Observations  52,594 51,534 
R-squared  0.25 0.36 
    
    
Diagnostic statistics 18    
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.84 0.10 0.91 
Kleibergen- Paap Wald rk F 
statistic  
139.84 184.66 335.05 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (p-value) 
0.00 0.00 0.02 
Endogeneity test (p-value) 
(H0: variable is exogenous) 
0.03 0.64 0.01 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 The robustness of the results is also tested by treating each of the variables alternatively as endogenous to test.  
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Table II.A3: Production Estimation with and without State Variables – Translog 
 
Variables No State Variable   No Long-Term Health 
Land 0.91*** 0.91*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Labour 0.49*** 0.52*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Fertilizer -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Animals 0.45*** 0.507*** 
 (0.05) (0.051) 
Precipitation 16.38*** 19.19*** 
 (1.55) (1.66) 
Precipitation² -1.23*** -1.42*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Labour residual -0.10*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Fertilizer residual -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Health  1.46*** 
  (0.16) 
Health residual  -1.43*** 
  (0.16) 
Land*  Land -0.17*** -0.17*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Labour* Labour -0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Fertilizer* Fertilizer 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Animals* Animals -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Land* Labour 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.017) 
Land* Fertilizer -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Land* Animals 0.08*** 0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Labour* Fertilizer -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Labour* Animals -0.11*** -0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
 Fertilizer* Animals -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
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Variables No State Variable   No Long-Term Health 
 Health*  Land  0.11 
  (0.11) 
 Health* Labour  0.01 
  (0.20) 
 Health* Fertilizer  0.00 
  (0.04) 
 Health* Animals  0.05 
  (0.16) 
 Health*  Land*  Land  -0.05*** 
  (0.01) 
 Health* Labour* Labour  -0.07 
  (0.09) 
 Health* Fertilizer* Fertilizer  -0.01 
  (0.00) 
 Health* Animals* Animals  -0.05 
  (0.07) 
 Health*  Land* Labour  -0.02 
  (0.05) 
 Health*  Land* Fertilizer  0.02** 
  (0.01) 
 Health*  Land* Animals  0.00 
  (0.05 
 Health* Labour* Fertilizer  0.01 
  (0.01) 
 Health* Labour* Animals  0.16* 
  (0.09) 
 Health* Fertilizer* Animals  0.00 
  (0.01) 
Constant -43.21*** -53.55*** 
 (5.22) (5.61) 
Observations 41,968  
Number of groups 107  
Wald Chi² 4731 4605 
Log Likelihood -78317 (72814) 
Note: We find that the impact on land is negative whether we used a Translog functional form 
for the production function or a Cobb-Douglas functional form. Elasticity of land in the model 
without health is 0.546, while it decreases in the model with health (0.536).   
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Many standard errors are reported using only two digits for simplicity of presentation but are 
not equal to 0. 
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Table II.A4:  Additional Production Model Specifications 
 
Note: Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
2SPS: labour and fertilizer instrumented using the specification in the appendix; standard errors 
adjusted 
2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES RE Model 2SPS 
 
OLS 2SRI 
Land 0.52*** 0.61*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) 
Labor  0.35*** 0.26*** 
 (0.03) (0.07) 
Fertilizer  0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Animals 0.24*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Precipitation    
   
Precipitation²   
   
Labor residual  -0.12*** 
  (0.03) 
Fertilizer residual  -0.08*** 
  (0.03) 
Constant 11.77*** 11.82*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
District FE/RE YES YES 
Observations 47582 47582 
Number of groups   
Adj R²  0.36 
Chi² Wald   1464.57  
Log Likelihood -65904.18  
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Figure II.A1—Elasticity of Marginal Productivity of Land with Respect to Long-Term 
Illness 
 
     
Source: Authors’calculation 
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Figure II.A2—Elasticity of Marginal Productivity of Fertilizer with Respect to Long-Term 
Illness 
 
    
 
Source: Authors’calculation 
 55 
 
 
 
  Chapter III 
 
 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus: 
Evidence from Senegal 
 
Authors 
 
Ligane Massamba Séne  
Momath Cissé  
 
This contribution has been published in International Journal of Health Economics and 
Management 
 
 
From 2001 to 2014 the journal was published as International Journal of Health Care Finance and 
Economics. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10754-015-9170-4 
 
Séne, L.M., and Cissé, M. (2015). Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty 
nexus: evidence from Senegal. International Journal of Health Economics and Management. 
Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 307-328.
III. Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus    
 
56 
 
 
 
Abstract    
 
Out-of-pocket payments are the primary source through which health expenditure is met in 
Senegal. However, these payments are financial burdens that lead to impoverishment when they 
become catastrophic. The purpose of this study is to cast light on the determinants of catastrophic 
household out-of-pocket health expenditures and to assess their implications on poverty. 
The 2011 poverty monitoring survey is used in this study. This survey aims to draw poverty 
profiles and to highlight the socio-economic characteristics of different social groups. 
In line with the concerns raised by the new Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM), poverty 
statistics are adjusted to take into account household health expenditures and to estimate their 
impoverishing effects. To identify the determinants of the magnitude of catastrophic health 
expenditure, we implement a seemingly unrelated equations system of Tobit regressions to take 
into account censoring through a conditional mixed-process estimator procedure. 
We identify major causes of catastrophic expenditures, such as the level of overall health spending, 
the expensiveness of health goods and services, the characteristics of health facilities, the health 
stock shocks, the lack of insurance, etc. Results show evidence that catastrophic health 
expenditures jeopardize household welfare for some people that fall into poverty as a result of 
negative effects on disposable income and disruption of the material living standards of 
households. 
Our findings warrant further policy improvements to minimize the financial risks of out-of-pocket 
health expenditures and increase the efficiency of health care system for more effective poverty 
reduction strategies. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Out-of-pocket expenditure, health care, health, Poverty.  
    
JEL Classification: I11, I140, I320.    
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III.1. Introduction   
 
Household out-of-pocket payments represent 95% of private expenditures and 55% of total health 
expenditures in Senegal. As in many developing countries, out-of-pocket payments are the primary 
source through which health expenditure is made, but there is no broader health financing system 
that offers financial risk protection. 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of household out-of-pocket health spending using 
the most recent household poverty monitoring survey in Senegal. The objective is to determine the 
distribution and the magnitude of out-of-pocket health spending and also to assess if these 
expenditures are determinant in pushing people into poverty. 
We want to shed new light on the distribution of poverty in Senegal using more complete and 
adequate measures that take into account the effect of certain categories of spending, such as 
household out-of-pocket health payments. The same idea might be applicable to payroll taxes or 
any other expenditure that risks impoverishing households. 
It is easily observable that these kinds of spending can be an investment in the long run but can 
also be burdens that may affect household welfare and economic status in the short run by messing 
up their spending structure and planning, which often leads to a reduction of the consumption of 
some goods in favor of medicines or an increase of household debt balance. In fact, borrowing 
money is a common method of dealing with health care costs among the poor in a country where 
health insurance is not wide-spread, especially in rural areas. 
The key figures related to the financing of the health system show that health expenditures 
represent only 8.3% of the state budget on average in the period 2000-2005. This is far from the 
Abuja Declaration goal of allocating 15 % of annual budgets to the health sector19. Also, the public 
funds are not mobilized effectively and not prioritized to reduce existing strong disparities across 
regions regarding budget allocation and health status. 
Meeting the World Health Organization’s standards for universal health care requires building an 
efficient and well-run health system (World Health Organization, 2014). Hence, there is a need to 
better understand financing sources of health services including households’ participation, their 
                                                 
19 In April 2001, heads of state of African Union countries met and pledged to set a target of allocating at least 15% 
of their annual budget to improve the health sector (United Nations, 2001). 
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implications in terms of poverty, and the characteristics that make people more vulnerable to 
catastrophic expenditures. 
The impact of household out-of-pocket health spending on disposable income is sometimes severe 
and this can be a reason why households fall into poverty over time. Subtracting these types of 
spending can help estimate the current household status and see how a shock on health status can 
affect household social and economic situations as proceeding this way offers a more accurate 
assessment of household resources. 
The distribution of poverty prevalence will be evaluated, in order to evaluate whether there is any 
bias when not considering household out-of-pocket health spending. 
Senegal’s economy has returned to growth during recent years. Gross domestic product (GDP) on 
average grew by around 5% since 1995. However, the recorded economic performance has not 
contributed as much as we hoped to improve the living conditions of populations and to cause a 
substantial reduction of poverty. Indeed, with a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.459 in 
2011, Senegal remains among the least developed countries despite the increase of Government 
willingness to fight poverty and food insecurity through several development programs 
implemented since the late 1900s, in addition to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
which call for a reduction of the proportion of people with less than US$1 per day. 
The official national poverty rate was estimated at 46.7% in 2011 according to the traditional 
measurement approach, with a small improvement in 2012, 5 out of 11 men (45.39%) living below 
the poverty line. However, as stated above, the official measure fails to isolate the burden effect 
of some range of expenses and might not provide an appropriate estimate of poverty. Indeed, the 
classical poverty measures will be compared to the alternative approach including the feature on 
health expenditures to see whether it presents a different picture or not. 
The health sector is among the Senegal Government’s priority sectors, as stated in its Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers. Significant efforts have been made but many actions and strategies are 
yet to be taken. The health system is characterized by a deficiency of personnel, insufficient 
infrastructures to cover the needs of the entire population, unequal distribution of workers and a 
lack of personnel motivation to work throughout the country, particularly in poor and remote areas. 
The literature on health expenses and economic status has grown over the past decade. Several 
studies in different countries have shown that many households have been impoverished by the 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending: India (Flores et al., 2008; Garg and Karan , 2009; Pal, 
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2012; Gupta and Joe, 2013), United States (Bennett KJ, Dismuke CE, 2010), Turkey (Yardim et 
al., 2010), China (Yi et al., 2009), Colombia (Amaya Lara and Ruiz Gómez, 2011), Zambia 
(Hjortsberg, 2003), Kenya (Chuma and Maina, 2012), Tanzania (Brinda et al., 2014). In a 
worldwide study, Xu et al. (2003) explored the determinants of catastrophic health expenditures 
in 59 countries and found that the share of government spending in total health spending was the 
primary explanation for the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditures. 
In a more recent work in India, Gupta and Joe (2013) suggested a multidimensional approach to 
see the incidence of catastrophic expenditure by integrating health expenditure with other social 
and economic parameters of deprivation. 
To our knowledge, no study in Senegal focuses on the distribution and determinants of catastrophic 
out-of pocket health expenditures or analyses their linkage to poverty. 
This study attempts to make a valuable contribution to this topic. The analysis aims not only to 
assess the impact of out-of-pocket health expenditure on poverty, but also to see the factors 
affecting the magnitude of the catastrophe, using an appropriate econometric method. Our 
approach integrates a measure based on the novel SPM (Supplemental Poverty Measure)20 that 
renewed interest on poverty measures into the country framework by using the most recent 
household survey in Senegal. 
The paper is organized as follows. The distribution of out-of-pocket health spending, some key 
figures on health, and the theoretical framework, will be presented firstly. Secondly, we will focus 
on the impacts of catastrophic household out-of-pocket health expenditures on poverty 
measurement, and we will finish with discussions on results and policy implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20SPM incorporates additional items such as tax payments and work expenses in its family resource estimates. Short, 
Kathleen , 2013 
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III.2. Catastrophic health expenditures and poverty measurement issue  
 
Our poverty measure subtracts out-of-pocket medical expenses before calculating the overall 
resources available for households. As stated earlier, our statistics are based on an SPM-like 
estimate that has recently been implemented by the Census Bureau in its objectives and attempts 
to calculate a more comprehensive measure of resources. The out-of-pocket health expenditures 
should be subtracted from total spending when measuring poverty in order to avoid 
underestimation of poverty rates.   
Out-of-pocket payment is considered as catastrophic and can impoverish households if exceeding 
40% of annual household non-food expenditure (Kawabata, Xu and Carrin, 2002; Xu and al., 2003; 
Karami et al., 2009). Another approach consists in using 10% as a critical threshold for the ratio 
between health expenditure and consumption expenditure (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Wagstaff 
and Van Doorlaer, 2003; Russell, 2004). 
Although some studies have analyzed the use of health care in Senegal and the determinants of 
health-seeking behavior (Fassin et al., 1988; Jütting, 2004, Lépine and Le Nestour, 2012), this 
study is an important contribution as it is the first analysis of household catastrophic out-of- pocket 
health expenditures and their impact on poverty. Health expenditures were found to be among the 
factors that drive households into poverty (Krishna 2006). 
Beyond absenteeism from work that causes illness, out-of-pocket health expenditures can have 
serious effects on household incomes and on their patrimony as households are sometimes 
compelled to sell some of theirs goods to afford medical goods and necessary services in order to 
cure their sick members. 
This study does not attempt to analyze the effect of illness on productivity and household welfare 
and neither does it aim to capture potential returns of health spending in the future, but it focuses 
on how some categories of health expenditure can affect the current households’ poverty status by 
diminishing their disposable incomes and therefore their capacity to purchase other essential 
goods. In this paper, out-of-pocket health expenditures correspond to consultation, medication, 
traditional medicine, medical examinations, hospitalization, transportation, laboratory tests / 
radiography, etc. 
We do not say that out-of-pocket health spending does not have any impact on welfare. This would 
be in contradiction to the Grossman theory of demand for health care as it can increase household 
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health stock and boost productivity mainly in future time periods. It has been proven that the 
marginal productivity of labour as well as land and fertilizers respond significantly to health (Allen 
et al., 2014). 
However, it should be recognized that for some categories of individuals, especially among the 
poor, at a certain critical threshold, these expenditures can became burdens and account for a very 
large portion of total income. Annual health expenditure is estimated to reach 2,461 CFA21 per 
capita with an important heterogeneity across location (1,764 CFA in rural areas; 3,857 CFA in 
the capital city Dakar and 2,766 CFA in other urban areas). 
Table III.1 depicts the distribution of frequentation of health services across strata.  In relation to 
the administrative structure of the country, the organizational structure of the health care system 
in Senegal is pyramidal and divided into three main levels: regional hospitals, district level health 
centers, and health posts. On the lowest level there are numerous health rooms that represent health 
points. The private sector and traditional medicine complete the system. 
Health posts are the most popular health facilities in all areas, especially in rural areas (54.2%). 
Hospitals follow, and are reported by 24.9% of the visitors at national level. Traditional 
practitioners are the least visited with less than 1% of individuals. 
Figure III.A1 in the Appendix illustrates through a map how the average propensity for 
consumption of health goods at household level varies across regions. It shows some spatial 
heterogeneity in health good consumption behavior. The Conflict-affected regions of Zinguinchor 
and Kedougou 22 have the highest average out-of-pocket expenditure share (6% and 5% 
respectively). In addition to expensive healthcare services and poor quality of care, this trend might 
be explained by the fact that much of the population in these regions remains isolated due to 
infrastructure conditions and remoteness, which may increase indirectly health related 
expenditures such as transportation when seeking for health care. 
 
 
     
                                                 
21 On May 23, 2014, 479.576 CFA Franc (African Financial Community) = US $1 (OANDA, 2014). This is the 
currency used in West Africa.  
22 The remote areas of these southern regions might be affected by the geographical imbalance of health workers 
and insufficient health facilities with the Casamance crisis (Separatist rebels of MFDC have been fighting for 
independence for the province of Casamance since 1982, despite peace agreements signed in 2004).  
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Table III.1: Distribution of the visits of health facilities across locations  
Areas  Dakar Other urban 
Areas 
Rural Areas Senegal 
Type of service  
 Hospital 26.6 40.8 18.6 24.9 
 Clinic 10.4 7.1 2.7 5.4 
 Health center 19.1 14.4 8.6 12.2 
 Health post 31.6 26.9 54.2 43.5 
 Health room 0.8 0.5 9.4 5.6 
 Marabout 1.2 1.6 2.9 2.2 
 Traditional 
Practitioner 
0.7 0.5 1 0.8 
 Other 9.8 8.2 2.7 5.4 
 Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Enquête de suivi de la pauvreté (ESPS), 2011 
Note: Health centers have generally one to two medical doctors and 15-20 people as part of the health staff. Health 
posts have four or five health workers and no medical doctor. Health rooms have one or two health agents and a 
midwife (Heyen-Perschon, 2005). 
 
Table III.2 indicates the occurrence of the different types of illnesses/symptoms that individuals 
have experienced during the four weeks preceding the survey. 
Malaria and Fever are the most common health problems and are reported in more than 25% of 
the cases. Nearly half of the respondents (45.9%) reported to have either malaria or fever and both 
may have occurred together. Besides malaria and fever, significant proportions of patients reported 
back or limb pain (21.8%), flu/cough/cold (17.4%) and stomachache (13.7%). The remaining 
health problems that are not presented have smaller proportions. 
Malaria has been a longstanding public health problem throughout Senegal. In fact, Senegal is one 
of the countries in Africa where malaria is endemic and represents the leading cause of morbidity 
and hospital mortality. Senegal accounts for an estimated 1% of all cases in the African Region of 
World Health Organization (World Health Organization, 2008). Despite large efforts most children 
die from malaria at home without receiving adequate treatment and protection. In 2008, only 31% 
of children under the age of 5 slept under a treated mosquito net (UNICEF, 2009). 
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Table III.2: Prevalence of illness  
Diseases Proportion 
Ear / nose / throat Problems 2.6 
Injury / Fracture / Sprain 3.2 
Diarrhea 4.0 
Dental problem 4.9 
Skin problem 4.9 
Voltage \ Diabetes 6.1 
Eye problem 6.6 
Stomachache 13.7 
Flu / cough / cold 17.4 
Back pain / limbs 21.8 
Fever 25.2 
Malaria 25.4 
Source: Enquête de suivi de la pauvreté (ESPS), 2011  
 
III.3. Methods  
 
III.3.1. Sampling and data collection and poverty measure 
 
The 2011 poverty monitoring survey is used in this study. This survey aims to draw the poverty 
profile and to highlight the socio-economic characteristics of the different social groups. 
It is a random sample survey at national level that uses a two-stage cluster sampling method with 
stratification in the first stage. Statistical units of the first stage are districts. Secondary units are 
constituted by households drawn from the district in the first stage. The overall survey sample 
covers 17,891 households with 5,953 households constituting the sub-sample from which the 
questionnaire on expenditures was administrated. Our study is based on this sub-sample. 
The poverty monitoring survey of 2011 is the second of its kind, after that of 2005-06. The 
collected information includes health, household spending, education, access to basic community 
services, etc. 
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The household consumption measured in local currency over the 12 months (or 30 days for food 
and some non-food consumption) preceding each interview is used to compute income estimation. 
Consumption spending includes all food and non-food expenditures made by households to 
purchase goods and services for meeting their needs. 
The poverty line used in the poverty measure is based on the cost of basic needs method. This 
method consists in determining a food poverty line that is designed in a manner in which each 
individual is able to buy food that can provide him (or her) a sufficient number of calories to live 
healthily. A basket of the 26 most consumed goods covering more than 80% of household 
consumption has been chosen in the construction. 
The same basket is used across strata but its value changes over time and space using specific price 
for each class. The total poverty line corresponds to the estimated food poverty line plus an amount 
to cover non-food expenditures. The non-food poverty line is calculated for each stratum as the 
average of non-food expenditure per adult-equivalent from all households who are around +/- 5% 
of the food poverty threshold. 
 
III.3.2. Catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure through a Mixed Process Estimator 
  
The determinants of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure are analyzed upstream of the 
analysis of their impoverishing effect. Section III.3.3 presents the theoretical relationship between 
health shock, health expenditures, and welfare. 
Taking into account the fact that we cannot observe health spending for some individuals because 
they are not ill, we used a system of Tobit regressions that involved censoring through a conditional 
mixed process estimator procedure developed by Roodman (2007). The procedure estimates multi-
equations where the dependent variable of each equation may have a different format. The model 
is recursive with three structural equations and the estimation is a full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). 
The methodological approach is justified by our attempt to sort out the issues and concepts related 
to the econometric analysis of data such as health expenditure that contains a large number of zero 
expenditure observations, which can lead to a number of estimations bias when using inappropriate 
estimators. 
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A SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Equations) system of two Tobit models for household out-of-pocket 
health expenditure and the catastrophic health expenditure gap combined with a linear equation 
explaining household  health status  (measured  as an ill-health score by counting the reported 
diseases within the household) is implemented. This accounts for correlations among unobservable 
factors affecting our endogenous dependent variables in addition to dealing with censoring issues.            
The empirical model can be written as follows: 
 
𝐻𝑖
∗  =  α 𝐼𝑖
∗  +  X𝑖  β +  ε𝐻𝑖
𝐻𝑖
  =   𝐻𝑖
∗  if  { 𝐻𝑖
∗    > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0  𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑖
∗    ≤ 0}
 
𝐼𝑖
∗  =   δ 𝑆𝑖
 +  M𝑖 β +  ε𝐼𝑖
𝐼𝑖
  =   𝐼𝑖
∗  if  { 𝐼𝑖
∗    > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0  𝑖𝑓 𝐼𝑖
∗    ≤ 0}
 
𝑆𝑖
 =   𝑓(𝐸𝑖
 ) +   ε𝑆𝑖
     (1) 
 
Where 𝐻𝑖
∗
   represents a censored variable measuring the distance from the catastrophic expenditure 
threshold23 for the household i, observed only for a household whose health expenditure is above 
the threshold. The endogenous  𝐼𝑖
∗
 corresponds to the total out-of-pocket household health 
expenditures. S reflects the above mentioned measure of health status, inversely related to the 
aggregate household health stock. 𝑋𝑖
 
, 𝑀𝑖
 
 and  𝐸𝑖
 
  are sets of exogenous household socio-economic, 
environmental and control variables, such as location and household size, that enter into 
consideration in the specification of the endogenous variables.  ε𝐻𝑖  ε𝐼𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ε𝑆𝑖 are random 
disturbances of the equations. The empirical model is jointly estimated. 
As stated earlier, this study makes a considerable contribution to the existing literature on the 
determinants of catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending. It uses the same framework to estimate 
health production function and out-of-pocket health expenditures and allows correlation between 
dependent variables to take into account endogeneity. Many studies on health expenditure do not 
deal with endogeneity (Hjortsberg, 2003; Su et al., 2006), which needs to be controlled in the 
modelling of healthcare expenditure to avoid bias in estimates. 
                                                 
23 10% of total household income. This experiment parameter is the most common threshold in the literature (Pradhan 
and Prescott, 2002; Wagstaff and Van Doolaer, 2003 and Russell, 2004), with the rationale that this represents an 
approximate threshold at which the household is forced to sacrifice other basic needs, sell productive assets, incur 
debt, or become impoverished (Russell, 2004).  
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A binary dependent variable that equals one when a household encounters catastrophic health 
expenditure and zero otherwise is commonly used to analyze the catastrophic health spending. 
However, this does not take into account the magnitude of the catastrophic out-of-pocket spending, 
contrary to the model we propose that uses the overshoot 𝑂𝑖 = 
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 – 𝜉𝑐 as 𝐻𝑖
  , our main dependent 
variable, and then captures the intensity of the occurrence of catastrophic expenditures. The 
parameter 𝜉𝑐 represents the threshold budget share above which the ratio 
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 corresponding to health 
expenditures is to be considered catastrophic.  
We conducted a preliminary data analysis to explore the correlates of both catastrophic out-of-
pocket health expenditures and out-of-pocket health expenditures using simple bivariate statistics 
(see Brinda et al. 2014 for example). In addition, we used knowledge gained in the literature to 
specify the model. Variables such as type of health facilities visited, characteristics of the offered 
services and health insurance subscription are added in the explanation of catastrophic health 
spending. The household health status proxied by the occurrence of illness as well as the severity 
of diseases proxied by duration is expected to be a strong determinant of the amount of health 
spending and therefore their catastrophe. 
Housing infrastructure and socio-economic household characteristics (rural/urban residence, 
education, age of household head, sex of household head, size, toilet facilities, household age 
structure, e.g. number of old people in the household (>50) and number of children under 5 years, 
mosquito nets use, etc.) might affect catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending through their 
effect on household health status. Descriptive statistics and description of the variables are 
presented in Table III.A1 in the appendix. 
 
III.3.3. Out-of-pocket household health expenditure and welfare nexus 
 
To better illustrate the relationship between household welfare, health spending and health shock, 
and to provide more rationale to our study, we consider the following Koç (2004) and Abul Naga 
and Lamiraud (2008; 2011) framework in which a household maximizes utility by choice of 
consumption good and health inputs. The effect of health shocks on demand for health inputs and 
welfare is examined, holding the household income constant. This conceptual framework shows 
why budget share for health inputs rises in response to a health deterioration arising from an 
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exogenous health shock and therefore indicates the nature of the association between households’ 
poverty and their health out-of-pocket expenditures. 
Let I denote health inputs and s denote an exogenous health endowment. The household maximizes 
its utility 𝑢  [
(𝑦 − 𝑝𝐼 𝐼)
𝑝𝐶 ⁄ , H (I, s)] through the choice of I. 
(𝑦 − 𝑝𝐼 𝐼)
𝑝𝐶 ⁄   is the remaining 
disposable income for spending on other non-medical goods C.  
The first order necessary condition for an optimum choice of I, 𝐹𝑜𝑐 (𝐼, 𝑦, 𝑝𝐼  , 𝑠) = 
𝜕u
𝜕I⁄  entails a 
level 𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑡 such that 𝐹𝑜𝑐 (𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑡, 𝑦, 𝑝𝐼 , 𝑠)= 0. 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑐 (𝐼, 𝑦, 𝑝𝐼  , 𝑠) = - 
𝑝𝐼 
𝑝𝑐 
 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 𝐻1 = 0     (2) 
where 𝑢𝑖 and 𝐻𝑖 correspond to first derivatives of the utility and the health production function 
with respect to their 𝑖𝑡ℎ arguments. 
Until now we have had the marginal effect of I on household utility. But let’s continue derivation 
to get the marginal effect of exogenous household shock. 
With a second differentiation we have 
 
𝜕Foc
𝜕I⁄  = ( 
𝑝𝐼 
𝑝𝑐 
)2 𝑢11 – 2 
𝑝𝐼 
𝑝𝑐 
 𝑢12  𝐻1 + 𝑢22 𝐻1 
2 + 𝑢2  𝐻11   (3) 
With 𝑢1, 𝑢2  >0, 𝑢11, 𝑢22  ≤ 0 and 𝑢12 ≥ 0 for all C, I > 0 and 𝐻1, 𝐻2 > 0 and 𝐻11 ≤ 0 for all I > 0 
representing the positive and decreasing assumptions about the marginal utility of income and 
health. Given these assumptions we have 𝜕Foc 𝜕I⁄  < 0. 
 
Let 𝑣(𝑦, 𝑝𝑐 , 𝑝𝐼 , 𝑠 ) denote the household’s indirect utility function. The effect of health shock on 
household welfare is given by  
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑠⁄  = (-
𝑝𝐼 
𝑝𝑐 
 𝑢1 + 𝑢2 𝐻1 ) 
𝜕𝐼
𝜕𝑠⁄  | 𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑡 +  𝑢2 𝐻2 | 𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑡     (4)  
The right side of (4) is zero from the envelope theorem. Accordingly, 𝑢2 𝐻2 | 𝐼𝑜𝑝𝑡 > 0 entails that 
welfare increases with health, meaning that a health shock results in a welfare deterioration holding 
true the previous assumptions on marginal utility.  
The implicit function assures that  𝜕I 𝜕s⁄  =  −  
𝜕Foc
𝜕s⁄
𝜕Foc
𝜕I⁄
      
So that  𝜕I 𝜕s⁄  will take the sign of  
𝜕Foc
𝜕s⁄  that equals to    
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𝜕Foc
𝜕s⁄  = -
𝑝𝐼 
𝑝𝑐 
 𝑢12  𝐻2 + 𝑢22 𝐻1 𝐻2 + 𝑢2 𝐻12    (5) 
The demand for health inputs, and accordingly the budget share, rises as consequence of health 
shock ( 𝜕I 𝜕s⁄   < 0) when the derivative in (5) is negative. While under the above assumptions the 
first and second right side terms of (5) are negative, the overall effect is ambiguous when 𝐻12 > 0.  
Through the additional restriction 𝐻12 ≤ 0 would entail that I rises as a consequences of a health 
shock. This means that the marginal product of health inputs is lower for individuals with higher 
health stocks, as represented in Figure III.1, or independent to s when 𝐻12 = 0.  
However, despite the potential importance of this specific point on marginal product, there has 
been relatively little empirical work done on how the marginal utility of consumption varies with 
health status. We leave for the future our contribution to this considerable empirical challenge in 
constructing credible estimates and in examining conditions under which the relation between 
marginal utility and health status is really valid and applicable. 
The budget share for health inputs always rises in response to a deterioration of the well-being 
arising from an exogenous health shock (Koç, 2004; Abul Naga and Lamiraud, 2008). 
 
Figure III.1: Health stock and marginal utility 
 
Source: Authors   
 
Let us consider g(y, Z) as the household poverty overshoot that equals 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  – y, with 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  the 
poverty line and y the income. 
In line with the Pareto principle (Atkinson, 1987), g(y , 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 ) is monotonically decreasing with 
the income or any measure of living standards y for all y ≤ 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  and g(y, 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 ) equals to zero if 
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y ≥ 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 . Given this property, g is invertible and it exists Ө such as y = Ө(g, 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 ). From the 
model and from equation (1) we can express the out-of-pocket health expenditures in this manner: 
 𝑇  =  Ӽ (Ө (g, 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 ), S, I , 𝑀, 𝐸 ) +  μ            
Where S represents household health status, M and E represent households’ socio-economic and 
environmental characteristics, I the level of out-of-pocket household health expenditure and μ the 
residual term. 
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝑔⁄   depicts the relation between catastrophic out-of-pocket household expenditures(above the 
catastrophic threshold) and poverty overshoot informs on the linkages between these catastrophic 
expenditures and aggregate poverty level. It indicates the intermediary variables through which 
the relation exists.    
𝜕𝑇
𝜕𝑔⁄ =  𝑥1 
𝜕Ө
𝜕𝑔⁄  + 𝑥2
𝜕S
𝜕𝑔⁄ + 𝑥3
𝜕I
𝜕𝑔⁄  + 𝑥4
𝜕M
𝜕𝑔 ⁄ + 𝑥5
𝜕E
𝜕𝑔⁄  + 
𝜕μ
𝜕𝑔⁄  
With 𝑥𝑗 the derivate of Ӽ with regards to its j-th parameter. Many terms in the right-side equation 
are most plausibly positive or equal to zero, provided the variables are measured in terms of non-
deprivation. The term  𝜕Ө 𝜕𝑔⁄    is negative as Ө(g, 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣 ) is decreasing in g. However, the sign of 
𝑥1 cannot be determined easily as depending on the relation between Ӽ and income.    
The above framework based on Koç (2004), and Abul Naga and Lamiraud (2008, 2011) shows 
theoretically through the linkages between health shock, health expenditures, and welfare that we 
might miss an important part, perhaps one central point, of the true story when ignoring out-of-
pocket health expenditure in poverty analysis. We will investigate empirically the existence of 
association between household out-of-pocket health expenditures and poverty using the following 
methods. 
In line with the concerns raised by the new SPM tool and following Wagstaff and Doorslaer (2003) 
poverty measures are adjusted to take into account household health expenditures.  
Let us define the catastrophic headcount ratio as specified in equation (6). 
 
𝑯𝑐 =  
1
𝐻
  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (𝐻 𝑖=1
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 - 𝜉𝑐)     (6) 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (. ) equals to 1 if  
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 > 𝜉𝑐 and 0 otherwise,  𝜉𝑐 represents the threshold above which the 
ratio 
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 corresponding to health expenditures is to be considered catastrophic, 𝐻 the sample size, 
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𝑌𝑖 income and i subscript for household. However, this measure fails to capture the extent to which 
households exceed the threshold budget share 𝜉𝑐. The catastrophic payment gap is used to 
overcome this shortfall in analogy to poverty literature. 
𝑯𝑐 gives an estimate of the proportion of households with health payments above the threshold 
but does not capture the amount by which these payments exceed 𝜉𝑐.  
Therefore, the mean positive gap is defined and indicates how much on average household out-of-
pocket health expenditures are catastrophic. 
 
 
𝑯𝑐
𝑔
 = 
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅
𝑯𝑐
⁄ = 
∑ (𝐻 𝑖
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 −  𝜉𝑐) 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 −  𝜉𝑐)
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (𝐻 ℎ=1
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 −  𝜉𝑐) 
⁄    (7) 
 
Where 𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ represents the average of overshoot 𝑂𝑖 = 
𝑇𝑖
𝑌𝑖
 – 𝜉𝑐  if catastrophic and captures the 
intensity of the occurrence of catastrophic expenditures.  
To account for the distribution of catastrophic expenditures in relation to income and between the 
richest and the poorest households, concentration indices24 𝑪𝑯𝒄  and 𝑪𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ are used to compute 
weighted headcount 𝑯𝒄
𝒘 = 𝐻𝑐 (1 − 𝑪
𝑯𝒄  ) and weighted overshoot 𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 
𝒘
=  𝑂?̅? (1 − 𝑪
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅).  
The concentration indices range from -1 to +1. A positive value indicates that the richer households 
are more likely to exceed the threshold while a negative value reveals a greater tendency for poor 
households to exceed the critical threshold. 
The measures used to examine the impact of out-of-pocket payments on poverty measures are 
defined below. The idea is to measure the impoverishment effect corresponding to the extent to 
which households are pushed into poverty by out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
Let 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre) be the pre-payment poverty line and 𝑥𝑖 the pre-payment income per adult equivalent 
of household i. The following FGT poverty measures can be defined   
The pre-payment poverty headcount : 𝑷𝟎(𝑝𝑟𝑒) =  
1
𝐻
  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(𝐻 𝑖=1  𝑥𝑖- 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre)) 
                                                 
24 C = 
2
𝐻𝜇 
 ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐻
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 − 1 −  
1
𝐻 
  where ℎ𝑖  is the health variable μ its mean and 𝑟𝑖  the fractional rank of household 𝑖 in 
the living standards distribution where income per adult equivalent  is the measure of living standards; For more 
details see Kakwani, Wagstaff, and van Doorslaer, 1997; O’ Donnell et al., 2008.  
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The pre-payment poverty gap: 𝑷𝟏(𝑝𝑟𝑒) =  
1
𝐻
  ∑ (𝐻 𝑖=1  𝑥𝑖- 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre))  
The normalized pre-payment poverty gap that eliminates the effect of poverty line in comparisons 
is:  𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝑝𝑟𝑒) = 
𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒)
𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre)
  
Differentiating these measures with regards to pre and post payment measures gives the effects of 
out-of-pocket health payments on poverty.  
 
Δ𝑷𝟎 = 𝑃0(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑃0(𝑝𝑟𝑒) 
Δ𝑷𝟏 = 𝑃1(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒) 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟏 = 𝑁𝑃1(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑁𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒) 
 
In the post-payment measures 𝑥𝑖   is recalculated by subtracting household out-of pocket health 
expenditures and the poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre) adjusted by deducting an amount from the poverty 
line derived from health spending among the group that provides the reference for the non-food 
based poverty line. Otherwise, the use of the food poverty line is applicable whether income 𝑥𝑖 is 
pre-payment or post-payment, albeit restrictive. 
 
III.4. Results and Discussion 
 
III.4.1. Determinants of household out-of-pocket expenditure on health 
 
Understanding the determinants of catastrophic household health expenditures is important as 
being a basis for developing effective health policies. The assessment of these determinants is done 
by using the model presented in equation (1). 
Results are indicated in Table III.3 and reveal that households with more elderly people and 
children have more health problems (S) and hence might encounter catastrophic expenditures. 
Indeed, having children under-five years of age and elderly people appears to reduce the 
household-level health status, as these populations are more vulnerable to most types of diseases.  
More attention should also be paid to these groups of the population that are generally not 
financially autonomous and specific policies should follow. The use of mosquito nets has a positive 
effect on health outcomes in the household because they remain effective against malaria and 
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positively affect the occurrence and intensity of catastrophic health expenditures. The health 
production function shows that having improved toilet facilities also affects positively household 
health stock.  Households with a man as head registered fewer cases of illness. 
Results also show that the occurrence of diseases within household, coupled with their severities 
increase the demand for medical care (I), which in turn increases the magnitude of catastrophic 
health expenditure. Households therefore tend to face higher risk of incurring catastrophic health 
expenditures. 
 
This linkage is not as obvious as it seems because there are individuals who are sick but do not 
seek healthcare or spend money on healthcare, and there are also individuals who spend on medical 
care without being sick or who are less severely affected. The less healthy people may use more 
resources to recover their health, but on another hand, some healthier people may spend on medical 
care to maintain their health. 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure (H) happens when prices of medical goods increase 
compared to their level in the previous year. Indeed, we found that households that have more 
frequently experienced increase of prices of medical goods/services are those that tend to have 
deeper catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures. This is captured with the variable # Prices 
[𝑃𝑡>𝑃𝑡−1], indicating the extent to which household members have observed an increase of 
medical goods/services prices or tariffs. However, we have to admit that we might have an 
asymmetric or biased perception in the reported price increases, as these are household specific.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus    
 
73 
 
Table III.3: Determinants of catastrophic out-of pocket health expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Catastrophic 
out-of-pocket  
health 
expenditure (H) 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Out-of-pocket 
health 
expenditures 
level (I) 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Household heath 
status/ ill-health 
score (S) 
      
Radio (yes=1) -0.0721** Radio 54,238*** House ownship 
(yes=1) 
-0.0269 
 (0.0315)  (15,598)  (0.0619) 
I 0.000*** S 6,020* Size 0.192*** 
 (0.000)  (3,534)  (0.0131) 
# Prices 
[𝑷𝒕>𝑷𝒕−𝟏] 
0.119*** Severity (# days) 1,036*** # Mosquito nets -0.0306*** 
 (0.0335)  (310.1)  (0.0109) 
High cost 0.0145** S*Severity -124.2** # Vaccine 0.0232 
 (0.00690)  (52.60)  (0.0343) 
Waiting -0.0157* Care seeking 12,060*** Sex household head 
(Male=1) 
-0.135** 
 (0.0095)  (4,303)  (0.0566) 
Perceived 
inefficiency of 
treatments 
-0.0143 Private health 
service 
3,879 Age household head -0.00321 
 (0.0158)  (8,363)  (0.00256) 
Hospital (yes=1) 0.00600 House ownship 
(yes=1) 
13,412 Education household 
head 
-0.000 
 (0.00975)  (10,392)  (0.0239) 
Health center -0.0573*** Other urban (out 
of Dakar) 
-69,089*** Rural vs Urban 
(Rural=1) 
0.163** 
 (0.0139)  (20,616)  (0.0686) 
Health Post -0.0224*** Rural vs Urban 
(Rural=1) 
-73,302*** Improved toilet 
(yes=1) 
-0.304*** 
 (0.0087)  (23,688)  (0.0670) 
Health room 0.00584 Farmer (yes=1) -2,232 Waste disposal 0.0512 
 (0.0123)  (7,973) (yes=1) (0.0791) 
Marabout 0.00714   Mud/Sand (yes=1) -0.256*** 
 (0.0327)    (0.0662) 
Private Doctor -0.0265   Subdivided area 
(yes=1) 
-0.0712 
 (0.0392)    (0.0668) 
Accident shock 
(yes=1) 
0.0431***   Child 0.104*** 
 (0.0158)    (0.0369) 
    Aged 0.0960** 
# Insurance 
or/and MHO 
-0.0128*    (0.0477) 
 (0.00758)     
Rural vs Urban 0.0424***     
(Rural=1) (0.00708)     
      
Constant -0.328*** Constant 58,335* Constant 0.568*** 
 (0.0142)  (32,513)  (0.192) 
lnsig_H lnsig_I lnsig_S atanhrho_HI atanhrho_HS atanhrho_IS 
-2.115*** 11.87*** 0.691*** -0.577*** -0.134*** -0.105*** 
(0) (0.196) (0.0167) (0.112) (0.0462) (0.0235) 
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-24698.036     
Observations 5,953     
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Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. lnsig_ and atanhrho_:  refer to unbounded 
scale logarithm and arc-hyperbolic tangents transformation of the standard deviation parameter of each error term and 
the correlation for each pair from the three equations (reflecting endogeneity).     
Source: authors 
 
Results also indicate some significant impacts associated with the type of health service providers 
when determining the intensity of the catastrophe. While Health centers and Health posts have a 
reducing effect on catastrophic health, we find no significant effect for the other structures. This 
might reflect some differences in the efficiency of the different types of services or in the provision 
of treatments that are relatively more expensive across health service types. 
 
The occurrence of other kinds of adverse events, such as accidents, is likely to be associated with 
a high risk of catastrophic health expenditures.   
The long waiting periods that confront patients entering healthcare facilities (variable Waiting) 
reduce catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure, perhaps in contradiction to what we should 
expect, as it could induce other costs by constraining the household to come another day for care 
or examination likely generating additional transport costs. However, this result could be explained 
by demand factors such as preference of patients regarding efficiency of the provided services or 
the possibility to get relatively cheaper products.  
Results show also that households located in rural areas have significantly more severe 
catastrophic expenditures compared to those living in urban areas despite having significantly 
lower health expenditures. Households with more health insurance enrollees or/and with more 
individuals engaged in Mutual Health organizations25 (MHO) have lower catastrophic health 
expenditures. This is in line with the statement of Waters et al. (2004) according to which one 
rationale for health insurance coverage is to provide financial protection against catastrophic health 
expenditures. 
 
                                                 
25 MHOs are voluntary organizations that provide health insurance services to their members. There are currently 
over 130 MHOs functioning in Senegal (Diop, F. and Ba, A., 2010).  
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III.4.2. Poverty and household out-of-pocket expenditure on health 
 
As explained earlier, we estimate how much the household health expenditures are catastrophic, 
their distribution with regards to the thresholds and across poor and non-poor, as well as the 
proportion of households below the poverty line before and after adjusting for health expenditures. 
Discussed results concentrate on the 10 % threshold but we also define measures with respect to 
various thresholds. As previously stated, this value is the most commonly used, although it may 
be arbitrary. Therefore, we think that considering a range of value for the threshold might provide 
a helpful indication regarding how many households would be affected, in addition to the popular 
approach. The 20% and 25% thresholds correspond to an extremely severe definition of the 
catastrophe. 
Table III.5 shows that 6.26% of households incurred health expenditure above the critical threshold 
of 10% of the total income with some disparities across areas. This ratio is higher in Dakar with 
7.72%. The mean of positive gap is estimated to be about 7.82 %, meaning that the amplitude of 
the excess of catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending is around 8% of the household income, 
with a more severe effect out of the capital. 
The results in Table III.4 reveal that the weighted headcount and the weighted gap from critical 
thresholds are in general higher than the un-weighted measures, showing that the poor tend to 
exceed the threshold. This is in line with the negative values of the concentration indices. 
 
Table III.4: Distribution-Sensitive catastrophic health expenditure measures at national 
level 
Measures Threshold budget share 𝝃𝒄  
 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
      
𝑯𝒄 16.18% 6.26% 2.33% 1.38% 0.87% 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Concentration index 𝑪𝑯𝒄 -0.051 -0.081 -0.087 -0.076 -0.27 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.047) (0.066) (0.077) 
Ranked weighted  
𝑯𝒄
𝒘 
17.01% 6.77% 2.53% 1.48% 1.10% 
      
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 1.00% 0.49% 0.28% 0.19% 0.14% 
 (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
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Concentration Index 𝑪𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ -0.152 -0.217 -0.285 -0.357 -0.411 
 (0.044) (0.068) (0.088) (0.104) (0.117) 
Ranked weighted  
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 
𝒘
 
1.15% 0.60% 0.36% 0.26% 0.20% 
Source: Authors  
Note: standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors of the concentration indexes are estimated using the Kakwani, 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (1997) estimator. 
 
Figure III.2 shows for comparison the distributions of out-of-pocket household expenditures in 
two approaches: when catastrophic payments are defined regarding total household income, as in 
our case, and when catastrophic payments are defined with respect to health payment relative to 
non-food expenditure (Xu et al., 2003; Kawabata, Xu and Carrin, 2002). The shares of health 
payments in total budget and in non-subsistence budget are plotted against the cumulative 
percentage of households ranked by decreasing budget share.   
The different health budget share curves show that at a given threshold, the headcount ratio is 
higher in the non-subsistence expenditure based approach. This confirms the existence of 
catastrophic health expenditures regardless of the method used. 
Figure III.2: Health expenditure as share of household total income and non-subsistence 
expenditure 
 
 
Sources: authors 
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Calculations of various measures show that the incidence and the intensity of poverty are impacted 
by out-of-pocket health expenditures. The pre–payment poverty ratio is 46.7% and is higher in 
rural areas (57.13). 
 
Table III.5: Poverty and out-of-pocket health spending  
 
Measures  Zones     
 Dakar Other urban 
areas 
Rural Areas Senegal 
𝑯𝒄 7.72 4.79 6.18 6.26 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.006) 
𝑯𝒄
𝒈
 7.20 9.44 7.68 7.82 
 (0.021)  (0.020) (0.017) ( 0.011) 
𝑷𝟎(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 26.09 41.15 57.13 46.70 
 (0.028) (0.017) (0.014) (0.011) 
𝑷𝟎(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 27.53 43.39 58.28 48.14 
 (0.029)  (0.018)  (0.014) (0.011) 
Δ𝑷𝟎 1.44 2.20 1.16 1.44 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 5.77 13.08 18.63 14.53 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 6.47 13.67 19.59 15.35 
  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟏 0.70 0.59 0.96 0.82 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
𝑵𝑷𝟐(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 2.14 5.87 8.67 6.59 
 (0.003)  (0.004) (0.006)  (0.002) 
𝑵𝑷𝟐(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 2.38 6.23 9.45 7.16 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟐 0.25 0.36 0.78 0.57 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Note: The measures are for the 10% threshold. 𝑁𝑃2 is the severity index. Standard errors of the statistics in parentheses.   
Source: authors                
      
At the threshold of 10%, the poverty headcount ratio increases by 1.44 percentage points when 
accounting for out-of-pocket health expenditure, as well as the average deficit to reach the poverty 
line (See Table III.5). At this point, there are more than 195,716 persons that are pushed below the 
poverty line due to catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending when extrapolating these data to the 
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national level. Robustness of results regarding the existence of the impoverishing effect are 
ensured by the non-subsistence expenditure based approach that identifies more severe impact as 
illustrated in Figure III.2. These results show some evidence that households are impoverished by 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures, albeit relatively not too heavily in average. 
In comparison, out-of-pocket health expenditures are more frequent in a country like Kenya, where 
16% of households incurred catastrophic health expenditures, and less in a country like Burkina 
Faso, where it was estimated that less than 2% of the households incurred these extreme 
expenditures. Regarding poverty, countries like Laos in 2008 and Philippines in 2009 have 
estimated impoverishment effects quite similar to those in Senegal, with respective estimates of 
1.1% and 1% (World Health Organization, 2011a, 2011b). 
Catastrophic health payments are additional factors pushing some households into poverty in 
Senegal. Therefore, there is a need for Government to provide better social protection and an 
efficient health financing system that can make them less vulnerable to financial catastrophes.  
 
III.5. Conclusion 
  
Out-of-pocket payments are the primary source through which health expenditure is met in 
Senegal, as in many other developing countries. These payments are financial burdens leading to 
impoverishment when they become catastrophic, as households must reduce their expenditures on 
other necessities. The purpose of this study was to cast a new light on the determinants of 
catastrophic household out-of-pocket health spending and its implications on poverty. 
The econometric analysis shows factors that explain catastrophic household out-of-pocket health 
expenditures such as high costs, annual increase of the prices of health goods/services, disease 
occurrence within the household, level of health spending, health insurance, etc. 
Analyses indicate that many individuals are pushed into poverty due to the burden of this type of 
payments. These findings provide insight for efficient Government action to fight poverty by 
tackling the impoverishment effects of catastrophic health expenditures. Financial mechanisms 
offering protection against the burden of catastrophic health expenditures should be provided to 
achieve greater poverty reduction. Reducing the occurrence of illness through good sanitation, a 
healthier environment, and policies that ameliorate quality of health care in terms of treatment 
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efficiency, reliance on out-of-pocket payments, and cost reduction would be beneficial to 
households. 
Individuals experiencing catastrophic health payments are associated with the lack of health 
insurance contracts. A crucial point is to increase the current low number of individuals covered 
under health insurance or enrolled in Mutual Health Organizations. Insurance coverage is 
practically absent among workers in the informal sector and very low in the formal sector; only 
20% of the population is covered by health insurance. The Government should expand its policy 
of mutual health insurance to cover more rural populations across the country and the informal 
sector. Mutual Health Organizations can easily reach the informal sector workers that do not have 
access to formal coverage. Beyond finding a more efficient funding mechanism, the political 
difficulty of implementing policies will be effective targeting of beneficiaries. However, it is sure 
that a mass extension of health coverage may lower catastrophic health expenditures. 
Households facing high costs of medical goods observe more severe catastrophic health 
expenditures. Therefore, more subsidy policies in health establishment may be necessary and 
would at least offer some financial protection to households and reduce the impoverishing effects 
of out-of-pocket health expenditures.  
The elderly should receive more attention through the reinforcement of existing policies such as 
the Sesame Plan (free care for elderly) introduced in 2006 by the Senegalese Government. The 
plan aimed to reduce social vulnerability among the elderly. However, the implementation of this 
program has not been achieved, and is jeopardized by political instability. There is a strong need 
to develop appropriate measures to ensure the follow-up of these kinds of policies and to improve 
sustainability of existing social financing mechanisms. 
The new broad project of social protection CAPSU26 that includes the Sesame Plan and 
consolidates all the subvention and exemption initiatives should learn from the previously applied 
reforms and programs to target more vulnerable groups like the elderly and children. The results 
show disparities across locations with regards to the magnitude of catastrophic expenditures and 
poverty distribution. This indicates the importance of a broader health care policy for the entire 
population and highlights the need for decentralization of financial protection methods and health 
services. Investments should be concentrated on individuals in rural areas and also in cities other 
than Dakar, as these living areas have increasing effects on catastrophic health expenditures and 
                                                 
26 Independent Fund for Universal Social Protection 
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fewer facilities. Indeed, it is estimated that around 70% of doctors and 80% of pharmacists and 
dentists are in Dakar, the capital city, whereas only about 20% of the Senegalese population live 
in the capital. In addition, data exploration reveals that the most common reported illness suffered 
amongst households incurring catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures is Malaria or fever 
(around 49% of the reported cases, both may occur simultaneously). Besides, digestive diseases 
including diarrhea (21%) are often reported by individuals in households that face catastrophic 
health payments. Interventions that try to provide appropriate treatment and lower fees for these 
diseases could significantly decrease the economic burden on households. 
National poverty estimates should be assessed by taking into account household out-of-pocket 
expenditures on health, and government policies on poverty reduction have to integrate healthcare 
programs in order to avoid potential impoverishing effects. 
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Appendix 
Figure III.A1: Map of Out-of-pocket health spending as share of total expenditure across 
regions (%)  
 
  
Source: Authors     
 
 
 
Table III.A1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Overshoot,  H Intensity of the catastrophic out-of-pocket 
spending e.g. distance from threshold 
budget share   
5953 0.01 0.06 0 2.41 
Radio Radio : 1 if owned  5953 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Insurance or/and MHO Insurance or/and MHO ( members 
covered) 
5953 0.21 1.04 0 22 
Rural vs Urban(Rural=1) 1 if lives in rural area 5953 0.49 0.50 0 1 
#[Pt > P t-1] Occurrence of increase of medical 
goods/services prices experienced 
(number of times) 
5953 0.14 0.15 0 0.9 
High cost Times cost perceived high by members 
(score e.g. number of times) 
5953 0.14 0.57 0 16 
Waiting Waiting times judged long by members 5953 0.15 0.55 0 16 
Inefficiency Inefficient treatment of members (score 
from individuals perception)   
5953 0.03 0.31 0 15 
Hospital Hospital visited by household members (1 
if yes) 
5953 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Health center Health center visited by household 
members (1 if yes) 
5953 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Health Post Health post visited by household members 
(1 if yes) 
5953 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Health room Health room visited by household 
members (1 if yes) 
5953 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Marabout Marabout visited by household members 
(1 if yes) 
5953 0.03 0.16 0 1 
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Private Doctor Private doctor visited by households 
members (1 if yes) 
5953 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Accident shock (1/0) Other kind of adverse events (accident 
shock) occurrence (1 if yes) 
5953 0.03 0.17 0 2 
Total expenditure, I Household aggregate out-of-pocket health 
expenditure level (CFA) 
5953 62009 151044 0 5025250 
Health status, S Correspond to inverse household health 
stock e.g. ill-health score from the overall 
disease occurrence 
5953 2.07 2.32 0 22 
Severity (# days) Severity proxied by duration of illness 
(days) 
5953 11.23 17.51 0 242 
Care seeking Looking for treatment or not (1 if yes) 5953 1.47 1.85 0 26 
Private health service Number of visits to private health services  5953 0.12 0.46 0 9 
House owner (1/0) 1 if house owner 5953 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Farmer (1/0) 1 if farmer household 5953 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Size Size of the household, control variable  5953 9.24 5.84 1 69 
Mosquito net Mosquito nets use (persons covered) 5953 7.06 6.00 0 68 
Vaccine Vaccine occurrence in the household 5953 1.39 1.77 0 15 
Sex of household head (Male=1) 1 if household head is male  5953 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Age of household head Age of the household head  5953 51.51 14.42 17 98 
Education of household head Education of the household head, level  5948 1.58 1.04 1 5 
Improved toilet (yes=1) 1 if improved toilet 5953 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Waste disposal (=1) 1 if waste disposal available  5953 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Mud/Sand (1/0) 1 if mud/sand floor 5953 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Subdivided area 1 if living in an area subdivided 5953 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Child Numbers of children in the household 
(less than 5) 
5953 1.76 1.85 0 21 
Aged Number of old persons (>50) 5953 1.11 0.96 0 6 
Source: Authors 
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Abstract    
 
This paper analyses the relationship between health expenditures and productivity in Senegal by 
using a dynamic recursive Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that has been run from 
2011 to 2020. This model links the growth rate of agricultural productivity to household 
investment in health goods taking into account catastrophic health payments considered as barriers 
to achieve maximal productivity gains. In fact, despite being a potential catalyst for productivity, 
out-of-pocket health expenditures can be a burden after a critical threshold has been crossed, and 
might potentially decrease household resources and place constraints on the productivity 
generating process. 
Results show a positive impact on poverty reduction when the Government reduces the burden on 
households by financing catastrophic payment overshoots. Lower health costs also appear to 
improve households’ well-being, especially in the case of agricultural households. These results 
suggest the need for policies which will reduce the health system’s reliance on out-of-pocket 
payments and demonstrate that health programs should reach the most vulnerable households. 
The effectiveness of poverty-oriented interventions can be increased by targeting households 
incurring catastrophic health expenditures. 
   
Keywords: agricultural productivity, health, poverty, out-of-pocket health expenditures, Senegal   
JEL classifications: Q12, I130, I320 
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IV.1. Introduction   
 
Agriculture is an important sector in Senegal and the main economic activity in rural areas (60% 
of the population, World Bank, 2011) and comprises a large share of total employment (more than 
45%, ESPS, 2011). The sector is affected by a continuing decline in exports and foods supply as a 
result of productivity loss partly attributed to the poor rainy season and factors related to 
mismanagement and political considerations. In many African countries, the poverty reduction 
objective is accompanied by a set of initiatives and reforms concerning fiscal management and 
budget allocation (CAADP, MTEF, Program-Budget etc.)27 in order to deal with the institutional 
failure and the weakness of budgetary processes. The Senegalese Government has undertaken 
numerous reforms and activities in response to the global productivity decline in order to generate 
a higher economic growth rate. Despite it being widely recognized that agriculture can play a 
crucial role in poverty alleviation in African countries, Governments continue to invest less in this 
sector. Therefore, it is important to consider how to promote non-agricultural sectoral policies with 
strong spillover and externality effects on agriculture. Indeed, in a context of limited resources, a 
budget allocation process integrating direct as well as indirect effects across the economy can help 
increase policies’ impact without necessarily relying on large financial resources. A better 
orientation and an efficient allocation of the resources can ensure linkage and consistency between 
social sector budget allocation and achievement of certain sets of agricultural development goals. 
Human capital theory supports the view that people with greater health stock should have higher 
labor productivity thanks to the positive effects on physical and mental capacity, i.e. endurance 
and strength of workers. The loss of productivity can also be due to the change in time allocation 
by integrating time needed to care for sick family members (Asenso-Okyere et al., 2011). 
Out-of-pocket health payments have an impact on household health, and in return, on welfare and 
productivity as earlier underlined in the Grossman theory of demand for health care. However, 
there is evidence that beyond a certain threshold these expenditures can become a burden when 
they account for a large share of household budget. In fact, out-of-pocket health payments might 
increase agricultural productivity, but when catastrophic, they can lead to households’ 
                                                 
27 CAADP : Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme  
  MTEF : Medium-Term Expenditure Framework 
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impoverishment by lowering their disposable income and by constraining them to sell their assets 
in order to afford medical goods and necessary services. In Senegal, household out-of-pocket 
payments represent the primary source through which health expenditures are made, namely 95% 
of private expenditures and 55% of the total expenditures (GIP SPSI, 2006). However, there is 
almost no insurance coverage in the informal sector and the coverage rate remains low in the 
formal sector, which constitutes only 10 percent of the workers (World Bank, 2007). The reliance 
on out-of-pocket health payments in financing health care exposes households to financial risk 
when health expenditures account for a large share of their income. 
We want to shed a new light on this potentially negative effect when analyzing productivity gains 
that result from investment in health. The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of household 
health expenditures on agricultural productivity by examining the way in which these expenditures 
can both produce productivity gains and push people into poverty as a result of diminishing 
disposable income and disruption of material living standards of a household. This study provides 
a valuable contribution by assessing the linkage between the health sector and the agricultural 
sector using a Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE) for 2011 to 2020 and the most recent 
household survey data in Senegal (Poverty Monitoring Survey ESPS II). The contribution is 
empirical as well as methodological.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section IV.2 we provide some background 
knowledge by revisiting the linkage between health expenditures, health, and productivity. Section 
IV.3 then introduces the methodology used in this paper. Section IV.4.1 presents the simulation 
design developed in our research. Section IV.4.2 analyzes the distribution of catastrophic out-of-
pocket health expenditures and their relationship with poverty. Finally, in Section IV.4.3 the 
linkage between health policies and agricultural productivity is analyzed through a CGE 
framework, which incorporates the issue of dynamic adjustments and spillover effects. Section 
IV.5 concludes.  
IV.2. Background  
 
IV.2.1. The health capital variable 
        
A large body of literature has been developed on the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
relationship between health and productivity. Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986) developed a conceptual 
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framework that evaluates the linkage between health and productivity and explains the 
mechanisms by which health affects utility and production. The authors defined utility as a 
function of the amount of produced food commodity, market-purchased food commodity, leisure 
and health state. The latter is modeled through a production function linking changes in health 
inputs and health status. In their model, the agricultural commodity is produced according to a 
conventional production technology; with the additional consideration of the ability of the farmer’s 
health status to affect the production level. Therefore, an increase in the farmer’s health status will 
serve to produce more healthy time. This means that additional healthy days are available for 
leisure or for farm labor. Numerous studies have examined empirically the relationship between 
health variables and productivity at micro level. Using a stochastic agricultural production, 
Croppenstedt and Muller (2000) found that nutrition, distance to the source of water, and morbidity 
affect agricultural productivity in Ethiopia. Badiane and Ulimwengu (2009) also used the 
stochastic frontier regression techniques and found a positive and significant relationship between 
health and agricultural technical efficiency in Uganda. Likewise, using cross-section data on hoe-
cultivating farm households in Sierra Leone, Strauss (1986) established a link between nutritional 
status and labor productivity. 
IV.2.2. Health investment as an economic investment   
       
Demand for health and health investment has led to a rich and controversial body of literature. 
Grossman (1972) provided a theoretical framework consistent with the utility maximization to 
reflect the interdependence between health and expenditure patterns. Other authors also 
empirically explored the Grossman model (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997; Cochrane et al., 1978; 
Stratmann, 1999). Zweifel and Breyer (1997) found no evidence of a positive relationship between 
health and demand for medical care, whereas Grossman’s model appears to predict a positive 
relationship. Cochrane et al. (1978) found that indicators of medical care usage are positively 
related to morbidity. However, these empirical studies might have an important limitation as they 
treated health as an exogenous variable. Stratman (1999) showed that when controlling for 
endogeneity of health variables, medical services tend to decrease work loss days, in line with the 
predictions of the Grossman model. 
In a recent study, Allen et al. (2014) examined the impact of health expenditures on agricultural 
labor productivity in order to inform the necessary policy decisions regarding the orientation of 
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scarce public resources towards most effective uses in the context of Tanzania. They found that 
marginal productivity of labor as well as capital and fertilizers respond significantly to health 
expenditures. Fan and Zhang (2008) found that Government’s spending on agricultural research 
and extension improved agricultural productivity in Uganda, but no large impact was found for 
health. Benin et al. (2009) found that the provision of public goods and services in the agricultural, 
education, health, and rural road sectors had a substantial impact on agricultural productivity in 
Ghana. 
A few applied studies analyzed the effects of health on non-health sectors, especially in agriculture 
using a general equilibrium framework. Savard and Adjivi (1997) developed a model in which 
health is incorporated in the form of improved labor productivity to take into account external 
effects. Some authors have developed models with a broad focus on the macroeconomic impact of 
diseases; for example, the HIV/AIDS28 model that assesses the economic impact of HIV and AIDS 
(Kambou et al., 1992; Arndt, 2003; Bell et al., 2003). Inclusion of the dynamic aspect is likely to 
improve understanding of the relation between health and economic outcomes, including income 
and labor productivity (McNamara et al., 2012). 
It is widely recognized that health expenditures can boost productivity, but as stated earlier, these 
payments are a financial burden leading to impoverishment or limited efficiency when they 
become catastrophic, as households must reduce their expenditure on other necessities, and on 
agricultural inputs in the case of farmers. Our contribution is as follows. Unlike the previous 
studies, our analyses integrate the burden of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures that 
might limit the extent of the impact of such expenditures on productivity after crossing a critical 
threshold. Another source of concern that we integrate is the dynamic and the spillover effects. 
Our approach also considers both the retroactive effects and the non-automatic adjustment of 
productivity with respect to health investment. Health spending will be linked to the household 
production function to get the elasticity of productivity with respect to medical expenditures, 
which will be included in the CGE model. The estimated model accounts for the endogeneity of 
the health variables. We believe that our research is also relevant from a policy perspective as it 
provides policy recommendations regarding the protection against catastrophic expenditures and 
examines the interactions between the agriculture and health sectors. 
                                                 
28 HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus); AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) 
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IV.3. The modeling framework  
 
The theoretical framework presents the core CGE model and the microsimulations that we use to 
derive both the poverty measures and the catastrophic headcount ratios.  
IV.3.1. The CGE model 
 
For our analysis, we use the model presented in Thurlow (2004) that is a dynamic extension of the 
standard model developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and 
documented in Lofgren (2002). The model is calibrated using the 2011 agricultural Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM). 
Table IV.A1 and Table IV.A2 in the appendix provide a description of the model, and further 
explanation can be found in the above-mentioned papers which include the mathematical model 
statement with an equation-by-equation description, the features, and the data required. Recursive 
CGE computes static equilibria at each point in time, that are then linked in a long run recursive-
path by specifying growth dynamics between time-steps (De Cian, 2006). Based on this model, 
we incorporate interactions between health inputs purchased by households and agricultural 
productivity, while recognizing that the effects of the consumption of health goods on productivity 
might be lower when they constitute a large share of household income. 
The CGE has eleven agricultural commodities as defined in the SAM. The aggregated agricultural 
sector includes Livestock, Forestry, and Fisheries accounts. Detailed information about the non-
agricultural sectors (industry and services) is also provided. The model aims to capture the linkage 
between all these various sectors. The model is written as a set of simultaneous equations, 
including several nonlinear equations, defining the behavior of the different agents, as specified in 
the appendix. The sectoral disaggregation of the accounts includes the following features: 
decomposition of the agricultural account into eleven crops plus livestock, fishing and forestry, 
and decomposition of the production into fourteen regions. This allows for an efficient modeling 
of the agricultural sector in Senegal by taking into account as much as possible the sub-national 
heterogeneity in cropping patterns and resource endowments. Households are disaggregated into 
eight categories: rural and poor agricultural, rural and non-poor agricultural, rural and poor non-
agricultural, rural and non-poor non-agricultural, urban and poor agricultural, urban and non-poor 
agricultural, urban and poor non-agricultural, and urban and non-poor non-agricultural 
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households. The main feature that we include in our CGE model is the linkage between health 
expenditures and agricultural productivity that will be explained later.   
The 2011 poverty monitoring survey (ESPS II) is used to model the demand side of the CGE. It 
covers 17,891 households with 5,953 households constituting the sub-sample from which the 
questionnaire on expenditures was administrated. It is a random sample survey at national level 
and based on two-stage cluster sampling method. This survey aims to highlight the socio-economic 
characteristics of the different social groups (ESPS, 2011). 
Household consumption, including medical expenditures, is measured in local currency over the 
12 months (or 30 days for food and some non-food consumption) preceding each household 
interview. The expenditure data is used to compute household income estimation. Health 
consumption expenditures include all food and non-food expenditures made by households to 
purchase goods and services in order to meet their health needs. The health sector is highlighted 
in the SAM, which uses the same structure of household health consumption as in the Poverty 
Monitoring Survey ESPS II, plus macro statistics from the National Agency for Demography and 
Statistics (ANSD). The SAM is balanced using the cross-entropy method as described in Robillard 
and Robinson (1999).The model assumes that each producer 𝑎 maximizes its profits by choosing 
the quantities, so that the marginal revenue products of the different factors are equal to their rents 
(equation 4). The structure of the production technology has at the top level a constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function of the quantities of value-added 𝑄𝑉𝐴 and aggregate intermediate 
input 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴. The former itself is a CES function of factors 𝑄𝐹𝑓 whereas the latter is a Leontief 
of disaggregated intermediate inputs 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇 as specified below (refer to Table IV.A1 in the 
appendix for the full list of notations). 
   (1 )
vava va
aa a
1
-
a a a
a a a a a a
f F
QA  QVA QINTA
 
  
 

 
      
 
   (1) 
1
1aa
a
aa c
a
a ca
QVA PINTA
 = 
1 - QINTA PVA


 
 
 
     (2) 
 
vava
aa
1
-
va va
a a f a f a
f F
QVA  QF

 


 
   
 
  (3) 
IV. Out-of-pocket health payments and Agricultural Productivity    
95 
 
     
1
1
'
1
va va
a ava va
faf a a a f a f a f a f a
f F
W WFDIST PVA tva QVA QF QF
 
 

  

 
         
 
    (4) 
c a ca aQINT ica QINTA     (5) 
We assume that the growth rate of productivity depends on household health investment, which 
corresponds to the health goods purchased by households from the health sector. Health is 
considered as an investment good, meaning that its consumption is expected to provide 
productivity gains. Considering this, the total factor productivity 𝛼𝑎
𝑣𝑎can be specified as 
endogenous and written as follows: 
 
va
a (t+1)  = 
va
a (t) (1 + Φ(Ψ))   (6) 
Where Ψ is a health related variable in relation to household health investment and Φ translates 
the incidence of our health related variables on agricultural productivity. 
We can write: 
va
a (t+1)  = 
va
a (t) (1 + ϑ  ∑ (
𝛥(𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡0)𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ(ℎ,𝑡−1))
𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡0)𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡−1)
𝐺
ℎ=1  )   (7)  
With ℎ the index for household groups within the model, G the number of household groups in the 
model, 𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ, 𝑡0) and 𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ(ℎ, 𝑡)  respectively the price and the quantity of health goods 
consumed by household h at period t. The responsiveness of agricultural productivity to household 
consumption level of health inputs is captured through the elasticity parameter ϑ, which is 
estimated using household level data. Each household maximizes a Stone Geary utility function 
subject to a consumption expenditure constraint. The demand side of the health good consumption 
is as follows.     
𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ, 𝑡). 𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ(ℎ, 𝑡) = μ(ℎ, 𝑡) + 𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ, 𝑡). 𝛾ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑚 (ℎ) +  β𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ
𝑚 (ℎ). (𝐸𝐻(ℎ, 𝑡) −
 ∑ 𝑃𝑐′  𝑐′𝜖 𝐶 .  𝛾𝑐′  
𝑚  (ℎ))              (8) 
Where ( )
m
health h  represents the minimum consumption level of household h, ( )
m
health h  is the budget 
share of health goods in the household consumption basket and ( , )EH h t  is the actual consumption 
spending for household ℎ. Besides, we include an exogenous shock 𝜇(ℎ, 𝑡) that represents the 
health environment and endowment (motivation of health center staffs, household’s health 
endowment, geographic accessibility of health centers etc.). It is calibrated using the distribution 
of residuals derived from health expenditure equation estimated by using the survey data (see 
section IV.4.3 and the note below Table IV.A3 for the distribution). Changing the magnitude of 
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this environmental factor could allow for an exogenous increase of households’ health expenses 
up to the threshold level or a reduction below. This might be interesting in the case where one 
would like to simulate policies that exogenously compel households to more or less direct their 
expenditures towards health goods and services, or in the case where unexpected shock-related 
expenditures are simulated. However, our policy simulation setup does not concentrate on these 
questions. Here, health care demand behavior is determined mainly by the postulate of utility 
maximization, as widely accepted in the literature. In fact, it is more realistic to let the households 
decide on how much to spend on the different available goods based on available income, well-
being, and the general equilibrium price substitution effects. 
IV.3.2. The microsimulation module  
 
To assess the impact on poverty, we use a microsimulation model which takes into account the 
poverty distribution in the country. Just as the CGE model, the poverty microsimulation module 
is also calibrated to the 2011 Senegalese household poverty monitoring survey - ESPS II. 
Endogenous changes in consumption resulting from the CGE model are passed down to the 
household by linking each of the household in the microsimulation model to the corresponding 
household in the CGE. The method is a non-parametric microsimulation where the calculated 
poverty indexes are the FGT (Foster-Greer-Thorbecke) family of poverty measures that propose 
summary indicators of the extent of poverty. 
𝐹𝐺𝑇 =  
1
𝑀
 ∑ (
𝑧−𝑦𝑚
𝑧
)
𝛼
𝑀 
𝑚=1 .  𝐼(𝑦𝑚 ≤ 𝑧)    (9) 
where 𝑧  is the poverty line, 𝑀 is the number of households in the survey, 𝑦𝑚 is the income of 
household 𝑚 and 𝐼(𝑦𝑚 ≤ 𝑧) is an indicator function which is equal to one when 𝑦𝑚 ≤ 𝑧  and zero 
otherwise. For α = 0  the FGT index collapses to the headcount ratio 𝑃0 , which is the most widely 
used poverty measure that quantifies the proportion of the population that is poor, but does not 
show how poor the poor are. The case where α = 1 gives the poverty gap index (𝑃1) that measures 
the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line as a proportion of the poverty line. The 
sum of these poverty gaps gives the minimum cost of eliminating poverty with a perfect targeting 
of transfers. The case where α = 2 gives an indication on the severity by squaring the normalized 
gap (𝑃2) and thus weights the gap by the gap. 
The cost of basic need method approach is used to define the poverty line. This method first 
estimates the cost of acquiring enough food for adequate nutrition, namely 2,400 calories per adult 
IV. Out-of-pocket health payments and Agricultural Productivity    
97 
 
per day, and then adds the cost of other essentials. We also define a new poverty measure to 
integrate the impoverishment effect corresponding to the extent to which households are pushed 
into poverty by making out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
The last part of the section describing the CGE model shows the linkage between productivity and 
health expenditures. However, given the fact that we want to capture more accurately the effect of 
household health payments, we allow this relation (equation 7) to depend also on the magnitude 
of catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments through the inclusion of the household group’s 
related headcount ratio that we define as follows: 
𝑯𝑐
ℎ =  
1
𝑀ℎ
  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (𝑀
ℎ 
𝑚=1
𝑇𝑚
ℎ
𝑌𝑚
ℎ - 𝜉𝑐)   (10) 
Where 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (. ) equals 1 if  
𝑇𝑚
ℎ
𝑌𝑚
ℎ  > 𝜉𝑐 and 0 otherwise, 𝜉𝑐 represents the threshold above which the 
ratio of health expenditures to income ( 
𝑇𝑚
ℎ
𝑌𝑚
ℎ  ) is considered as catastrophic, 𝑀
ℎ the sample size of 
the aggregated household group ℎ , 𝑌𝑚
ℎ is the income, with 𝑚 subscript for household within the 
aggregate group ℎ. 
Out-of-pocket payments are considered catastrophic and poverty increasing if they exceed 40% of 
annual non-food expenditures by households (Kawabata, Xu and Carrin, 2002; Xu et al., 2003; 
Karami et al., 2009) or 10% of the ratio between health expenditures and consumption 
expenditures (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Wagstaff and Van Doorlaer, 2003; Russell, 2004). In 
our case, catastrophic payments are defined with regard to the total household expenditures. 
𝑯𝑐
ℎ gives an estimate of the proportion of households who experienced health payments above the 
threshold 𝜉𝑐 within each household group in the SAM. It is endogenous and calculated each year 
after transmitting changes in health expenditures and income from household groups in the CGE 
model to the corresponding households in the microsimulation module, similar to the calculation 
of poverty measures.  
𝑯𝑐
ℎ is related to the severity of morbidity level within the different household groups and translates 
the effectiveness of health inputs in generating technical progress. If all households within a given 
household group ℎ spend on health goods without catastrophic outcomes as defined here, then 
there is a perfect transmission of investment in health inputs to productivity in line with the 
elasticity ϑ. 
Considering this, equation (7) can be rewritten in the following manner: 
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va
a (t + 1)  =  
va
a (t) (1 +  ϑ  ∑
𝛥(𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡0)𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ(ℎ,𝑡))
𝑃ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡0)𝑄ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ (ℎ,𝑡−1)
𝐺
ℎ=1  (𝑯𝑐
ℎ(𝑡))(1−1[𝛥(𝑃𝑄)>0])(1 −
𝑯𝑐
ℎ(𝑡))1[𝛥(𝑃𝑄)>0])    (11) 
The model is intended to take into account the potential non-automatic adjustment of productivity 
with respect to health investments. Moreover, the general equilibrium framework allows 
integrating the bi-directional linkage between productivity and health expenditures. Health 
expenditures enhance productivity, which ultimately increases household income and therefore the 
capacity to invest in goods and services that can maintain or potentially improve health and provide 
energy for the farmers. 
The logic behind equation (11) is that if health expenditures increase (i.e. 𝛥𝑃𝑄>0) for a household 
group in the model compared to the previous periods, the positive impact on productivity depends 
not only on the estimated parameter ϑ, but also on the share of households who had not incurred 
catastrophic health expenditures (𝟏 − 𝑯𝑐
ℎ(𝑡)). This amount is provided by the health module of 
the household survey and updated with the microsimulation module. Therefore, a lower 𝑯𝑐
ℎ(𝑡) 
tends to generate more technical progress. Similarly, if 𝛥𝑃𝑄<0, the extent through which 
productivity is reduced depends this time on the share of households that faces catastrophic 
expenditures. If 𝛥𝑃𝑄=0 for all individuals, then productivity remains at the same level. Indicator 
functions are used for a mathematical and straightforward formulation.  
Catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments might reduce the full impact of health investment on 
productivity, while at the same time negatively affect the capacity of farm laborers to afford food 
and nutrients that they need for the maintenance of good health and energy. The high share of out-
of-pocket household payments can also lead to negative effects on the efficient use of fertilizer 
and other traditional agricultural inputs, in a context where household purchasing power decreases 
as a result of lower disposable incomes. Households who incur catastrophic expenditures can be 
forced to cut down on subsistence needs and sell productive goods in response to the financial 
shock. In addition, catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments might reflect very severe shock on 
the household health status. These issues are incorporated in the model following the specification 
in equation (11) that stipulates that aggregated household groups with fewer occurrences of 
catastrophic payments are more likely to achieve their maximum potential productivity gains 
resulting from the consumption of health goods.   
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The proposed framework integrates the externality effects between sectors and therefore 
determines the economy wide impacts of the structure and the changes in household out-of-pocket 
health payments. One strength of our paper is that shift in productivity is endogenized and no 
technological progress is assumed ad hoc, as it is commonly done in the CGE literature. 
 
IV.4. Policy simulations and discussion  
 
IV.4.1. Simulation designs   
 
When designing policies that integrate health into agriculture, it is essential to consider some 
negative effects that might exist when household out-of-pocket expenditures exceed a critical 
threshold in terms of share of total income. As explained earlier, our study attempts to provide 
evidence on this issue. It shows the advantage of providing financial protection by examining the 
long run effects of policies that mitigate the consequences of catastrophic health payments on 
individuals. The simulations are run over a ten year period from 2011 to 2020. 
Under the first policy that is simulated, the government would pay for the cost of drugs beyond 
amounts that might otherwise threaten the financial security of a given household. In this case, we 
also simulate alternative options for the government to pay for the policy and the resulting impact 
on the economy and household well-being. In the first option, the excess or catastrophic share of 
expenditures is entirely supported by the government and financed through reduced public savings 
or through increased taxes on domestic institutions or on commodities, whether uniformly or not.  
This is simulated by transferring amounts equivalent to full payment overshoot ∑ 𝑂𝑚. 𝑌𝑚
𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1  =
∑ 𝑇𝑚
ℎ  – 𝜉𝑐 𝑌𝑚
ℎ𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1   to each household group in each period in order to eliminate the impoverishing 
effects of out-of-pocket health expenditures. The size of the catastrophic payment overshoot 
captures the intensity of the occurrence of catastrophic expenditures. In order to reduce the fiscal 
burden of the policy and ensure its sustainability, an option with transfers equivalent to 50% of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments is also presented in the appendix. In this cost-sharing 
option, households bear half of the cost up to the critical threshold. 
Adoption of mutual health insurance can also be a more efficient funding mechanism regarding 
sustainability. Insurance coverage is practically absent among workers in the informal sector and 
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very low in the formal sector29; only 20% of the population is covered by health insurance 
(Pereznieto, 2009).  
The second policy option is to reduce the price of health good for households. This price reduction 
could come from productivity gains in the domestic health producing sector, government subsidies 
or reduction of the import tariffs on imported health goods. We consider only the last two channels. 
Most of the drugs used in Senegal (85-90%) are imported with relatively high margins, which 
contributes to their relative inaccessibility (Ministry of Health, 2005). Drugs imported from 
outside the WAEMU and ECOWAS30 are subject to a tax rate of 2.5%. We simulate the impact of 
an annual 3% decrease in the duty rate τ over the simulation period. This duty escalator, meaning 
a progressive liberalization, is likely to mitigate the burden of health good expenditures and give 
incentive to households to invest more in health. Under this scenario, the associated direct cost per 
year is given by the lost revenue resulting from the lowering import tariffs for health goods that is: 
𝑝𝑤𝑚 𝑄𝑀 𝐸𝑋𝑅 𝑡𝑚0 (1 −   (1 −  𝜏) 𝑛 ), where 𝑝𝑤𝑚 is the import price, 𝑄𝑀 the quantity of 
imported health good, 𝑡𝑚0  the initial import tariff, 𝑛 the number of years between the base year 
2011 and the current simulation period 𝑡 in the dynamic model, and 𝐸𝑋𝑅 the exchange rate. We 
also simulate an alternative option of a 3% annual increases of subsidy ρ to the domestic health 
sector. The size of the simulations is not critical here, as simulating different levels might generate 
the same types of mechanisms in the economy. The different scenarios are ranked using as criterion 
the degree of poverty reduction achieved per unit of lost government revenue. Table IV.1 describes 
the different policy simulations. 
Table IV.1: Simulation designs 
Simulations’ 
names  
Simulations’ description 
𝑺𝟏 and 𝑺′𝟏 Full (𝑆1) and partial (𝑆′1) coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments financed by saving  
𝑺𝟐 and 𝑺′𝟐 Full (𝑆2) and partial (𝑆′2) coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments financed by uniform direct tax rate for institutions, e.g. the percentage  
adjustment is the same for all institutions  
                                                 
29 A sesame plan (free care for the elderly) was introduced in 2006, but as many other initiatives offering financial 
protection methods and health services, such programs are jeopardized by political instability.  
30 WAEMU : West African Economic and Monetary Union 
ECOWAS : Economic Community of West African States 
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𝑺𝟑 and 𝑺′𝟑 Full (𝑆3) and partial (𝑆′3) coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments financed by non-uniform direct tax rate  
𝑺𝟒 and 𝑺′𝟒 Full (𝑆4) and partial (𝑆′4) coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments financed by uniform sales tax 
𝑺𝟓 and 𝑺′𝟓 Full (𝑆5) and partial (𝑆′5) coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
payments financed by scaled sales tax 
𝑺"𝟏    3% annual decrease of tariffs on health goods, base value 2.5%    
𝑺"𝟐    3% annual increases of activity subsidy to health sector, base value 10%     
Source: The author 
 
IV.4.2. The distribution of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures  
 
Before discussing the simulation results, we want to highlight the magnitude and the distribution 
of out-of-pocket health expenditures across household groups . We also discuss the extent to which 
these expenditures are likely to have poverty exacerbating effects and productivity lowering effects 
among households. Some metrics already defined in Séne and Cissé (2015) are presented.  
We use the mean positive gap to assess the magnitude of the catastrophic impact of household out-
of-pocket health expenditures that is to see how excessive they are. In contrast to the headcount 
ratio, it gives an indication of how much consumer payments exceed the threshold amount. At the 
national level it is computed using the following formula: 
𝑯𝑐
𝑔
 = 
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅
𝑯𝑐
⁄ = 
∑ (𝑀 𝑚
𝑇𝑚
𝑌𝑚
 −  𝜉𝑐) 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (
𝑇𝑚
𝑌𝑚
 −  𝜉𝑐)
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑 (𝑀 𝑚=1
𝑇𝑚
𝑌𝑚
 −  𝜉𝑐) 
⁄   (12) 
where 𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ represents the average of overshoot payment 𝑂𝑚  = 
𝑇𝑚
𝑌𝑚
 − 𝜉𝑐 . The expression measures 
the intensity of the occurrence of catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures. 
To measure the inequality in health expenditures, concentration indices31 𝑪𝑯𝒄  and 𝑪𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ are used to 
compute weighted headcount 𝑯𝒄
𝒘 = 𝐻𝑐 (1 − 𝑪
𝑯𝒄  ) and weighted overshoot 𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 
𝒘
=  𝑂?̅? (1 − 𝑪
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅). 
                                                 
31 C = 
2
𝑀𝜇 
 ∑ ℎ𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝑟𝑚 − 1 −  
1
𝑀
  where ℎ𝑚 is the health variable, μ its mean, and 𝑟𝑚  the fractional rank of 
household 𝑚 in the living standards distribution where income per adult equivalent is the measure of living 
standards. For more details see Kakwani, Wagstaff, and van Doorslaer, 1997; O’ Donnell et al., 2008.  
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This allows us to see whether the households who experienced catastrophic health expenditures 
were unequally distributed across the population, between the richest and the poorest households.      
The calculations of the indices help illustrate the impact of household out-of-pocket health 
expenditures on poverty when they reach catastrophic levels. These measures elucidate the 
impoverishment effect which corresponds to the extent to which households are pushed into 
poverty and likely to become unable to achieve their maximum level of potential productivity due 
to catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
Let 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre) be the pre-payment poverty line and 𝑥𝑚 the pre-payment income per adult 
equivalent of household 𝑚. We use the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke (FGT) class of poverty indices 
that can be defined as follows.   
The pre-payment poverty headcount is: 𝑷𝟎(𝑝𝑟𝑒) =  
1
𝐻
  ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑(𝑀 𝑚=1  𝑥𝑚- 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre))   (13) 
The pre-payment poverty gap is: 𝑷𝟏(𝑝𝑟𝑒) =  
1
𝐻
  ∑ (𝑀 𝑚=1  𝑥𝑚- 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre))      (14) 
The normalized pre-payment poverty gap controls for differences in poverty lines between strata 
and is expressed as: 𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝑝𝑟𝑒) = 
𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒)
𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre)
    (15) 
We compare the pre- and post-payment measures, in order to measure the poverty effects of out-
of-pocket health payments, as follows: 
Δ𝑷𝟎 = 𝑃0(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑃0(𝑝𝑟𝑒)      (16)  
Δ𝑷𝟏 = 𝑃1(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒)   (17) 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟏 = 𝑁𝑃1(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡) − 𝑁𝑃1(𝑝𝑟𝑒)  (18) 
In the post-payment measures, the income per adult equivalent 𝑥𝑖  is recomputed by subtracting 
household out-of-pocket health payments, and the poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣  (pre) is adjusted by deducting 
an amount of the poverty line derived from health spending among the group that provides the 
reference for the non-food based poverty line. The results are discussed further below (and will be 
presented in Table IV.3).  
Although the CGE simulations are based on a threshold value of 10%, Table IV.2 considers a 
range of threshold values and illustrates the extent to which catastrophic payments can push people 
into poverty32. The higher thresholds (20% and 25%) represent an extremely severe definition of 
                                                 
32 The 10% threshold is the most common - albeit arbitrary - threshold in the literature (Pradhan  and  Prescott,  
2002;  Wagstaff  and  Van  Doolaer,  2003  and  Russell,  2004),  The  rationale is that  this represents an approximate 
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the catastrophe owing to higher out-of-pocket costs. In general, the results in Table IV.2 show 
negative concentration indices, and higher values for the weighted gap from critical thresholds and 
the weighted headcount compared to the unweight measures. This indicates a greater tendency for 
the poor to incur financial catastrophe.  
 
Table IV.2: Distribution-sensitive catastrophic health expenditures (at national level) 
Indices Threshold budget share 𝝃𝒄  
 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
      
𝑯𝒄 16.18% 6.26% 2.33% 1.38% 0.87% 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Concentration index 𝑪𝑯𝒄 -0.051 -0.081 -0.087 -0.076 -0.27 
 (0.019) (0.031) (0.047) (0.066) (0.077) 
Ranked weighted  
𝑯𝒄
𝒘 
17.01% 6.77% 2.53% 1.48% 1.10% 
      
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 1.00% 0.49% 0.28% 0.19% 0.14% 
 (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
      
Concentration Index 𝑪𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ -0.152 -0.217 -0.285 -0.357 -0.411 
 (0.044) (0.068) (0.088) (0.104) (0.117) 
Ranked weighted  
𝑶𝒊̅̅ ̅ 
𝒘
 
1.15% 0.60% 0.36% 0.26% 0.20% 
Source: Séne and Cissé, 2015  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors of the concentration indices are estimated using the Kakwani, 
Wagstaff and Doorslaer (1997) estimator. The indexes are significant. The weighted measures also.    
       
At the 10% threshold, the prevalence of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures is estimated 
at 6.26%. The size of the excess of catastrophic out-of-pocket health spending stands at 7.82% of 
the household income at the national level, as shown by the mean of positive gap in the last column 
of Table IV.3. 
Results show that catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments exacerbate poverty. Estimations 
reveal that the conventional poverty headcount ratio for Senegal increases by 1.43 percentage point 
when controlling for catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure (Δ𝑷𝟎). The average deficit to 
reach the poverty line also increases due to the burden of excessive health payments (Δ𝑵𝑷𝟏). 
                                                 
threshold at which the household is forced to sacrifice other basic needs, sell productive assets, incur debt, or 
become impoverished (Russell, 2004). 
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When extrapolating at national level, we found that a large number of people (195, 716)33 that 
encountered catastrophic health expenditures were pushed into poverty due to the burden of 
excessive health expenditures (For more details on the out-of-pocket health expenditures see Séne 
and Cissé, 2015). The headcount ratio 𝑯𝒄 varies across household groups, reaching a maximum 
value for urban agricultural household group (10.30%). Therefore, the impact of out-of-pocket 
health expenditures on productivity might be heterogeneous across the aggregated household 
groups within the CGE model. 
Table IV.3: Poverty and catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures  
 
Note: The above measures are for the 10% threshold. 𝑁𝑃2 is the severity index.  
Source: The author  
                                                 
33 Namely the increase in the poverty headcount ratio (1.43%) times population size estimated at 13 591 436 
millions (ESPS, 2011). 
 CGE household groups  
 Rural 
agricultu
ral poor 
Rural 
agricultu
ral rich 
Rural 
non-
agricultu
ral poor 
Rural 
non-
agricultu
ral rich 
Urban 
agricultu
ral poor 
Urban 
agricultu
ral rich 
Urban 
non-
agricultu
ral poor 
Urban 
non-
agricultu
ral rich 
Senegal 
          
𝑯𝒄 4.37 5.07 6.32 8.24 10.30 3.59 4.72 7.16 6.26 
 
𝑯𝒄
𝒈
 5.91 5.64 7.72 9.19 5.46 3.93 9.82 7.57 7.82 
 
 Rural 
agricultural 
Rural non-
agricultural 
Urban 
agricultural 
Urban non-
agricultural 
Senegal 
      
𝑷𝟎(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 61.09 54.5 42.96 32.69 46.71 
𝑷𝟎(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 62.24 55.67 42.97 34.55 48.14 
Δ𝑷𝟎 1.15 1.17 0.01 1.86 1.43 
𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 18.80 18.52 13.03 9.02 14.53 
𝑵𝑷𝟏(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 19.55 19.62 13.8 9.65 15.35 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟏 0.75 1.1 0.77 0.63 0.82 
𝑵𝑷𝟐(𝒑𝒓𝒆) 8.19 8.98 5.62 3.80 6.59 
𝑵𝑷𝟐(𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒕) 8.64 9.99 6.06 4.09 7.16 
Δ𝑵𝑷𝟐            0.45 1.01 0.44 0.29 0.57 
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IV.4.3. CGE simulation results and the macroeconomic implications  
 
All the simulations are based on the endogenous technical progress growth that is generated by the 
consumption of health goods, and take into account the effect of catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
expenditures in the transmission mechanisms.  
The elasticity of productivity with respect to health goods consumption, ϑ, is presented in Table 
IV.A3 in the appendix. It is estimated through a two-stage least square (2SLS) and a multilevel 
mixed-effects linear (MMEL) regression, allowing random intercept combined with a two-stage 
residual inclusion (2SRI)34 to correct for endogeneity. Both estimations provide approximately the 
same value for ϑ. The instruments of medical spending are good predictors and the Kleibergen-
Paap rank Wald F-statistic35 as well as the Hansen J test reveals the appropriateness of the 
instruments. 
Table IV.4 shows the macroeconomic impacts of the different simulations. In the base-run 
simulation, we assume that the gross domestic product (GDP) grows at around a quite realistic rate 
of 3.7% for the period considered here (2011-2020), which is the observed average growth rate for 
the period 2005-2011. The agricultural GDP has been characterized by erratic growth levels during 
this period, reaching the highest point of 18.5% in 2008 and the lowest (-13.1%) in 2011. The 
baseline scenario (Business As Usual, BAU) assumes that the annual agricultural GDP growth rate 
for 2011-2020 is 3.5%, which reflects the recent performance in the overall agricultural sector. 
The baseline also assumes the continuation of demographic trends. Urban population is supposed 
to grow at 2.5%, while rural population grows at 2.1%. The annual growth rate of government 
consumption is fixed at 3.9, as well as the growth rate of foreign savings, to reflect the past trend 
in these key variables. Economic growth also results from increases in factors. We assume a 
homogenous land expansion within the different agricultural crop production systems of 1.9%. 
Capital accumulation grows endogenously as a result of the dynamic interaction between 
investment and saving across the periods. The various results show an increase in agricultural GDP 
compared to the baseline scenario as a response to productivity gains in the agricultural sector 
resulting from alternative policy options to reduce the burden of catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
expenditures. Under scenarios 𝑆"1 (tariff reduction) and 𝑆"2 (increase in subsidy), the decrease in 
the price of health goods consumed by households raises total private consumption in the economy. 
                                                 
34 For more details see Garen, 1984; Vella, 1993; Terza et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2010 
35 See Stock and Yogo, 2005; Baum et al., 2003; Kleibergen and Paap, 2006 
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The quantity of imported goods increases following the tariff reduction in 𝑆"1. Simulations of the 
full coverage of the catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments (Ss simulations, s=1,…,5) have the 
same direct cost that equals the overall transfer payments households receive from the government. 
These simulations show that the agricultural growth does not change much in general with the 
funding options. However, we can observe slightly more impact when the funding option relies on 
uniform direct tax rate for institutions (𝑆2) with 3.73% average growth rate over the simulation 
period. 
Table IV.4: Macroeconomic impacts   
 𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒐𝒓𝒕𝒔 𝑨𝒈𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒖𝒍𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝑮𝑫𝑷 𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆  𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒖𝒎𝒑𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 
Simulations    
𝑰𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍 -2,958.48 946.35 5,733.16 
𝑩𝑨𝑼 3.70 3.54 3.33 
𝑺𝟏 3.52 3.68 3.55 
𝑺𝟐 3.45 3.73 3.63 
𝑺𝟑 3.45 3.71 3.63 
𝑺𝟒 3.52 3.72 3.62 
𝑺𝟓 3.53 3.70 3.63 
𝑺"𝟏 3.98 3.53 3.51 
𝑺"𝟐 3.68 3.59 3.36 
Source: The author 
Figure IV.1 and Table IV.A4 in the appendix summarize the key results in terms of poverty 
reduction. The poverty evolutions in Figure IV.1 are drawn only for the selected simulations 𝐵𝐴𝑈, 
𝑆1, 𝑆2 and 𝑆"1 for a good visualization
36. For the remaining simulations, the detailed results are 
presented at national level in the appendix.  
                                                 
36 In fact, some simulations might overlap because they present a very similar poverty path, albeit with marginal 
differences. Figure V.1 only shows evidence that policy options concerning catastrophic health payments have a 
potential for poverty reduction and does not intend to compare simulations of different types.   
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Scenario 𝑆2 shows the large impact on poverty reduction at national level (2.26 percentage points) 
among the full expenditure coverage scenarios. In this scenario the government takes the burden 
off households by removing the financial shock of out-of-pocket health expenditures, using 
uniform direct tax rate for institutions as a funding option. This illustrates the potentially 
significant implications of catastrophic health expenditures on households’ welfare. 
The scenarios lowering import tariffs and increasing subsidies to the health sector also have 
poverty reducing effects, albeit marginal for the subsidy scenario. Regarding this direction, larger 
shocks would affect more prices and would have greater impacts. All simulations have the effect 
of increasing the consumption of health goods compared to the baseline, especially for the subsidy 
simulation, as indicated in Table IV.A5 in the appendix. In general, the growth rate of health group 
consumption is higher for urban non-agricultural and rich households with 4% for 𝑆"2, and around 
3.7% for 𝑆1. 
On average, rural areas experience a larger reduction in poverty than urban areas in almost all the 
simulations. For example, the poverty rate in the whole rural area decreases by 2.69 percentage 
points in 𝑆2 compared to the counterfactual scenario, while there is a reduction of 1.7 percentage 
points in urban areas. 
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Figure IV.1: Poverty evolution per household type for selected simulations 
  
     
Source: The author   
The comparison of full coverage simulations with the partial coverage simulation and the tariff 
and subsidy simulations, requires taking into account the endogenous government revenue losses 
beyond the estimated direct cost in Table IV.5. Therefore, we calculate the response of poverty 
reduction in unit of government revenue loss (ξ) for simulations  𝑆2 ,  𝑆′2 (that show, respectively, 
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larger impacts among the full coverage and partial coverage simulations), for import tariff and 
subsidy simulations. These effects are expressed as absolute poverty reduction per unit of average 
government revenue loss over the simulation period for each scenario.  
 
Table IV.5: Poverty reduction and policy costs with respect to national poverty 
Simulations Poverty 
reduction 
𝑷𝟎𝒊𝒏𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒂𝒍- 
𝑷𝟎𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟎 
Estimated direct cost 
in year t 
Estimated direct 
cost average over 
the simulation 
period (billion 
CFA) 
Average 
government 
revenue loss, 
endogenous 
 (billion CFA)  
 𝑺𝟐 9.31 ∑ 𝑂𝑚. 𝑌𝑚
𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1  = ∑ 𝑇𝑚
ℎ  – 𝜉𝑐  𝑌𝑚
ℎ𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1  
20.6  29.7 
 𝑺′𝟐 9.47 ∑
1
2
𝑂𝑚. 𝑌𝑚
𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1  = ∑
1
2
(𝑇𝑚
ℎ  – 𝜉𝑐  𝑌𝑚
ℎ𝑀ℎ 
𝑚=1 ) 10.3  
76.5 
𝑺"𝟏 8.75 pwm(t) QM(t) EXR(t) tm0 (1
−  (1 −  τ) 𝑛 ) 
0.018 44.1 
𝑺"𝟐 7.12 − 𝑃𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ  (𝑡)𝑄𝐴ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ  (𝑡)𝑡𝑎ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ  (1
−   (1 +  ρ) 𝑛 ) 
1.66 10.0 
 
Note: On May 23, 2014, 479.576 CFA Franc (African Financial Community) = US $1 (OANDA, 2014). This is the currency used 
in West Africa. 
Source: The author 
 
As shown in Figure IV.2, subsidizing the health sector (𝑆"2) and full coverage of catastrophic out-
of-pocket health expenditures financed by a uniform tax on institutions (𝑆2) are found to yield 
greater efficiency gains in the long run, than the other simulations.   
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Figure IV.2: Poverty reduction per unit of government revenue loss for specific simulations  
  
 
Source: The author 
In addition, we analyze the public transfers’ effectiveness of the full coverage scenario (financed 
by uniform direct taxes) between household groups ℎ by scaling their relative poverty change 
(𝑃0𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
ℎ − 𝑃02020
ℎ )/𝑃0𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
ℎ) to the specific amount of money they received. Figure IV.3 
shows the variation of the poverty reduction per unit of money received, for each household group. 
Our results indicate higher effectiveness for agricultural households, especially those in urban 
areas who are the most frequently affected by catastrophic health payments. 
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Figure IV.3: Relative variation of poverty per billion transferred (average over the 
simulation period) for specific household groups 
 
 
Source: The author 
 
IV.5. Conclusion   
 
This paper has outlined the issue of integrating the relationship between health expenditures and 
productivity in a dynamic CGE model. It also focused on the impact of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
health payments on the economy, taking the specific case of Senegal over the period 2011-2020. 
According to the analysis of out-of-pocket health payments, there is evidence that many 
households are pushed into poverty by unforeseeable catastrophic expenditures. The idea that 
health good consumption has a positive impact on productivity is widely recognized in the existing 
literature, especially in microeconomics. This paper simulates the macroeconomic impact of 
alternative government policies to protect households from the effects of catastrophic payment 
overshoot. 
It also examines the ways in which policies affect health good prices, their consumption, 
productivity, and ultimately the level of poverty. The model is a recursive dynamic CGE with the 
agricultural technical progress modeled as endogenous and depending on the change of health 
consumption over time. Results reveal that policies reducing the cost and promoting consumption 
of health goods have a significant and positive impact on the agricultural sector growth and 
important spillover effects on the rest of the economy. The simulations also show considerable 
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productivity gains and poverty reducing effects resulting from policies protecting vulnerable 
households against large unpredictable financial costs of illness. 
The various scenarios show that programs protecting against catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
expenses are workable options to reduce the long term impoverishing effects on vulnerable 
households. The potential returns in terms of reducing poverty and enhancing long term economic 
growth far outweigh related potential fiscal costs. The results highlight the need to have an efficient 
health care system that does not put the entire financial burden of health services on households, 
in particular in the case of major illnesses. The gains in terms of long term growth and progress in 
poverty reduction can be substantial. Subsidizing the provision of health goods and providing full 
coverage of catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures through uniform taxes on institutions 
can be cost effective policy options. The main target of such policies should be poor and more 
vulnerable groups, such as rural and urban agricultural households, who are the most affected by 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures.  
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Appendix 
Table IV.A1: Model sets, parameters, and variables 
Symbol Explanation Symbol Explanation 
Sets    
 
Activities ( )c CMR C   
Regionally imported 
commodities 
 
Activities with a Leontief function at 
the top of the technology nest 
( )c CMNR C   Non-regionally imported 
commodities 
 
Commodities 
 
Transaction service 
commodities 
 
Commodities with domestic sales of 
domestic output  
Commodities with domestic 
production  
 
Commodities not in CD 
 
Factors 
 
Exported commodities  
 
Institutions (domestic and rest 
of world) 
 
Commodities not in CE 
 
Domestic institutions 
( )c CM C   Aggregate imported commodities 
  
Domestic non-government 
institutions 
 
Commodities not in CM 
 
Households 
Parameters    
 
Weight of commodity c in the CPI 
 
Import price (foreign currency) 
 
Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index cr
pwmr
 
Import price by region (foreign 
currency) 
 
Quantity of c as intermediate input per 
unit of activity a  
Quantity of stock change 
 
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per unit of c’ produced and sold 
domestically  
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
 
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’  
Base-year quantity of private 
investment demand 
cc ricer   
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per exported unit of c’ from 
region r  
Share for domestic institution i 
in income of factor f 
 
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’   
Share of net income of i’ to i 
(i’  INSDNG’; i  INSDNG) 
cc ricmr   
Quantity of commodity c as trade 
input per imported unit of c’ from 
region r 
 
Tax rate for activity a 
 
Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input per activity unit  
Exogenous direct tax rate for 
domestic institution i 
 
Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input per activity unit  
0-1 parameter with 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
 
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i  
Import tariff rate 
 
0-1 parameter with 1 for institutions 
with potentially flexed direct tax rates cr
tmr  Regional import tariff 
 
Export price (foreign currency)   Rate of sales tax 
crpwer  
Export price by region (foreign 
currency)  
Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
Greek symbols   
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES activity 
function  
CET function share parameter 
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function  
CES value-added function share parameter 
for factor f in activity a 
a A
( )a ALEO A 
c C ( )c CT C 
( )c CD C  ( )c CX C 
( )c CDN C  f F
( )c CE C  i INS
( )c CEN C  ( )i INSD INS 
( )i INSDNG INSD 
( )c CMN C  ( )h H INSDNG 
ccwts cpwm
cdwts
caica cqdst
'ccicd cqg
'ccice cqinv
ifshif
'ccicm 'iishii
ata
ainta itins
aiva itins01
imps ctm
imps01
cpwe ctq
  i ftrnsfr
a
a
t
c
va
a
va
fa
m 
ch  
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Shift parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
 
Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
 
Armington function shift parameter 
 
Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
 
CET function shift parameter       CES production function exponent 
m
c  
Shift parameter in the CES regional import 
function  
CES value-added function exponent 
e
c  
Shift parameter in the CES regional export 
function  
Domestic commodity aggregation function 
exponent 
a  Capital sectoral mobility factor  Armington function exponent 
 
Marginal share of consumption spending on 
marketed commodity c for household h  
CET function exponent 
 
CES activity function share parameter 
m
c  
Regional imports aggregation function 
exponent 
 
Share parameter for domestic commodity 
aggregation function 
e
c  
Regional exports aggregation function 
exponent 
 
Armington function share parameter 
a
fat  Sector share of new capital 
f  
Capital depreciation rate   
Exogenous variables   
 
Consumer price index  
 
Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for base) 
 
Change in domestic institution tax share  (= 
0 for base; exogenous variable)  
Quantity supplied of factor 
  Foreign savings (FCU)  
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
 
Government consumption adjustment factor 
 
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
 
Investment adjustment factor   
Endogenous variables   
a
ftAWF  Average capital rental rate in time period t  
Quantity demanded of factor f from 
activity a 
 
Change in domestic institution savings rates 
(= 0 for base; exogenous variable)  
Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
 
Producer price index for domestically 
marketed output  
Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
 
Government expenditures 
 
Quantity of household home consumption 
of commodity c from activity a for 
household h 
 
Consumption spending for household 
 
Quantity of aggregate intermediate input 
 Exchange rate (LCU  per unit of FCU)  
Quantity of commodity c as intermediate 
input to activity a 
 
Government consumption share in nominal 
absorption  
Quantity of investment demand for 
commodity 
 
Government savings 
 
Quantity of imports of commodity c 
 
Investment share in nominal absorption 
crQMR  
Quantity of imports of commodity c by 
region r 
 
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government institution 
(exogenous variable) 
crQER  
Quantity of exports of commodity c 
to region r 
 
Activity price (unit gross revenue) 
 
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite supply) 
 
Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically 
  
Quantity of commodity demanded 
as trade input 
 
Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically  
Quantity of (aggregate) value-added 
ac
c
q
c ac
t
c
a
a
va
a
ac
c
q
c
m
ch
t
c
a
a
ac
ac
q
c
CPI MPSADJ
DTINS fQFS
FSAV TINSADJ
GADJ faWFDIST
IADJ
faQF
DMPS cQG
DPI chQH
EG achQHA
hEH aQINTA
EXR caQINT
GOVSHR cQINV
GSAV cQM
INVSHR
iMPS
aPA cQQ
cPDD cQT
cPDS aQVA
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Export price (domestic currency) 
 
Aggregated quantity of domestic 
output of commodity 
crPER  
Export price by region (domestic 
currency) 
  
Quantity of output of commodity c 
from activity a 
 
Aggregate intermediate input price 
for activity a f
RWF  Real average factor price 
ftPK  Unit price of capital in time period t   Total nominal absorption 
 
Import price (domestic currency) 
 
Direct tax rate for institution i (i  
INSDNG) 
crPMR  
Import price by region (domestic 
currency)  
Transfers from institution i’ to i 
(both in the set INSDNG) 
 
Composite commodity price 
 
Average price of factor 
 
Value-added price (factor income per 
unit of activity)  
Income of factor f 
 
Aggregate producer price for 
commodity  
Government revenue 
 
Producer price of commodity c for 
activity a  
Income of domestic non-
government institution 
 
Quantity (level) of activity 
 
Income to domestic institution i 
from factor f 
 
Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output 
a
fatK  
Quantity of new capital by activity a 
for time period t 
 
Quantity of exports   
Source: Adapted from Lofgren et al (2002) and Thurlow (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cPE cQX
acQXAC
aPINTA
TABS
cPM iTINS
'iiTRII
cPQ fWF
aPVA fYF
cPX YG
acPXAC iYI
aQA ifYIF
cQD
cQE
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Table IV.A2: Model equations 
Production and price equations  
c a ca aQINT ica QINTA   (A1) 
a c ca
c C
PINTA PQ ica

   (A2) 
 
vava
aa
1
-
va va vaf
a a f a f a f a
f F
QVA  QF

  


 
    
 
  (A3) 
 
   
1
1
'
1
va va
a a
faf a a a
va vaf va vaf
f a f a f a f a f a f a
f F
W WFDIST PVA tva QVA
QF QF
 
   

  

     
 
     
 

 (A4) 
   (1 )
vava va
aa a
1
-
a a a
a a a a a a
f F
QA  QVA QINTA
 
  
 

 
      
 
     (A5) 
(1 )a a a a a a aPA ta QA PVA QVA PINTA QINTA        (A6) 
a c a c aQXAC QA   (A7) 
a ac ac
c C
PA PXAC 

   (A8) 
1
1accac
cac ac
c c a c a c
a A
QX QXAC

 




 
   
 
  (A9) 
1
1
'
ac ac
c cac ac
ca c c a c a c a c a c
a A
PXAC   = QX QXAC  QXACPX
  

  

 
     
 
  (A10) 
 '
'
c r c r c c c r
c CT
PER pwer EXR PQ icer

     (A11) 
 
ee
cc
1
-
e e
c c c r c r
r R
QE  QER

 


 
   
 
  (A12) 
   
1
1e ec cc r e e
c r c r c r c r c r
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(See section IV.3.1 for health)  
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System constraints and macroeconomic closures  
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Productivity growth  
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Note:  
CET: Constant Elasticity of Transformation  
CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution 
CPI: Consumer Price Index 
FCU: Foreign Currency Unit  
LCU: Local Currency Unit  
Source: Adapted from Lofgren et al (2002) and Thurlow (2004)  
 
 
Table IV.A3: Estimation of the elasticity of productivity with respect to health 
expenditures 𝛝 
Variables  MMEL-2SRI 2SLS 
   
Land  0.418*** 0.380*** 
 (0.071) (0.054) 
Fertilizer 0.0297** 0.0445*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0077) 
Capital 0.0343*** 0.0276*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Labor  0.0208* 0.0159* 
 (0.0108) (0.008) 
Health spending (Ψ) : 𝛝 0.111*** 0.117*** 
 (0.0318) (0.034) 
Ψ residual  -0.0128  
 (0.010)  
Constant : ς 0.495** 0.484** 
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 (0.215) (0.223) 
   
Observations 1,499 1,499 
Log-pseudo likelihood  -2567.88  
σ(𝒖𝟎) 0.313  
 (0.093)  
   
Hansen J-statistic (P-value)  0.149 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic  16.08 
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic (P-value)  0.00 
   
Notes:  
The dependent variable is the output. The variables are in logarithm.  
Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
MMEL: Multilevel mixed-effects linear regression.  
2SRI: Two-Stage Residual Inclusion. 
2SLS: Two-Stage Least Square.  
The first step results are available but not reported. The instruments for health expenditures are: age of household 
head, education of household head, private health center frequentation, house ownership, radio, improved toilet, type 
of activity, wall material, use of mosquitoes and vaccine.  
“Ψ residual” represents the residual from this regression. 
The regressions presented in Table IV.A3 are the logarithm transformations of the following production function:  
y = 𝐴 ∏ 𝑥𝑖
𝛽𝑖𝑛
𝑖=1  With   log 𝐴 = 𝛼0 + ϑ Ψ + 𝜇0 , y is the output, xi the traditional inputs and Ψ the health spending.         
The exogenous shock μ(ℎ, 𝑡0)  is calibrated using the sum of the residuals “Ψ residual” across the household groups. 
It is expressed in the SAM unit and is distributed as follows: rural agricultural poor (3.67), rural agricultural rich 
(5.20), rural non-agricultural poor (3.51), rural non-agricultural rich (8.87), urban agricultural poor (0.18), urban 
agricultural rich (0.87), urban non-agricultural poor (3.50), urban non-agricultural rich (14.62).  
Source: The author 
 
Table IV.A4: Poverty P0 evolution for all the simulations 
  BAU 𝑺𝟏 𝑺𝟐 𝑺𝟑 𝑺𝟒 𝑺𝟓 𝑺′𝟏 𝑺′𝟐 𝑺′𝟑 𝑺′𝟒 𝟓 𝑺"𝟏 𝑺"𝟐 
2011  46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 46.71 
2020  39.65 38.15 37.39 37.76 37.40 37.47 39.13 37.24 38.52 37.35 39.13 37.96 39.58 
Source: The author 
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Table IV.A5: Health good consumption growth rate per household group and for selected 
simulations   
Source: The author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Initial value  BAU 𝑺𝟏 𝑺𝟐 𝑺𝟑 𝑺𝟒 𝑺𝟓 𝑺′𝟏 𝑺"𝟏 𝑺"𝟐 
Rural agricultural poor 5.20 3.02 3.11 3.18 3.12 3.16 3.13 3.06 3.05 3.72 
Rural agricultural rich 4.21 2.96 3.08 3.14 3.09 3.12 3.10 3.02 3.00 3.66 
Rural non-agricultural poor 5.64 2.89 3.10 3.15 3.11 3.14 3.13 2.99 2.94 3.58 
Rural non-agricultural rich 14.01 2.96 3.23 3.28 3.24 3.27 3.26 3.10 3.01 3.67 
Urban agricultural poor 0.84 1.53 1.92 2.02 1.93 1.96 1.94 1.72 1.59 2.01 
Urban agricultural rich 1.45 3.28 3.29 3.36 3.29 3.35 3.35 3.28 3.41 3.87 
Urban non-agricultural poor 9.40 3.34 3.50 3.59 3.53 3.58 3.58 3.42 3.49 3.94 
Urban non-agricultural rich 59.18 3.40 3.63 3.71 3.77 3.70 3.70 3.52 3.53 4.00 
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V.1. Introduction  
 
Africa is one of the most growing regions in the world, and in the 2000s six African countries were 
among the world ten fastest growing countries (AFD, 2012). However, despite this performance 
over the last decades, it is widely recognized that poverty is still persistent. Therefore, getting 
empirical evidence on growth-poverty linkages and analyzing the policy options could help the 
governments strengthen their ongoing poverty reduction agenda. There is timely research question 
to assess poverty-growth linkages in order to better understand and evaluate Pro Poor Growth 
(PPG) strategies. Devising Pro Poor Growth strategies demand the knowledge of both growth-
poverty and policy-growth linkages. Hence, at a conventional level, we need to assess the patterns 
through which growth translates into poverty as well as the way policies generate growth. 
Many studies have analyzed PPG through the comparison of growth-poverty linkages across the 
economic sectors (Diao et al., 2005; Christiaensen et al. 2006; Dorosh and Thurlow, 2014). 
However, most of the existing approaches have shortcomings in identifying key sectors as they 
only focus on the growth-poverty linkage by assuming exogenous growth and therefore ignoring 
the policy-growth side. Analogously, the existing studies that investigate key policies only assess 
the policy-growth linkages (Fan and Zhang, 2004; Benin et. al, 2009). Only very few studies assess 
the policy-poverty linkage in a reduced form, but without explicitly separating policy-growth and 
growth-poverty linkages and without focusing on a specific range of policy programs (Fan et al. 
2000, Fan and Rosegrant, 2008). 
Thus, deriving key sectors without integrating comprehensively the growth-poverty and the 
policy-growth linkages leads to partial and biased results. The cost issues to generate growth, and 
in turn poverty reduction have to be investigated. 
The derivation of the policy-growth relationship can be found in Benin et al (2009). They estimated 
the effects of different types of public spending on agriculture, education, health and rural roads 
on agricultural productivity through a simultaneous equations modeling approach, using public 
expenditure data at district and regional level and household-level agriculture production data in 
Ghana. One of their results was that an increase in the public spending in the agricultural sector by 
1% is associated with a 0.15 % increase in agricultural productivity, with a higher effect with 
development expenditures. Likewise, Dial et al. (2010) undertake CGE simulation to analyze 
agricultural growth and investment options for poverty reduction in Nigeria. They estimate the 
growth elasticity of public investments at 0.24 percent per year using historical data for spending 
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and agricultural total factor productivity (TPF) growth and by assuming that there is a Cobb-
Douglas type relationship between TPF and public investment. However, they do not analyze the 
impact of specific and disaggregated agriculture related policies. 
Fan and Zhang (2004) focus on the impact of specific spending such as Research and Development 
(R&D), and Infrastructure on rural non-farm productivity and agricultural productivity in China. 
Similarly, Fan and Rosegrant (2008), based on the IFPRI’s IMPACT model and poverty-growth 
elasticities estimated the average technical progress induced by the total budget expenditure for 
agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs. They considered the public investment drivers 
affecting agricultural growth, such as agricultural research, irrigation, and rural roads. However, 
these analyses did not estimate technical progress in specific subsectors, and did not explicitly 
integrate the composition of budget spending for different policy programs and the different policy 
options to mobilize resources. 
The literature on the identification of key sectors shows different methodologies, stimulating too 
many discussions and wide debates about the most convenient approach to use. A large part of 
them seeks to rank sectors by distinguishing the activities that have important interdependence 
(backward and forward linkages)37 with the rest of the economy using Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) framework or micro economic data (Rasmussen, 1956; Hirschman 1958; Haggblade, 
Hazel, and Brown 1989; Lenzen, 2003; Cai and Leung, 2004, Temurshoev and Oosterhaven, 
2013). Another trend uses a General Equilibrium Approach (CGE) to integrate price and re-
allocation effects in their linkage analyses (Byerlee, 1973; Bautista and Thomas, 1998). Likewise, 
using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach, more recent studies have compared 
economic sectors by examining the supply side multipliers that give the effects of sector-led 
productivity growth, especially in agriculture, on the economy and on household welfare (Diao et 
al 2005, Christiaensen et al. 2006, Dorosh and Thrulow, 2014). 
This paper will also compare the Growth Poverty Multiplier (GPM) commonly used in the above 
mentioned papers and that incorporates a sector’s economic linkages to poor households with a 
new concept of Poverty Growth Elasticity (PGE) we introduce. With this metric, the sector size 
criterion is additionally taken into account when identifying the key sectors. As pointed out by 
                                                 
37
Backward linkages relate to the dependence of a given economic sector on inputs produced from other sectors. 
Forward linkages refer to the situation where the growth of a given sector leads to growth of the other sectors that use 
its output as input.    
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Diao et al. (2010) the size of the subsectors in the economy is among the factor to consider in 
designing an agricultural strategy and prioritizing growth. These two concepts (GPM and PGE) 
might lead to controversial results depending on how one weighs the initial contribution of the 
sectors to the economy (in terms of sector size) and their interdependencies with the rest of the 
economy among the criteria that determine key sectoral status. Fortunately, the controversial 
debate that might resurge from the calculations of the PGE and GPM concepts is not necessary as 
both of these concepts fail to inform about the required costs to achieve poverty reduction. The 
costs associated with the various investment options are far more critical to consider in weighing 
the various investment options needed to induce economic growth in the different economic 
sectors. 
In this framework, we follow the literature and combine econometric approaches estimating 
policy-growth relation with modeling approaches of growth-poverty relation. Our Policy Impact 
Function (PIF) models the policy-growth linkage and brings valuable contribution to the literature 
in various ways. It allows the consideration of the cost issues for a straightforward identification 
of the key sectors by explicitly taking into account both their growth-poverty reduction potential 
and their responsiveness to government spending.   
Besides, the estimation of the PIF includes all relevant agricultural policy instruments and non-
agricultural spending in a set a sector specific nested two stage function. In fact, we not only 
disaggregate public spending in economic activities between Public Agricultural Expenditures 
(PAE) and Public Non-agricultural Expenditures (PNE), but also explicitly integrate different 
policy programs such as water and land management, farm management policies for food crops, 
animals or export crops, investments in road and storage related infrastructure, Research and 
Development and Extension services. Our PIF simultaneously assesses the impact of the different 
policy programs and therefore allows the integration of the complementary effects between those 
programs. 
The policy-growth relationships expressed through the policy impact function are sector and 
subsector specific because optimal budget allocation into agricultural and non-agricultural policy 
programs might vary across the different economic sectors and the same budget allocation might 
translate into different effective budgets inducing different technical progress in different sectors. 
Besides, our approach allows for diminishing and increasing returns of investments while existing 
approaches assume constant return that could be unrealistic in the real world.  
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Based on our approach, we can identify the key sectors and key policies. Furthermore, we can use 
the policy impact function to derive optimal allocations to realize maximal achievements for given 
policy goals. The issue of optimal allocations has been often overlooked in most of the previous 
studies. Beyond identifying key sectors, the distribution of spending across subsector and sector 
specific policy programs can also influence the effectiveness of budget allocation and boost 
productivity, which, in turn, might generate significant results in terms of policy outcomes, 
especially poverty alleviation. This intra-sectoral allocation of public spending still remains an 
underexplored area of research. Improvement of budget allocation and better management 
practices are one of the pre-requisites to guarantee the success of development policies. An 
Effective budget allocation and an orientation of the budget toward the key sectors and key policy 
programs might be an appropriate tool for reducing poverty. For instance, in Africa, despite the 
fact that agriculture has a large share in employment, governments allocate little money to this 
sector, which should be intuitively a key component of development strategies given its linkage to 
poor households. In fact, the vast majority of African countries have generally failed to achieve 
the 10% budget allocation to agriculture as promoted by the Comprehensive African Agricultural 
Development Program (CAADP)38. 
Contrary to most of the previous studies that investigate the policy-growth linkage, our approach 
is applicable at country level and takes into account country specifities. The use of cross-country 
analyses might affect the estimations as pointed out in (Heady at al., 2009). In fact, because of the 
problem to get adequate time-series data to estimate country specific Policy Impact Function (PIF), 
they recommended to use additional information from expert data. Previous authors also warranted 
the need to use country specific survey data instead of cross-country regressions that might yield 
too much broad insights and do not integrate idiosyncratic factors. (See Palaniswamy and Birner 
2006; Bezemer and Headey 2008). 
Our approach to estimate the PIF combines in an innovative way empirical data on sectoral input 
and output, and country expert data collected in personal interviews. To do this, we apply a 
Bayesian alternative to Generalized Maximum Entropy and Generalized Cross Entropy (Heckelei 
et al., 2008) in order to estimate the PIF and link spending on both non-agricultural and agricultural 
                                                 
38 An African leaders’ collective vision, is set in order to promote agricultural-led growth. The member states of the 
African Union committed to achieve at least 6% growth in the Agriculture sector and to devote 10% of their 
national budgets to agriculture development.   
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policy programs within the CAADP to a set of political outcomes, including welfare of the 
population. The expert data are used to get prior information on the levels and the ranges of the 
parameters of the PIF.  
Furthermore, we derive an integrated approach of policy-growth and growth-policy linkages by 
integrating the PIF into a Quasi-Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium (DCGE).   
Finally, our approach can be directly linked with the political economy models explaining the role 
of political incentives and policy beliefs (knowledge) of government investing in agriculture and 
non-agriculture sectors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section V.2 introduces the theoretical framework of 
this paper. Section V.3 presents the methodological framework that basically relies on the 
integrated PIF-CGE approach. In Section V.4, we present the estimation strategy and the 
econometric models with an application to Senegal. Section V.5 discusses the results.  
V.2. Defining the key sectors and key policies: a theoretical framework  
 
The logic of our Policy Impact Function is underlined in Figure V.1. The latter illustrates the way 
different options of policy interventions like those within the CAADP translate in terms of 
achievement of different policy outcomes like poverty reduction (𝑍2), farm income (𝑍1), provision 
of public goods (𝑍3), urban consumer income (𝑍5), welfare of the export sector (𝑍4), welfare of 
the indusry sector (𝑍6) and sustainability (𝑍7). 
These policy programs intervene in both the agricultural and the non-agricultural sector. They can 
be categorized into policy programs promoting technical progress, such as intervention related to 
natural resource (land and water policies), human resource (extension services and Research and 
Development) and farm management (improved access to fertilizer, pesticides, and higher quality 
seeds), and policy related to market access such as investment in roads and storage infrastructure. 
Policy programs might impact differently growth in the different sectors, which, in turn, might 
induce different levels of poverty reduction or achievements in other policy outcomes.  
Let us denote by 𝑍𝑘 the achieved political outcome (For example the poverty reduction level  𝑍2) 
and 𝑤𝑠 the growth rate of a sector 𝑠. 𝐵𝑒 is the amount of budget expenditure used to promote 
growth. We can formalize the poverty-growth linkage and the policy-growth linkage in the 
following manner. 
𝑍𝑘 = CGE(𝑤𝑠)     (1)  and 𝑤𝑠= PIF(Be)    (2)  
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Based on this framework, a key sector is a sector for which additional budget investment induces 
high poverty reduction. This implies that key sectors are characterized by the following properties: 
high growth-policies linkages and efficient policy-growth relations. Formally, we define key 
sectors as sectors for which additional budget investment is the most effective regarding poverty 
reduction. Thus, formally it follows: 
𝜕𝑍𝑘
𝜕𝐵𝑒
 = 
𝜕𝐶𝐺𝐸
𝜕𝑤𝑠
 . 
𝜕𝑃𝐼𝐹
𝜕𝐵𝑒
   (3) 
The resulting metric (
𝜕𝑍𝑘
𝜕𝐵𝑒
, 𝑘 = 2) is called PPG-elasticity. Obviously, the PPG elasticity is 
separated into independent partial derivatives. The first term is the marginal growth impact 
corresponding to Growth Poverty Elasticity (GPE), and the second term is the marginal 
productivity denoted by 𝑀𝐵𝑃.     
According to our framework, assessing the key sectors using only CGE elasticities (Diao et al., 
2005; Christiaensen et al. 2006; Dorosh and Thurlow, 2014) is incomplete and may lead to biased 
results because it fails to integrate the policy-growth linkages. For example, let us consider a sector 
like telecommunication in Senegal, which has a high technical progress (t.p.) and which is also 
related to the poor, e.g. has high CGE-elasticities.39 But, assume like it is in fact the case for 
Senegal that this sector has already reached his t.p. potentials, e.g. cannot, or only slightly be 
improved via policy programs. This implies that state budget investments in promoting t.p. in this 
sector have a very low productivity. Given all this, our comprehensive analysis will not identify 
this sector as being a key while traditional approaches will wrongfully do.  
The above framework and the provided illustration demonstrate the shortcomings of existing 
approaches and the usefulness of our new approach.  
Similarly, key policies for poverty reduction are policies that are efficient in reducing poverty. 
More precisely, they are policies that are efficient in producing technical progress in sectors that 
lead to a high poverty reduction. Formally, we have  
PPG(𝛾𝑝) =  ∑
𝜕𝐶𝐺𝐸
𝜕𝑤𝑠
 .
𝜕𝑃𝐼𝐹
𝜕𝛾𝑝
 𝑠      (4) 
Following our framework, finding the most effective Pro Poor Growth strategies requires firstly 
the identification of key economic sectors that when leading growth have the highest impacts on 
                                                 
39 Growth in the Telecommunication sector induces favorable consumer price change for all the households. This is 
in relation with the fact that Telecommunications is the only sector among private services for whom products have 
relatively an important budget share in the consumption structure of all the households, even those in rural areas.  
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the income of the poor households. Secondly, it requires to identify the key policy programs that 
are likely to induce economic growth at a minimal cost by investing a minimal amount of budget. 
 
Figure V.1: Intervention logic of the policy programs  
 
Source: Authors  
 
V.3. Methodological approach: an integrated PIF-CGE approach 
 
V.3.A. The concepts of CGE-elasticity  
 
The Poverty Growth Elasticity (PGE)  is defined and calculated to assess the impact of total factor 
productivity growth in the different economic sectors on the policy concerns, 𝑍𝑘 ; 𝑘 = 1,2, … ,7, 
reminded below. This metric is the linear growth rate for the seven policy concerns induced by an 
increase of the technical progress in each single sector s from 1% in the base run scenario to 10 % 
in the different simulations (sim).  
𝛥𝑡𝑝𝑠 = 𝛥𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑠𝑖𝑚 - 𝛥𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 10% -1%        (5) 
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𝜉𝑧𝑘 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸 = (
𝑍𝑘𝑡
𝑠𝑖𝑚− 𝑍𝑘𝑡
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
 𝑍𝑘0
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 ) 
1
𝑡 𝛥𝑡𝑝𝑠  
              (6) 
Z1= Real net-income of small-scale farmer households  
Z2= Normalized poverty measure overshoot from the poverty line 
Micro simulation modules can be used to assess impacts on poverty. In our application on Senegal 
data, the micro simulation module is calibrated to Poverty Monitoring Surveys. Endogenous 
changes in consumption resulting from the CGE model are passed down to the household by 
mapping each of the household in the micro simulation model to the corresponding household in 
the CGE40. We used a non-parametric micro simulation where the calculated poverty indexes are 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family of poverty measures. 
𝐹𝐺𝑇 =  
1
𝑁
 ∑ (
𝑧−𝑦𝑖
𝑧
)
𝛼
 
𝑖=1 .  𝐼(𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝑧)      (7) 
For α = 0  the FGT index collapses to the headcount ratio 𝑃0  and α = 1 gives the poverty gap 
index (𝑃1) that measures the extent to which individuals are poor.  
The poverty reduction concern 𝑍2 is measured as 100 (1 −  𝑃1 ). 
Z3= Public goods, e.g. total state revenue subtracted by CAADP budget and transfers 
Z4= Sum of total GDP generated in the export sector 
Z5= Real net-income of urban consumer households 
Z6= Sum of total GDP generated in industry sector 
Z7= Negative of the sum of total purchased input payments per hectare of agricultural land 
The PGE concept informs on how an increase of a sector’s output by 1 percent (e.g. from 
investment to raise productivity) impacts on poverty reduction while the CGE-multiplier relies on 
an absolute unit increase. The corresponding Growth Poverty Multiplier (GPM) controls for the 
size of the sector being shocked and by normalizing the PGE by an index of sector size.  
V.3.B. The two-stage Policy Impact Function  
 
The Policy Impact Function is a political technology 𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑠( 𝑍, 𝛾) that translates policy programs 
𝛾 into policy outcomes (the concerns 𝑍𝑘).  
                                                 
40 See (Colombo, 2010) for explanation of survey data and CGE model linkages.  
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In fact, in order to capture the importance of different policy programs 𝛾 ϵ P (set of policies) on 
technical progress realized in a specific sector s, a two-stage policy impact functions 𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑠 (γ) are 
defined for each sector s as follows:  
𝑡𝑝𝑠 =  𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑠 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑥.𝑎𝑠𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
−𝑒𝑥.𝑏𝑠)
1+ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑒𝑥.𝑎𝑠𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
−𝑒𝑥.𝑏𝑠)
    (8)     
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓 =  𝜔𝑠  [∑ 𝜇𝑠𝑝𝑝  (𝛾𝑝) 
−𝜌𝐼𝐹]
−1
𝜌𝐼𝐹⁄   (9) 
 
Equation (9) transforms budget allocation into effective budget allocation following a Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) specification. In equation (8) effective budget is transformed into 
technical progress using a logistic function where 𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑠 represents the maximal technical progress 
that can be achieved via governmental policies. The marginal impacts of additional effective 
budget spending are diminishing and approximate zero for a sufficient large effective budget. 
The shifter parameter s is accordingly normalized such as with an optimal budget allocation; the 
effective budget equals the total budget (𝐵𝑒), 𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝛾) =  𝐵𝑒(𝛾) =  ∑ 𝛾𝑝𝑝  , and is lower for any 
non-optimal budget allocation. 
Assuming growth through technical progress, the overall poverty-growth linkage can be linearly 
approximated as follows.  
Where 𝑤𝑧𝑘= ∑ 𝜉𝑧𝑘 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸
𝑠  (𝑡𝑝𝑠 – 𝑡𝑝𝑠
0 )  + 𝑤𝑧𝑘
0              (10) 
Where 𝜉𝑧𝑘 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸   represents the Poverty Growth Elasticities (PGEs) and 𝑤𝑧𝑘 is the induced growth rate 
of the different policy concerns, including poverty reduction for 𝑘 = 2.  
𝑤𝑧𝑘
0  is the growth rate of the policy concerns 𝑍𝑘 at the baseline scenario, e.g. simulation of the 
current path of the economy and 𝑡𝑝𝑠
0 is technical progress at the base. In our case study 𝜉𝑧𝑘 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸   and 
𝑤𝑧
0 are computed using simulations from the dynamic extension of the standard model developed 
by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (see Lofgren 2002 and Thurlow, 2004). 
The CGE model is calibrated by using the 2011 agricultural and regional Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) that we have built for Senegal. 
𝑡𝑝𝑠  is the technical progress in the sector 𝑠 generated as expressed in equation (8).  
Futhermore, we can analyze the effectiveness of the different CAADP policy programs by deriving 
the marginal impacts on poverty reduction (𝑍2) for each policy program to understand how 
policies translate into outcomes. This corresponds to the marginal decrease in poverty that would 
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be achieved if the budget expenditure within a specific policy program is increased by one unit. 
They are derived as follows.   
PPG(𝛾𝑝) =  ∑ 𝜉𝑍2 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸
𝑠   
𝜕𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝛾𝑝
   (11) 
With  
𝜕𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝛾𝑝
 = 𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑠  𝑒𝑥. 𝑎𝑠 
exp(𝑒𝑥.𝑎𝑠𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
−𝑒𝑥.𝑏𝑠)
(1+exp(𝑒𝑥.𝑎𝑠𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
−𝑒𝑥.𝑏𝑠)) 2
 
𝜕𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝜕𝛾𝑝
 = 𝑒𝑥. 𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑝𝑠 (1 −  
𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑠
⁄ ) 
𝜕𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝜕𝛾𝑝
  (12) 
Thus the marginal impact of 𝛾𝑝 is   
𝜕𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝛾𝑝
 = 𝑒𝑥. 𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑝𝑠 (1 −  
𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝑡𝑝̅̅̅𝑠
⁄ ) 𝜇𝑠𝑝  [
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑠
𝑒𝑓𝑓
𝛾𝑝
] 1+𝜌
𝐼𝐹
 𝜔𝑠
−ρ𝐼𝐹    (13) 
 
Thus, with our modelling framework, it is also possible to estimate the key policies that achieve 
the highest technical progress in sectors where growth generates the highest outcomes, focusing 
especially on poverty reduction. This derivation of key policies can provide guidance to decision 
makers for evidence-based decisions in order to efficiently define policies. Politicians generally 
fail to fully understand the relationship between political instruments and desired policy outcomes.   
V.4. Empirical application for Senegal  
 
V.4.A. Estimation strategy and econometric models  
 
i. Estimation of Technical progress  
 
Technical progress in all its aspects is hard to measure precisely, but its essential quantitative 
characteristic is to shift the production function enabling greater output to be produced with the 
same volume of inputs, or the same output with lesser inputs (Kennedy and Thirlwal, 1972). Prior 
to the estimation of the policy impact function, we applied the standard neo-classical growth 
accounting exercise to break down the output growth in production factor growth and growth of 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) that corresponds to the rate of technical progress in the different 
mesosectors (Solow, 1956; Solow, 1957). Assuming the special case of a neutral technical change, 
e.g. marginal rates of substitution untouched, the following production function is assumed for 
each of the sectors. 
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𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 f (𝑁𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 ), where 𝐴𝑡 represents the Total Factor Productivity (TFP),  𝑁𝑡 the labor 
force, 𝐾𝑡 the capital stock and  𝐿𝑡 the quantity of land only specified for the agricultural sectors.  
Furthermore, considering the Cobb-Douglas functional form f (𝑁𝑡, 𝐾𝑡, 𝐿𝑡 ) = 𝑁𝑡
𝛼𝐾𝑡
𝛽𝐿𝑡
𝛿 and 
differentiating totally the log-transformation with respect to time gives the following expression.  
?̇?
𝑌
 = 
?̇?
𝐴
+  𝛼 
?̇?
𝑁
+  𝛽 
?̇?
𝐾
+  𝛿  
?̇?
𝐿
  , 𝛼 +  𝛽 +  𝛿 =1          (14) 
The Total Factor Productivity growth 
?̇?
𝐴
  can be estimated using the equation (14) as the difference 
between output growth and a weighted sum of factor growths with weights equal to the factor 
shares. 
The Solow residual 
?̇?
𝐴
  might not measure only technical change, especially if the neoclassical 
assumptions do not hold. But despite potential shortcomings, it has been proven that the TFP 
growth computed from the above framework is highly correlated to the most sophisticated indexes 
that control measurement errors and market imperfections (Basu and Fernald, 1997). Furthermore, 
the trend of TFP growth is estimated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to the raw TPF 
series in order to control cyclical fluctuations. In fact, Total Factor Productivity Growth highly 
moves pro-cyclically e.g. tends to move in the same direction as the output. This filter has been 
used in many studies (Blackburn and Ravn, 1992, Kydland and Prescott, 1990; Baxter and King, 
1999; Ravn and Uhlig, 2002), despite being subject to some criticisms (Söderlind, 1994; Cogley 
and Nason, 1995). The Hodrick-Prescott framework will decompose the TFP growth 𝑇𝑡 =
?̇?
𝐴
  in 
the sum of a trend component 𝑔𝑡 and a cyclical component 𝑐𝑡 .  
The filter is defined as the solution to the following optimization problem. 
min
𝑔𝑡 
∑ 𝑐𝑡 
2 +  𝜆𝑇𝑡=1 ((𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡 ) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1 ))
2      (15) 
𝜆 is the smoothing parameter that the researchers typically set to 1600 when using quarterly data, 
but different values have been applied for other frequencies. For our annual data we follow Cooley 
and Ohanian (1991), and Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1992) by setting a value of 400; Backus and 
Kehoe (1992) set the parameter to 100, Baxter and King (1999) used a value of 10 while Ravn and 
Uhlig (2002) suggest setting it to 6.5 The larger is the value; the smoother is the estimated trend, 
the solution being the least squares fit of a linear trend model for 𝜆 approaching infinity (Hodrick-
Prescott, 1997). Derivation of the solution to the optimization problem is provided in the appendix 
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V. A.1 and detailed information on the background of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter can be 
found in Hodrick-Prescott (1997) and King and Rebelo (1989).  
ii. PIF’s Estimation  
 
While standard econometric methods will not be appropriate in our case given the large number 
of parameters, the estimation is possible by applying the Bayesian alternative to the generalized 
cross entropy (Hecklei, Mittelhammer and Janson, 2008).  
We estimate the PIF using empirical budget data on Public Agricultural Expenditures (PAE) and 
Public Non-agricultural Expenditures (PNE). Prior information from political expert survey data 
will help to get prior information on the level of the PIF-parameters. We also use these collected 
data on experts’ view in order to define boundaries for the parameters assuming a 95% confidence 
intervals.   
The Bayesian alternative to entropy methods is described below.  
As a reminder, a classical entropy method can be formulated as follows: 
?̂? = argmax v(𝜑) s.t .  g(𝜑) = 0      (16) 
Where v(𝜑) is the entropy metric and g(𝜑) =  0 corresponds to M equations of K unknown 
parameters 𝜑 (𝐾 > 𝑀) defining admissible values of the parameter of interest 𝜑. 
Heckelei et al. approach’s is an alternative to entropy methods for deriving solutions to an 
undetermined system of equations, by taking the additional prior information and setting a useful 
and defensible choice of the extremum metric 𝑣(𝜑). 
 𝑣(𝜑) = 𝑃(𝜑) = ∏ 𝑝𝑖
𝐾
𝑘=1 (𝜑𝑖)     (17) 
In their approach, the combination of the prior and the dichotomous likelihood 𝐼𝜓 (narrowing the 
feasible space of solutions) gives the posterior density.    
ℎ(𝜑) ∝   𝑃(𝜑) 𝐼𝜓  (18) 
The maximization of ℎ(𝜑) gives the highest posterior density (HPD) estimates of 𝜑.  
Following this, our optimization problem for our parameters can be specified as follows: 
max
χ,ϵ
𝑉(χ)∏ 𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑝 (ϵ𝑖𝑝) s.t. PIF(χ)  + 𝜀 =0   (19) 
 where  χ represents the vector of parameters of the PIF, V(χ) the associated prior distribution and 
𝑝𝑒 (ϵ𝑖𝑝) distribution of the error terms. We assume that individual parameters are normally 
distributed V(𝜒) ~ N (χ0, Σ).  
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The HDP is then given by: 
min
𝑠.𝑡.
PIF(χ) + 𝜀 =0 
𝑟𝑒𝑠(χ)=0
(Vec(χ) − 𝑉𝑒𝑐(χ0))
′Σ−1(Vec(χ) − 𝑉𝑒𝑐(χ0))     (20) 
𝑟𝑒𝑠(χ) represents additional restrictions on the parameters and integrates the policy beliefs of 
politicians and stakeholders translating specific ideas on how policies generate technical progress. 
V.4.B. Empirical data 
 
The PIF is estimated using budget data, expert survey data and estimated empirical data on 
technical progress (plotted in Figure V.A.1 for some selected sectors).  
 Production data 
Sector input (labor and capital) and output data used to estimate t.p. in the different sectors are 
mainly from the National Agency of Statistics (ANSD) while land data are from the DAPSA. 
These data generally cover the period 1980-2009.   
 Expert data 
Expert surveys were conducted on policy goals and preferred policy positions of policy makers 
and stakeholders. From the data, we derive the relative interests (𝑋𝑘) of political actors and 
organizations on the different policy goals, the desired target for achieving the goals (𝑍𝑘) and 
preferred policy positions that correspond to their own appropriate allocations to different policy 
programs (𝛾𝑝) and sub-programs under the CAADP agenda. In Senegal, the different policy 
programs formulated under CAADP are: water (𝛾1) and land (𝛾2) management, farm management 
policies for food crops (𝛾3), animals (𝛾4) and export crops (𝛾5), investments in road (𝛾6) and 
storage related infrastructure (𝛾7), Research and development (𝛾8) and Extension services (𝛾9), 
and investments in the non-agricultural sector (𝛾10). These policy programs are used in our 
empirical application.  
The interviews were conducted among the stakeholder groups and policy makers. For each specific 
policy area, the respondents are considered as experts for the organization representing that area. 
Targeted organizations were carefully selected using a list of potentially relevant organizations 
compiled based on desk research and expert interviews. Based on this initial list and by using a 
snowball sampling method, personal interviews were conducted with the representatives of the 
preselected organizations. Interviewers were asked to identify all the influential organizations on 
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the provided list or suggest the new ones. The suggested organizations that were not initially 
included to the list were added on the list when they are nominated more than three times. In total, 
we have 15 governmental organizations and 31 non‐governmental organizations. These non‐
governmental organizations includes 7 donors, 10 research organizations, 4 civil society groups 
and 8 socioeconomic interest groups (2 farmer and 6 agribusiness interest groups).  
 Social Accounting Matrix  
The constructed Senegalese 2011 agricultural SAM is mainly based on the 2011 Supply-Use table 
and trade data provided by the National Agency of Statistics. The breakdown of the agricultural 
sector is done using information from the most recent household poverty monitoring survey 
(ESPS) and agricultural surveys conducted by the DAPSA41 and the Senegalese Institute for 
Agricultural Research (ISRA). Other data comes mainly from the balance of payments which 
records the transactions among the residents and the rest of the world and the Table of Government 
Financial Operation (TOFE) from DPEE42 which tracks tax and non-tax revenue of the 
government, as well as budget expenditures including transfers. The SAM has been built in a 
perspective to construct and calibrate a dynamic CGE model used to derive the multipliers, as 
stated above. A social accounting matrix is a comprehensive, economy wide data framework that 
provides a coherent presentation of the production activities, incomes, investments and the other 
transaction flows among the economic agents (sectors, government, household and the rest of the 
world). The CGE model used in our integrated PIF-CGE approach is calibrated with the SAM and 
includes 43 sectors with the crop production sectors desegregated by regions. 
 Micro-simulation data  
The Senegalese 2011 household poverty monitoring survey is used for poverty assessment in the 
microsimulation model. It is a random sample survey at the national level that uses a two-stage 
cluster sampling method with stratification in the first stage (the statistical units of the first stage 
are districts while the secondary units are households drawn from the district in the first stage. The 
overall survey sample covers 17,891 households with 5953 households receiving the questionnaire 
on expenditures. 
                                                 
41 Direction de l'Analyse, de la Prévision et des Statistiques Agricoles  
42 Direction de la prévision et des études économiques  
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 Budget data 
Data on budget are from the Statistics of Public Expenditure for Economic Development (SPEED) 
compiled by IFPRI. For Senegal the budget data used in the estimations cover the period 1980-
2009 (See Figure V.A.7 in the appendix).  
 
V.5. Results  
 
V.5.A. Estimation results      
 
Table V.1 presents the prior parameters and estimated parameters of the policy impact function. A 
PIF is estimated for the different sectors of the Senegalese economy. For food crop and export 
crop sectors, the same t.p. is estimated for all the corresponding subsectors. Please not the given 
the large number of sectors and results only aggregated values of the parameters over the 
megasectors are presented.  
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Table V.1: Estimated parameters of the PIF (aggregation over the megasectors)  
  
 
 
 Source: Authors
  𝝁𝒔𝒑 𝝎𝒔 𝛒
𝑰𝑭  𝒆𝒙. 𝒂𝒔 𝒆𝒙. 𝒃𝒔 𝒕𝒑̅̅ ̅̅̅ ̅𝒔 
MESOS
ECTORS 
Parame
ters 
water land pr-crop pr-
animal 
pr-
export 
Inf-road inf-
storage 
Researc
h_Dev 
Extensi
on 
Non-agr normali
sation 
rho     
  (𝛾1) (𝛾2) (𝛾3) (𝛾4) (𝛾5) (𝛾6) (𝛾7) (𝛾8) (𝛾9) (𝛾10)       
                  
FOOD 
CROPS 
Est. 0.112 0.131 0.211 0.000 0.000 0.217 0.041 0.069 0.106 0.113 2.987 -0.500  0.072 -4.564 11.023 
 Prior 0.094 0.107 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.249 0.050 0.089 0.131 0.139 6.440 -0.500  0.026 -4.265 8.330 
EXPORT 
CROPS 
Est. 0.088 0.088 0.104 0.000 0.096 0.268 0.060 0.124 0.068 0.104 1.124 -0.500  0.009 -0.665 4.319 
 Prior 0.075 0.064 0.000 0.000 0.138 0.249 0.100 0.178 0.079 0.111 6.330 -0.500  0.010 -0.969 10.000 
LIVEST
OCK 
Est. 0.368 0.048 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.016 0.096 0.024 0.136 0.104 0.412 -0.500  0.006 -0.379 0.629 
 Prior 0.247 0.052 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.018 0.121 0.040 0.177 0.144 5.477 -0.500  0.024 -3.628 4.855 
FISH Est. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.112 0.320 0.168 0.168 0.056 0.135 -0.500  0.006 -0.307 0.066 
 Prior 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.109 0.301 0.159 0.159 0.096 4.854 -0.500  0.045 -2.765 0.719 
AGRIBU
SINESS 
Est. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.125 -0.500  0.014 -1.223 1.431 
 Prior 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.286 0.068 0.416 0.070 4.279 -0.500  0.018 -5.516 3.262 
INDUST
RY 
Est. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.729 -0.500  0.014 -2.499 6.069 
 Prior 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.297 0.049 0.359 0.243 3.902 -0.500  0.009 -4.570 5.173 
SERVIC
ES 
Est. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.804 -0.500  0.016 -4.405 3.415 
 Prior 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.671 0.011 0.038 0.228 2.888 -0.500  0.014 -5.307 5.199 
PUBLIC 
SERV. 
Est. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.878 -0.500  0.020 -4.773 0.477 
 Prior 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.488 0.011 0.038 0.411 2.197 -0.500  0.040 -10.694 1.465 
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V.5.B. Key sectors  
i. Poverty Growth Elasticities (PGE) and Growth Poverty Multipliers (GPM) 
 
As said earlier, some recent works have used the CGE framework in order to run simulations 
that compare the poverty-growth linkage across sectors. We follow the trend of the literature, 
but turn our attention to the fact that these methods are limited because they might lead to 
controversy without integrating the cost issues. 
The results show that PGE’s vary significantly across subsectors. As can be seen in Figure V.3, 
within agriculture, relatively high PGEs are observed for millet and peanut, the main export 
crop, while for fruits and roots we have low PGEs. Analogously, in agribusiness a high PGE 
of 0.019 is found only for food processing, while PGEs are extremely low for all other 
agribusiness sectors (Figure V.2). 
Figure V.2 shows that the highest PGE’s are found for the market service sectors, namely 
trading (0.058), followed by telecommunication (0.042). This implies that technical progress 
realized in these sectors reduces poverty more than in the livestock or the food processing 
sector. Technical progress in the Trade sector reduces transaction costs and leads to an 
improved market access.  
Within industrial sectors, a comparatively high PGE is observed only for chemical 
manufacturing with a value of 0.031, followed by mining with a PGE of  0.014, while for all 
other industries as well as for all public service sectors we found rather low PGEs (below 
0.006).  
The observed growth implies changes in price and income that occur together. The effect on 
household real income depends on the magnitude of changes in prices and nominal income. 
Therefore, both price and income need to be analyzed to interpret the variations of household 
real income. 
To better understand these changes, there is a need to conduct the analysis at a detailed level 
as the effect might vary depending on the household characteristics. In fact, productivity shock 
in one sector might have differentiated effects across household groups and the same household 
might be affected differently by a given growth profile.  
As can be seen from Figure V.A.2 in the appendix, results indicate that the largest part of 
welfare variation comes from the income effect for both rural and urban households (see the 
appendix for the welfare decomposition). Therefore, the income variation is informative 
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enough to assess the impact on household welfare as it is the important determinant of the 
impacts of the different growth profiles. 
Figure V.2: PGE by sectors  
 
Source: Authors  
 
Figure V.3: PGE by agricultural subsectors  
 
 
Source: Authors 
Following growth led by technical progress in each single sector 𝑠, the importance of the 
income effect in the multiplier for a given household type will depend on the propensity of the 
sector to use a given factor 𝑓 and on the share of this factor income distributed to the household. 
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The importance of the price effect for households depends on the weight of goods produced by 
the driving sector in the composition of the households’ consumption basket.  
While PGE’s of non-agricultural sectors are clearly dominated by income effects, significant 
price effects can also be observed for agriculture. However, the higher income effect of non-
agricultural sectors, even for rural poor households, appears surprising at a first glance. 
Especially, earlier studies highlight the fact that the majority of poor households are constituted 
by rural farm households which earn their main income from agriculture. Accordingly, 
economic growth in agriculture has a higher impact on the income of the poor when compared 
to non-agriculture (see for example Chistiaensen and Demery, 2007; World Bank 2007; Diao 
et al. 2012 or Dorosh and Thurlow 2014). However, these studies analyze the growth-poverty 
linkage applying a multiplier concept. Compared to our PGE analysis, Growth-Poverty-
Multipliers (GPM) analyze the impact of a “normalized” economic growth shock induced in a 
specific sector on the reduction of poverty, as previously mentioned. 
Accordingly, identified key sectors of PPG (pro poor growth) may significantly differ 
depending on the concept applied. For example, Figures V.4 and V.5 present Growth-Poverty 
impacts of sectors measured by their corresponding GPM derived from calculated PGE’s via 
dividing by an index of sectoral shares in GDP. As can be seen from these figures, agricultural 
sectors tend to have in average a higher impact on poverty reduction applying a multiplier 
(GPM) concept, while non-agricultural sectors are relatively more pro-poor compared to 
agricultural sectors applying an elasticity (PGE) concept, i.e. taking the sector size explicitly 
into account.  
In particular, telecommunication and trading have significantly higher PGE-values while 
corresponding GPM-values are higher for agriculture. Moreover, within agriculture, livestock 
appears more pro poor when compared to both stable and export crops based on PGE-values, 
respectively, while GPM-values are significantly higher for food and export crops compared 
to livestock.  
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Figure V.4: GPM by sectors  
 
Source: Authors  
 
Figure V.5: GPM by agricultural subsectors  
 
Source: Authors  
Please note that for Senegal as in most African countries, agriculture has a much higher direct 
link to rural and urban poor households via factor markets, since both poor household types are 
mainly employed in the farm sector, as well as via commodities markets since poor households 
spend the largest share of their income on food. Moreover, following Thorbecke and Jung 
(1994) decomposing the income effect further into direct and indirect factor market effects as 
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well as indirect loop effects reveals that, at least for the Senegalese economy, for all sectors 
main growth effects on income of the poor operate via factor markets. Accordingly, given the 
significant dependence of poor households on agriculture, agriculture appears as a natural key 
sector. Nevertheless, applying the PGE that considers the economic size of a sector still has a 
larger impacts for non-agriculture, especially trade for which t.p. reduces transaction costs, 
telecommunication, and chemistry. Quite straightforward explanations could be obtained by 
looking at their weight in the economy. Trade and telecommunication account respectively, for 
16.7 and 7.3 percent of the Senegalese GDP (see Table V.A.1 in the appendix). In particular, 
regressing sectoral PGE’s on GDP-shares reveals that a large part of the variance in PGE can 
be explained by sector size only (See V.A.3 in the appendix). Beyond the value addition share, 
the magnitude of PGE depends also on many other factors, albeit correlated with the sector 
size. Figure V.A.3 in the appendix plots the correlations between the PGE and the export 
orientation of sectors, the inter-sectoral linkages, namely backward and forward linkages, the 
import propensity, employment share and value added share. We found evidence of correlation 
between welfare concerns and the value added share, the employment share, the export share, 
the forward linkages. There are additional channels that might enter into consideration such as 
the initial productivity level of sectors, wages through the stimulation of the demand, sectors 
related sale and activity tax payments, sector’s contribution to the overall saving etc. 
ii. Pro Poor Growth Elasticities (PPG) 
 
One strength of the analyses is that productivity shift will be endogenized and no technological 
progress is assumed to fall from the sky, as commonly done in the existing literature. As 
mentioned, unlike the widespread method of considering the exogenous technological 
technical progress, the PIF will show the way in which government spending on policy 
programs will generate technological progress, which in turn will determine the different policy 
concerns, including income growth and poverty reduction, based on the multiplier 𝜉𝑧𝑘 𝑠
𝐶𝐺𝐸 . The 
key policy question is not only to identify the sectors with the highest responsiveness of poverty 
to growth, but also to see to what extent it is easy to stimulate growth in the different sectors 
through public investments. 
Therefore, taking into account that t.p. does not fall from heaven, from a viewpoint of a 
government, the final question in identifying key sectors is: how costly is it for a government 
to promote /achieve t.p. in different sectors? Hence, overall key sectors are characterized by a 
relatively high growth-poverty linkages induced per public budget expenditures used to 
promote t.p. in this sector. Our analysis is in line with Diao et al. (2012). They pointed out that 
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if policymakers are to conclude whether agriculture or non-agriculture is a more effective 
policy option for achieving poverty reduction, comparable cost assessments for both sectors 
are needed. Of course, this is even more important if specific agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors should be identified as key sectors. 
In this regard, our estimated two-stage policy impact function (PIF) links budget allocated to 
specific agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs to sectoral technical progress. It is 
possible, in the light of these estimates to evaluate the marginal costs of promoting t.p. in 
specific agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  
An overview of Marginal Budget Productivity (𝑀𝐵𝑃 =
𝜕𝑡𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝐵𝑒⁄ ) in promoting t.p. in 
different sectors in Senegal is provided in Figure V.6. The marginal cost equals the 
multiplicative inverse of marginal budget productivity, where for convenient scaling we 
present marginal budget productivities instead of marginal costs. To see this more clearly, the 
marginal productivity of 10.43 for export crops corresponds to the marginal cost of roughly 
1/10.43 = 0.1, i.e. a share 0.1 of the total budget spent under the status-quo policy in 2010 on 
economic policy programs has to be invested to achieve an increase in t.p. by 1 percent point. 
The marginal budget productivities for the status-quo policy in 2010 reveal that policy 
programs have been most effective in promoting t.p. in the agricultural sector.  
Within Agriculture, Export crops appear to be most productive, followed by food crops and 
livestock, while for non-agricultural sectors marginal budget productivity is comparatively 
low. Only for rubber and glass industry significant productivity levels can be observed, while 
for all other industries and services budget productivities are extremely low implying that cost 
to promote t.p. in these sectors is much higher when compared to agriculture, especially for the 
trading sector and telecommunication sector. 
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Figure V.6: Marginal budget productivity by sectors  
 
Source: Authors 
 
On the basis of the estimation of the PIF using empirical data, it appears that although technical 
progress in non-agricultural sectors has higher impacts on poverty than technical progress in 
agricultural sectors, promoting growth in agriculture is less costly. The findings do not mean 
that the agricultural sector should be the only priority in Senegal and no attention should be 
paid to non-agricultural sectors as these have a meaningful impact on poverty reduction, 
although they are more resource demanding. Overall, from the view point of a rational 
government facing serious budget constraints promoting t.p. in sectors with high potentials for 
Pro Poor Growth (PPG), like telecommunication, appears attractive. Vice-versa, promoting tp. 
in the food and export crop sector, which have only moderate poverty reduction potential based 
on PGE-elasticities appears quite promising given the relatively low cost (or vice versa high 
marginal budget productivity) for promoting t.p. in these sectors. Hence, to come up with a 
final answer on which sectors are the key sectors for poverty reduction we define an additional 
metrics named PPG-elasticities that is the product of the PGE-elasticities and the marginal 
budget productivity (MBP). This metric integrates both the poverty-growth linkage and the 
growth-spending linkage and therefore corresponds to poverty reduction that can be achieved 
by spending an additional budget unit on promoting tp. in a given sector. Figure V.7 presents 
the PPG-elasticities and shows that, by far, the highest potentials to reduce poverty via 
economic growth can be found for livestock and export crops. However, non-agricultural 
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sectors, especially the market service sector and glass industry, have also potentials for pro 
poor growth. The PGE and GPM concepts are only weakly correlated to the PPG metric as 
shown in the Figures V.A.5 and V.A.6 in the appendix.   
 
Figure V.7: PPG-elasticities by sectors  
 
Source: Authors  
 
V.5.C. Key policies PPG (𝜸) 
 
An important contribution is the identification of the key policy programs under the CAADP 
framework. These key policy programs are those which maximize technical progress in the key 
sectors based on the PPG elasticities. In doing so, our approach beyond identifying key sectors 
seeks to go further by outlining the strategic policy programs that promote poverty reduction. 
Increasing overall public spending or agricultural spending might not be easily feasible in a 
world of constrained resources. However, one alternative attempt to foster technical progress 
and growth can be the change or the reallocation of the composition of these spending while 
keeping the total spending unchanged if possible. Intra-Sectoral allocation of public spending 
remains largely an unexplored area of research. Closing this research gap could help relieve 
the persistent productivity problem in many African countries. For each of the sectors of the 
Senegalese economy involved in the analysis, a PIF is estimated. 
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According to equation (11), we calculate the marginal effectiveness PPG(𝛾𝑝) of specific 
CAADP programs in reducing poverty as shown in Figure V.8. The PPG(𝛾𝑝) corresponds to 
the marginal decrease in poverty that would be achieved if the budget expenditure within a 
specific policy program is increased by one unit. The CAADP pillars can be subdivided into 
programs aiming to improve natural resource management (NR), farm management (FM), 
human resource management (HR) and market access (MA). 
 
Figure V.8: Marginal effectiveness of CAADP policy programs in reducing poverty 
 
The results show that in Senegal the most productive policy programs in terms of poverty 
reduction at the national level are investments in road infrastructures by far, research and 
development, and agricultural extension services. This is in line with previous findings of Fan 
and Zhang (2008) who showed that investment into agriculture Research and Development and 
extension services offers one of the best avenues for enhancing economic growth in the 
agricultural sector and reducing poverty. Furthermore, Fan and Zhang also showed that 
investment in rural road infrastructure has a high return and can have a large effect on 
agricultural productivity and poverty reduction. 
Based also on the estimation of the PIF and under the CAADP, Table V.2 provides for each 
agricultural sector the optimal distribution of the budget among the different pillars. 
Heterogeneity is found in the optimal allocation across the different agricultural sectors. In fact, 
Table V.2 reveals that promoting t.p. in different agricultural sectors depends on these different 
programs, to varying degrees, e.g. livestock depends especially on the improvement of water 
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management (NR-land), while food crops depend more on improved farm management and 
market access (both foster fertilizer and pesticide use). Export crops depend especially on 
improved infrastructure (MA-storage and MA-road) and also on improved research and 
development (HR-R&D). The results show only little spillover effects for non-agricultural 
programs with optimal budget share below 9% for all sectors. There are negligible spillover 
effects of agricultural programs on non-agricultural t.p. Concretely, this is translated with an 
optimal budget share that equals trivially 1 for non-agricultural policy for all non-agricultural 
sectors (not reported in Table V.2). 
 
Table V.2: Optimal CAADP budget shares for sectors 
  
 food crop export crop livestock fish forest 
NR-water 8.2% 5.4% 55.8% 0.0% 9.4% 
NR-land 11.3% 3.5% 1.0% 0.0% 12.5% 
FM-crop 29.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.5% 
FM-animal 0.0% 0.0% 21.4% 15.0% 0.0% 
FM-export 0.0% 22.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
MA-road 31.4% 38.2% 0.1% 6.5% 37.0% 
MA-storage 1.1% 4.7% 6.0% 50.7% 1.4% 
HR-R&D 2.9% 18.1% 0.3% 13.1% 4.1% 
HR-Extension 7.0% 1.4% 9.4% 13.1% 9.3% 
Non-agr 8.6% 6.1% 6.1% 1.7% 5.9% 
 
Source: Authors  
  
An interesting quantitative assessment of the CAADP 2010 investment plan could be its 
comparison with the optimal budget allocation and estimated required resources that we 
derived from the model. Figure V.9 presents this comparison that can be a significant 
contribution in making CAADP successful. 
In Senegal, under the optimal PPG-strategy the share of Agricultural Pubic Expenditure (APE) 
rises from the value of 10.8% targeted in the CAADP investment plan to 14.5%. This coincides 
with an allocation of 15.5% of total budget to non-agricultural policy programs (PNAE), while 
in 2010 around 20% of the total budget was devoted to PNAE. 
As can be seen from Figure V.9 compared to CAADP-2010, optimal CAADP expenditure 
focuses on market access, especially investment in road infrastructure. Investments in 
improved market access increase from a share below 1.5% in CAADP-2010 to a share of over 
10% under an optimal PPG-strategy. Moreover, investments promoting agricultural R&D and 
extension services would be significantly higher under an optimal PPG-strategy when 
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compared to CAADP-2010 with an optimal share of almost 4% and a share of less than 1.5% 
under CAADP-2010. In absolute terms investment in R&D would increase more than 7 times, 
while expenditure for agricultural extension services would double. Furthermore, based on our 
own expert survey data, we derived different policy strategies for CAADP-2025. The 
interviewed organizations were classified by using cluster analysis based on their relative 
political interest of the policy outcomes (𝑋𝑘), their preferred policy outcomes (𝑍𝑘), and their 
policy position (𝛾𝑝). An important cluster of organizations (labeled CAADP25-MA in Figure 
V.9) prefers a stronger focus on agriculture with a CAADP budget share of over 14%, and 
within CAADP a stronger focus on market access, while a second cluster (CAADP25-NA) 
prefers constant CAADP budget shares of 10%, i.e. focusing spending on non-agriculture 
policies. 
Figure V.9: Optimal CAADP budget shares for PPG 
 
 
Source: Authors  
 
 
The simulations show that under this optimal budget allocation, the actual poverty rate of 45% 
would stand at 11% by 2025. The implementation of the CAADP-2025, as reported by the 
government and stakeholder organizations would also have significant impact on poverty that 
is expected to fall at around 20% (Figure V.10). 
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Figure V.10: Achieved poverty reduction induced by alternative CAADP strategies 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
Moreover, we found no conflict between poverty reduction and the other policy outcomes 𝑍𝑘. 
Figure V.A.4 in the appendix shows that in Senegal, the same sectors promoting poverty 
reduction also promote both growth of farm incomes and urban households. Non‐agricultural 
sectors, like glass and chemistry industry, increase urban household income, but have limited 
impact on farm incomes and poverty reduction. The key sectors of high PPG are also in line 
with key sectors promoting state budget revenues, i.e. provision of public good services. 
However, the sectors that promote industrial growth have in general the lowest impact on 
poverty reduction. 
The achieved technical progress induced in the selected sectors is presented in the Figure V.11 
under different budget allocations (the optimal budget allocation, CAADP-2010, CAADP-25 
budget allocation for the identified policy clusters of stakeholder and governmental 
organizations CAADP25_MA, CAADP25_NA). The estimated PIF gives expected t.p. at 
sectoral level, and includes both true technical progress and increased technical efficiency at 
the micro level.    
The reallocation of the budget from from non-agriculture to agriculture would especially 
increase average t.p. in the agricultural sector from roughly 4% to 8%, while t.p. in the non-
agricultural sectors would in average only slightly decrease, from 3.6% to 3.2% for industry 
and 2.5% to 2.4% for the service sector.  
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Figure V.11: Achieved t.p. by sectors induced by alternative CAADP-strategies 
 
Source: Authors 
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V. 6. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we develop an innovative Policy Impact Function (PIF) in order to analyze the 
links between policies and development outcomes. The PIF shows how government 
investments in agricultural and non-agricultural economic policy programs generate growth in 
the different sectors and, in turn, poverty reduction. Our integrated PIF-CGE framework 
considers both the growth-poverty and policy-growth relationships. It allows a comprehensive 
identification of key sectors and key policies programs by assessing the cost of generating 
growth, unlike most of the previous analyses. The proposed framework could be very insightful 
in the context of high and persistent poverty in Africa, and given the limited evidence on the 
impacts of government policy responses.    
The application of the method on Senegal data reveals that more budget resources would be 
required to promote technical progress in non-agricultural sectors compared to Agriculture. In 
fact, promoting technical progress in non-agricultural sectors is costly compared to the 
agricultural sector. Moreover, the calculation of Pro Poor Growth (PPG) Elasticities shows that 
the highest potentials to reduce poverty are found for Agriculture, especially livestock and 
export crops. Results also show that some non-agricultural sectors have potentials for pro poor 
growth. The most productive policy programs among the CAADP pillars are related to 
investments in road infrastructures, research and development, and agricultural extension 
services. However, the complete effectiveness of the key polices in reducing poverty will 
depends substantially on the implementation strategies. Ultimately, our projected technical 
progress does not include potential prices and weather shocks, particularly in the agricultural 
sector.  
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Appendix 
 
Table V. A.1: The general structure of the Senegalese economy 
Sectors   GDP share  Employment 
share 
Export share Import share 
Primary sector 16.1 47.4 11.2 7.0 
 Agriculture 7.0 26.4 3.2 6.1 
 Food Ag. 5.6 17.2 1.2 5.7 
 Industrial Ag. 1.4 9.2 2.0 0.3 
 Livestock 5.1 16.5 0.0 0.3 
 Forestry 1.1 2.5 0.1 0.1 
 Fishing 2.8 2.1 7.9 0.6 
Secondary sector  23.9 14.7 64.1 85.3 
 Mining  2.2 0.9 8.9 9.9 
 Food processing  5.8 5.2 14.8 17.6 
 Industry 10.0 3.8 34.8 52.3 
 Other industries  6.0 4.8 5.6 5.5 
Tertiary sector  60.0 37.9 24.7 7.7 
 Trade 16.7 25.8 0.0 0.0 
 Telecommunication  7.3 0.2 5.4 1.3 
 Business services  5.3 3.5 6.2 3.1 
 Health and Education  4.4 2.8 0.7 1.3 
 Other services  26.4 5.7 12.4 1.9 
 
Note: GDP, employment, export and import shares from the SAM are presented 
Source: Authors  
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Figure V.A.1: Observed technical progress for selected sectors in Senegal  
 
 
Source: Authors  
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Figure V.A.2: Decomposition of the PGE in income and price effects: Rural and Urban 
households in Senegal 
 
 
Note: EV = Equivalent Variation, EV_I = Income effect and EV_P = Price effect  
Source: Authors  
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Figure V.A.3: Drivers of the PGE for Senegal 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure V.A.4: PPG‐elasticities for Zk and poverty reduction in Senegal 
 
 
Source: Authors  
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FigureV.A.5: GPM vs PPG elasticities  
 
Source: Authors 
 
Figure V.A.6: PGE vs PPG elasticities  
 
Source: Authors 
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Figure V.A.7: Agricultural Public expenditure  
 
 
Source: SPEED data 
 
 
Table V. A.2: Overview CAADP policy programs  
 
 
 
V. A.1. The HP cyclical filter  
min
𝑔𝑡 
∑ 𝑐𝑡 
2 +  𝜆𝑇𝑡=1 ((𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡 ) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1 ))
2  
  min
𝑔𝑡 
∑ (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡)
2 +  𝜆𝑇𝑡=1 ((𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡 ) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1 ))
2 
The first order condition of the maximization problem takes the following form. 
2. (𝑇𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡) − 2𝜆  [𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1)] + 4𝜆 [𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1)] − 2𝜆  
[𝑔𝑡+2 −  𝑔𝑡+1) − (𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝑔𝑡)] = 0 
 Manipulating this first order condition leads to  
𝑇𝑡 = [𝜆 (1 − 𝐵)
2 (1 − 𝐵−1)2 + 1 ] 𝑔𝑡  = F(B) 𝑔𝑡   
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Where B is backshift operator with 𝐵𝑛 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡−𝑛 
𝑔𝑡 = G(B) 𝑇𝑡 with G(B) = F(B) 
−1 = 
1
𝜆 (1−𝐵)2 (1−𝐵−1)2 + 1 
 
The cyclical component 𝑐𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡  = (1− G(B)) 𝑇𝑡 = (1 − F(B) 
−1) 𝑇𝑡= 
𝜆 (1−𝐵)2 (1−𝐵−1)
2
 
𝜆 (1−𝐵)2 (1−𝐵−1)2 + 1 
𝑇𝑡 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝐶(𝐵) 𝑇𝑡  With 𝐶(𝐵) =  
𝜆 (1−𝐵)2 (1−𝐵−1)
2
 
𝜆 (1−𝐵)2 (1−𝐵−1)2 + 1 
  
The cyclical filter’s Fourier transform ?̃?(𝜔) allows the analysis of the filter in frequency 
domain. 
After using the following expressions   
𝑒∓ 𝑖𝜔 = cos 𝜔 ∓𝑖. sin 𝜔  and 𝑒− 𝑖𝜔 + 𝑒  𝑖𝜔 = 2 cos 𝜔 
We get  
?̃?(𝜔) = (1 − F(𝑒−𝑖𝜔) −1) = 
4𝜆 [1−cos(𝜔)]2
1+4𝜆 [1−cos(𝜔)]2
 
The cyclical filter has a zero weight at the zero ferequency and assigns a weight close to one 
for high frequencies (for more details see King and Rebelo, 1989).  
   
V. A.2. Decomposition of welfare variation into price and income effects 
Assuming a Stone Geary utility function that gives rise to the Linear Expenditure System (LES) 
in the CGE model, the mathematical decomposition of the EV is as follows: 
EV = 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 , 𝑌𝐼1)  -  𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0 , 𝑌𝐼0)  
EV =  𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 , 𝑌𝐼1)  - 𝑌𝐼0  
Where ν𝐿𝐸𝑆  is the corresponding indirect utility function, 𝑃𝑄𝑐
0 and  𝑌𝐼0 the initial price of the 
good 𝑐 and the initial income, 𝑃𝑄𝑐
1  and  𝑌𝐼1 the price and the income after a policy scenario, 
and 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 the money metric indirect utility function.     
To evaluate the price effect, we include the situation where the prices are 𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 and the income 
equals the initial income level 𝑌𝐼0.  
The price effect is  
EV𝑃= 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 , 𝑌𝐼0)  - 𝑌𝐼0   (3) 
EV =  𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 , 𝑌𝐼1) –  𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 , 𝑌𝐼0)  + 𝑒𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
0, ν𝐿𝐸𝑆 (𝑃𝑄𝑐
1 
, 𝑌𝐼0)  - 𝑌𝐼0  
Then, EV =  EV𝐼 + EV𝑃 , where EV𝐼 is the income effect. 
Following the LES specification, we have  
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𝐸𝑉 = ∏ (
𝑃𝑄𝑐
0 
𝑃𝑄𝑐1 
⁄ )
𝛽𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 (𝑌𝐼
1 − ∑ 𝛾𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 𝑃𝑄𝑐
1) −  (𝑌𝐼0 −  ∑ 𝛾𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 𝑃𝑄𝑐
0)     
EV𝑃= ∏ (
𝑃𝑄𝑐
0 
𝑃𝑄𝑐1 
⁄ )
𝛽𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 (𝑌𝐼
0 −  ∑ 𝛾𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 𝑃𝑄𝑐
1) −  (𝑌𝐼0 −  ∑ 𝛾𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 𝑃𝑄𝑐
0)      
EV𝐼= ∏ (
𝑃𝑄𝑐
0 
𝑃𝑄𝑐1 
⁄ )
𝑐
𝐶
𝑐=1 (𝑌𝐼
1 − 𝑌𝐼0)  
Where 𝛾𝑐 and 𝛽𝑐 are respectively the minimum consumption level and the budget share of the 
good  𝑐. 
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Abstract  
 
In the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, the implementation of the 
2009 Directives pertaining to the harmonized framework for public financial management is a 
major policy focus. The Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) have been used as tools 
for multi-year budget programming for over a decade in Africa. Their rapid spread throughout 
Africa raises questions about their impact. This article uses quantitative methods to provide an 
initial assessment of the MTEFs as applied in Senegal in the light of its main objectives by using 
non-parametric statistics. Beyond budget allocation to specific sectors and programs, the question 
on how effectively the policy programs are implemented crucially determines the impact on 
poverty reduction. 
Ultimately, the study shows that the MTEF approach has significant potential, which remains 
untapped. 
 
 
  
 
 
JEL Codes: H6, E62, E63, E65.  
Keywords: Budget, Regional Integration, Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, WAEMU, 
Senegal. 
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VI.1. Introduction  
 
The mitigated success of poverty reduction strategies has shown the importance of improved 
budget management through better linkage to the budget. Public expenditure programming could 
not ignore the development priorities nor macroeconomic challenges. With the emergence of the 
Managing for Results (MFR) paradigm in the 1990s, several African countries started adopting 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), multi-year budgetary programming tools and 
programme budgets to move from resource-based budget to budget outcome, and thus improve 
their public expenditure management.  
Within the WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union), the new guideline laws on 
finance, adopted in June 2009, provide for an additional stage in this process, giving these tools a 
true legal character and placing them at the core of budget procedures. 
The new tools for multi-year budgetary programming thus contribute to the improvement of the 
definition and application by states of convergence criteria, both guiding the macroeconomic 
management of member states and guaranteeing the efficacy of financial and economic policies. 
Implementation of the harmonized public finance framework guidelines of WAEMU member 
states is thus a major pillar of economic integration policy aimed at spreading good practices in 
the area of budget management. 
WAEMU members have opted for harmonious adoption of modern management instruments such 
as the medium-term expenditure framework, functional classification and the social dimension of 
public finance, mainly under the poverty reduction strategic framework.  
The three-year rolling MTEF should be the tool to improve the implementation of policies by 
strengthening the linkage between policies and the budget. The MTEF should allow public 
expenditures programming to take into account the priorities of development and macroeconomic 
constraints by integrating the medium-term vision to the preparation of estimates that have been 
based on a resource -based approach and not outcome-based. 
Adoption of the MTEF approach by Senegal and several African countries stems from a desire to 
improve budget performance. Initiated in Senegal in 2004, the MTEF initially covered four pilot 
ministries (Education, Health, Justice, and Environment) and was subsequently expanded to 14 
ministries. Gradually, it was extended to other sectors in keeping with government priorities.  
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This study determines to which extent MTEF adoption has improved budget discipline and 
predictability as well as resource redeployment to priority sectors as stated in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Documents (PRSD). It also analyzes the linkages between the various infra-
three-year budget programming exercises of this instrument. Contrary to the earlier works on 
MTEF, the approach adopted for this study gives priority to the non-parametric statistics to analyze 
the evolution of budgetary variables. 
This analysis shows that the predictability did not improve at the global level, for the ministries 
with a Sectoral Medium-term Expenditure Framework (SMTEF) as well as for the ministries 
without a SMTEF. The absence of redeployment towards most of the priority sectors compared to 
the period preceding SMTEF is also analyzed. However, since its establishment, there is a gradual 
increase for some priority sectors as Education, Environment and Transports. It should also be 
noted that there is an existing relationships between the budgetary programming of the period with 
the same MTEF version and between those of corresponding years for the versions produced in 
2009 and 2008. This shows that budgetary programming are realized on the basis of those done 
for the preceding years. The budgetary discipline evaluated within the frame of the primary balance 
did not evolve as significantly as with the adoption of this approach. 
This chapter is divided into three parts: Section VI.2 briefly presents the MTEF approach; Section 
VI.3 analyses the MTEFs of some African countries based on the empirical studies conducted; and 
Section VI.4 analyses the impact of the MTEF approach in Senegal in terms of budget discipline, 
budget predictability, and sector allocation.  
 
VI.2. A Multi-Year Budget Programming Tool 
 
The definition commonly adopted, mainly by Le Houerou and Taliercio (2002) or Holmes and 
Evans (2003), and drawn from the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook, is 
the following: ‘The MTEF consists of a top-down resource envelope, a bottom-up estimation of 
the current and medium-term costs of existing policy and, ultimately, the matching of these costs 
with available resources’ (World Bank, 1998).  
In other words, the MTEF is a hierarchical envelope of resources that is consistent with 
macroeconomic stability and certain strategic priorities. It facilitates estimation of the medium-
term costs of policies as well as decision-making that harmonizes costs with available resources. 
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The MTEF is a triennial or multi-year cycle programming and budget expenditure control 
instrument. It must be rolling, and should cover all expenditures, regardless of their nature or 
financing source. It prepares estimates for the budgeted year (N+1) and for subsequent years (N+2, 
N+3). Hence, the multi-year character of the MTEF addresses the annuality constraint of the 
budget: although the budget is voted annually, state commitments go beyond the budgeted year. 
The MTEF is also a mechanism adapted to results-based management (RBM), based on 
autonomous decision-making by managers and under which budget allocations are directed 
towards specific targets whose achievement is measured by performance indicators.   
 
MTEF implementation stages are as follows: 
 Update of the macroeconomic framework and establishment of the indicative amounts of 
revenue and expenditure; 
 Review of sectoral programmes and definition of priorities; 
 Fixing of indicative sectoral ceilings; 
 Preparation of the Sectoral Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks (SMTEFs); 
 Preparation of the general MTEF and finance law; 
 Approval and/or inclusion in the finance law. 
 
The starting point for a multi-year approach is undoubtedly the preparation of a Medium-Term 
Expenditure Framework that essentially comprises estimates of the main public finance 
aggregates, the main macroeconomic indicators, the general level of revenue and expenditure, and 
the definition of general medium-term budget objectives. 
More precisely, the MTEF is aimed at enhancing the efficiency of inter-sectoral resource allocation 
and ensuring the future budgetary impact of allocated resources addresses macroeconomic 
framework constraints. This objective is targeted by developing tools that allow for policy 
implementation in the budget while focusing on priority sectors. The enhancement of predictability 
starts with respect of ceilings by the authorities. MTEF determines the sectoral budget for each 
ministry/institution by estimation. Its goal is to indicate the amount of financial resources needed 
in the medium term, usually three to five years, for the execution of an existing policy. Extending 
the planning horizons makes it possible to move beyond annual differential budgets which make 
it difficult to adopt new guidelines and programmes, and are not very flexible. 
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Another objective of MTEF is to provide better programme management visibility and improve 
public expenditure performance by instituting a performance monitoring framework. In this 
approach, a distinction is made between the general MTEF which makes projections for the entire 
envelope of available resources and sectoral medium-term expenditure frameworks (SMTEFs) 
used essentially to estimate the cost of sectoral programmes. 
 
VI.3. MTEF in Africa  
 
Poverty eradication is a priority for African countries. Efforts to combat poverty are accompanied 
by a set of innovations in the area of budget management, as the budget is a key tool for economic 
policy implementation. Nonetheless, studies have shown that public expenditure execution and 
control in most countries, particularly in Africa, is often inadequate. 
Budget preparation and execution processes are also affected. The efficient involvement of 
members of parliament in most Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries is obstructed through 
limitation of the information provided to them and over-centralization of executive power. 
Although budget policy debates (BPD) are organized, there are many countries where parliament 
does not have the possibility for debating on budget policies and guidelines prior to budget review. 
Meanwhile, budget execution is generally characterized by inadequate control, and regulation laws 
that sometimes take a decade to be adopted by the parliament.  
Some SSA countries have initiated and continue to initiate reforms and adopt tools to eradicate 
these shortcomings and thus improve public expenditure management. Introduction of the general 
MTEF into WAEMU dates back to the early 2000s following initiatives taken by other countries 
of the region in the mid-1990s: Ghana in 1996 and Guinea in 1997 (UNDP/ Development 
Strategies and Public Finances, 2010). MTEF adoption has spread rapidly in SSA (Table VI.1).    
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Table VI.1: MTEF adoption in WAEMU and Africa 
Country Year of Adoption  Country  Year of Adoption  
    
WAEMU Member Countries 
    
Burkina Faso 2000 Niger  2007 
Benin  2001 Togo 2009 
Mali 2005 Cote d'Ivoire  2010 
Senegal  2004 Guinea Bissau  No general MTEF  
    
Non-WAEMU Countries 
    
Uganda 1992 Ethiopia  2004 
Ghana  1996 Swaziland 2004 
Malawi 1996 Zambia 2004 
South Africa 1997 Cape Verde 2005 
Mozambique  1997 Madagascar 2005 
Guinea 1997 Chad 2005 
Gabon 1998 Mauritius  2005 
Kenya 1998 Sierra Leone  2005 
Tanzania  1998 Cameroon 2006 
Rwanda 1999 DRC 2006 
Namibia  2000 Lesotho  2006 
Mauritania  2003 Nigeria  2006 
Source: UNESCO (2007), UNDP/POLE, Africa region country economists and Public 
Expenditure Management Thematic Group.  
 
Within WAEMU, member states are at different levels of MTEF development. The approach was 
started in Burkina Faso, Benin and Mali to improve the conduct of public policy by ensuring the 
adequacy and control of expenditure relative to revenue. Countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau and Togo have problems implementing this instrument, probably due to a limited 
production of statistical data to ensure a good macroeconomic framework and shortcomings in 
budget systems caused by recent socio-political strife. 
Impact assessments of MTEF in Africa are few, and introduction of MTEF is quite recent in most 
of WAEMU countries. On the 25 MTEF that existed in 2002, up to 90 percent were adopted 
between 1997 and 2001. Le Houerou and Taliercio (2002) were the first to conduct an empirical 
analysis of MTEF adoption in Africa by comparing MTEF in nine African countries. They relied 
on the trends of indices and key budget variables such as the Budget Deviation Index (BDI), that 
is ‘the sum of the absolute values between the approved budget and the executed budget expressed 
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as a percentage of the approved budget’ and the budget balance before and after MTEF adoption 
to compare the countries in their sample. The Budget Deviation Index is used to estimate the gap 
between the executed amounts and the approved allocations. 
 
Houerou and Taliercio (2002)’s study showed that budget deficits in South Africa and Tanzania 
during the MTEF period were lower than those of other countries in the study. However, these 
deficits were not very different from those recorded prior to MTEF application. From the above, 
they concluded that, considering the available data, MTEF did not lead to a reduction in budget 
deficit. But their analysis did not take into account the prevailing economic situation at that time. 
The hypothesis that the MTEF enhanced resource allocation in the major priority sectors was 
confirmed by Tanzania, South Africa and Uganda which were the countries that had the most 
developed MTEFs at the time. Countries like Ghana did not. The BDI study for Tanzania found 
tangible evidence to conclude that MTEF enhanced budget predictability. It concludes that MTEF 
alone cannot improve public expenditure management. The BDI study recommend that MTEF 
should serve as a supplement rather than a substitute to conventional budget management reforms 
and should also take into account the existing capacity within the countries. 
While studying Uganda’s MTEF, Bevan and Palomba (2000) found that MTEF were successful 
in ensuring macroeconomic stability, and confirmed sector allocation in priority sectors. Their 
result depended on the introduction of measures enabling future limits to be consistent with low 
inflation for all the expenditures. However, Uganda’s MTEF has a certain number of 
shortcomings. Studies by Schiavo-Campo (2008) and Allen (2009) highlighted the mixed results 
of MTEF introduction in Africa. They noted that there are positive lessons to learn from the MTEF 
experience in Africa (raising consciousness about the importance of a multi-year approach in the 
budgetary programming, concentration on the efficacy of the budgetary expenditures), including 
failures linked to a premature implementation, lack of approval, inefficient spending and failure 
of the budgetary control, among others. Allen takes a critical look at budget programs and PSRD 
as a means to achieve the MDG and a tool for resource allocation. He considers that these 
initiatives lead to ritualist practices and produce a large amount of databases that unfortunately are 
redundant and unused.  
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VI.4. MTEF and Budget Programming in Senegal 
 
Most of the methodological approaches used in the few impact assessment studies in existence are 
based on comparing the averages of budget variables before and after MTEF implementation. To 
address these methodological shortcomings, an approach based on non-parametric statistics is 
adopted. Non-parametric tests are more relevant when the series distribution is unknown and when 
the number of observations is limited. This approach is appropriate for the study, given the short 
data series for most of our variables and especially for the post-MTEF period. The MTEF's 
contribution to budget management and project efficiency will be analyzed by comparing 
approved and executed amounts, the various projections of matching fiscal years, budget variations 
and sector allocations.  
The data used are from the database of the Integrated Public Finance Management System (PFMS) 
of the Senegalese government, of the Directorate of forecast and economic studies of the Ministry 
of Economics and Finances of Senegal, and the World Bank. The tests are generally based on data 
for the 2000-2009 period. Budget predictability is then determined by conducting the Spearman 
and Kendall (KS) tests on MTEF and budget projections and on budget implementation under 
schedule.  
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney/Wilcoxon tests are used for the independent 
samples. The objective of the other tests is to look for any differentiation variables between the 
pre- and post-MTEF years. The following sections present the results on MTEF impact with 
formulation of the following research hypotheses:   
 
 H1: MTEF improved budget predictability; 
 H2: The volume of allocations to priority sectors increased during the MTEF period 
compared to the pre-MTEF period; 
 H3: MTEF has a positive impact on budget balance; 
 H4: Budget discipline has consequently improved with the adoption of MTEF; 
 H5: There has been a steady increase in allocations to certain priority sectors since MTEF 
was instituted; 
 H6: MTEF programming takes account of the programming done under a previous MTEF; 
 H7: Projections for three years of the same MTEF are linked; 
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 H8: The budget variances of ministries under SMTEF are narrower than those of non-
SMTEF ministries; 
 H9: There is concordance between MTEF priorities and budget priorities (in terms of sector 
allocations).  
These are the main hypotheses that are tested in the study. 
 
VI.4.1. Budget discipline  
 
The tests conducted make it possible to identify any significant difference in the values of variables 
or indices before and after MTEF adoption. This first series of tests is conducted on data that covers 
the 2000-2009 and 2007-2009 post-MTEF period. The zero hypothesis to be tested is H0: The 
distribution pattern of the variable is the same before and after MTEF adoption. 
The alternatives depending on the variables tested are: 
 Alternative hypothesis H1: The central tendency of the variable after MTEF adoption is 
different from the tendency before MTEF adoption. 
 Hypothesis H1’: The central tendency of the variable after MTEF adoption is higher (or lower) 
than the tendency before MTEF adoption. 
 
Table VI.2 presents the results of the unilateral tests on budget balance. The probability accorded 
to the unilateral test is the half of the probability accorded to the bilateral test. The Wilcoxon tests 
clearly confirm the increase in total revenue and total expenditure when MTEF is implemented. 
There is practically no interlinking between the values of these series for the two periods (Figure 
VI.A.1, Table VI.A.3 and Table VI.A.4). Tested variables don’t display ex-aequo rankings.  
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Table VI.2: Mann-Whitney/Wilcoxon test on certain budget variables 
Variable           Average 
ranking    
Pre      Post  
Mann-
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W    P-value        Test result 
at 5% 
Basic balance (net of 
HIPC, MDRI)  
6.57     3 
 
3.0 9 0.06 No 
evidence 
~ Non-
rejection 
of     H0 
Total revenue, base 96 4        9 0.0 28 0.008 Rejection 
of H0 
Total expenditure, base 96 4       9 0.0                          28 0.008             Rejection 
of H0 
Primary balance  5.71  2.5 2 5 0.111 Non-
rejection 
of H0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Government data. 
 
An analysis of the test results shows that MTEF did not lead to an evolution of the deficit which 
is expressed by the basic balance net (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - HIPC initiative and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative- MDRI) and the primary balance. Hence, hypothesis H3 has not 
been proven. MTEF has no impact on the primary balance. 
VI.4.2. Budget programming and predictability  
 
The years MTEF N,3; MTEF N+1,2; MTEF N+2,1 (in terms of forecasts) are compared to see 
whether MTEF generally takes account of the allocations made in a previous MTEF. Hence, it will 
be possible to determine whether there is a link between the budget programming of the years 
presented below.    
Table VI.3: Rolling three-year programming method 
MTEF 
Version 
 Programmed Fiscal Year   
2007 2007      MTEF 2007, 
2007 
2008        MTEF 2007, 2008 2009   MTEF 2007, 2009 
2008 2008      MTEF 2008, 
2008 
2009        MTEF 2008, 2009 2010        MTEF 2008, 2010 
2009 2009      MTEF 2009, 
2009 
2010        MTEF 2009, 2010 2011        MTEF 2009, 2011 
Source: Authors  
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The following relations of the rolling three-year programming method are analysed.  
 Second-year budget programming of the MTEF prepared in 2007 (MTEF 2007, 2008) and 
first-year programming of the MTEF prepared in 2008 (MTEF 2008, 2009); 
 Second-year budget programming of the MTEF prepared in 2009 (MTEF 2009, 2010) and 
third-year programming of the MTEF prepared in 2008 (MTEF 2008, 2010); 
 Third-year budget programming of the MTEF prepared in 2007 (MTEF 2007, 2009), second-
year programming of the MTEF prepared in 2008 (MTEF 2008, 2009) and first-year 
programming of the MTEF prepared in 2009 (MTEF 2009, 2009). 
Correlation test results are set out in the tables below:  
 
Table VI.4: Links between the corresponding years of the budget programming exercises  
 Link tested   MTEF 2007, 2008 
R MTEF 2008, 2008  
    MTEF 2008, 2010  
  R MTEF 2009, 2010 
 
N        5               8  
Spearman’s Rho ρ       0.6                1  
p-value ρ       0.28                0.0 ***  
Kendall’s tau τ       0.4                 1  
p-value τ       0.32                0.001 ***  
Decision   Non-rejection of H0  Rejection of H0  
Note: ***) rejection of H0, threshold at 1% and **) rejection of H0, threshold at 5%. The zero 
hypothesis is H0: Programming exercises are independent. 
Source: Authors  
Table VI.5: Links between the three corresponding years of the budget programming 
exercises   
Tested link   MTEF 2007, 2009 
R MTEF 2009, 2009  
    MTEF 2008, 2009  
  R MTEF 2009, 2009 
MTEF 2007, 2009 
R MTEF 2009, 2009 
N        5               11    5 
Spearman’s Rho ρ       0.1                0.78   0.3 
p-value ρ       0.87                 0.004 ***   0.62  
Kendall’s tau τ       0.0                0.63   0.2 
p-value τ        1                0.006 ***   0.62 
Decision   Non-rejection of H0  Rejection of H0   Non-rejection of H0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Government data. 
Note: ***) rejection of H0, threshold at 1% and **) rejection of H0, threshold at 5%. 
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The test results (Table VI.4 and VI.5) reveal a link between second-year projections of the MTEF 
prepared in 2008 and first-year projections of the MTEF prepared in 2009 (MTEF 2008, 2009 and 
MTEF 2009, 2009). The same applies between third-year projections of the MTEF prepared in 
2008 and second-year projections of the MTEF prepared in 2009 (MTEF 2008, 2010 and MTEF 
2009, 2010). However, some disconnect is observed between second-year programming of the 
MTEF prepared in 2007 and first-year programming of the MTEF prepared in 2008. The third year 
of MTEF 2007 is neither linked to the second year of MTEF 2008 nor to the first year of the MTEF 
2009. 
 
Concluding from the above, there is no link between allocations of the first MTEF (2007) and 
those of the second MTEF (2008). This disconnect between the ministerial programming of two 
inter-linked MTEF is no longer apparent between the second (2008) and third (2009) versions of 
the MTEF. Hence, it can be imagined that it was only during preparation of the 2009 MTEF that 
the programming of budget allocations as of date t started picking up from the programming done 
in t -1, i.e. from preparation of the MTEF of the previous year. Hence, hypothesis H6 is partially 
proven. There was an improvement of the programming process from 2009, probably due to 
learning by practice, taking into account the lessons learnt from previous fiscal years.  
 
Programming Exercises Link 
 
The existence of a link between programming exercises for the years N, N+1 and N+2 within the 
same MTEF reflect the internal coherence of projections and the effective implementation of the 
short-term policy vision. Apart from the information it will provide on the link between the fiscal 
years programmed within the same MTEF, this analysis, once it confirms the existence of the link, 
will make it possible to assess the variation in amounts allocated to priority sectors so as to 
determine whether MTEFs encourage the allocation of a growing share of resources to these 
sectors. 
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Table VI.6: Link between budget programming exercises within the same MTEF 
Tested link MTEF 2007, 
2007  
R  
MTEF 2007, 
2008       
MTEF 2007, 
2008  
R 
MTEF 2007, 
2009 
MTEF 2008, 
2008  
R 
MTEF 2008, 
2009  
MTEF 2008, 
2009  
R 
MTEF 2008, 
2010 
MTEF 2009, 
2009   
R  
MTEF 2009, 
2010 
N    5    5 11 11 11 
Spearman ρ    1    0.9 0.92 0.93  0.76 
p-value ρ    0.0 ***    0.04 ** 0.0 *** 0.0***  0.006*** 
Kendall τ    1    0.8 0.78 0.85  0.67 
p-value τ    0.01 **    0.05  0.001 *** 0.0***  0.004*** 
Decision Rejection of 
H0 
Rejection of 
H0 
Rejection of 
H0 
Rejection of 
H0 
Rejection of 
H0 
Note: ***) rejection of H0, threshold at 1% and **) rejection of H0, threshold at 5%.  
 
Budget allocation programming exercises for years within the same MTEF are highly correlated 
(Hypothesis H7 is proven). Hence, the budget programming exercises for years N+1 and N+2 are 
based on the allocations for year N (Table VI.6). Besides, it should not be very far from the year 
N budget. This is verified subsequently.  
 
MTEF and budget predictability  
 
The average relative Budget Deviation Index is used to evaluate MTEF’s contribution to budget 
predictability. This index (calculated in the ministries) is similar to the BDI (Moon’s Budget 
Deviation Index) in terms of its target, but different in terms of methodology, because it is defined 
as simply the average of the relative budget variances of the ministries concerned. It will be 
calculated for 2008-2009, the post-MTEF period (the period for which SIGFIP43 data on budget 
execution by authorization is available) and for 2004-2006, the period that immediately precedes 
the institution of MTEF. Furthermore, relative analysis gives a clearer idea of the magnitude of 
budget deviations between two ministries.  
                                                 
43 Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques, e.g. Public Finance Management System  
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However, it should be noted that the index is calculated in the ministries and institutions and that 
certain ministries whose structures have changed (ministries split up or merged during the 2004-
2010 period) were deliberately excluded. This will make it possible to have deviation indices 
calculated for the same entities before and after MTEF implementation so that the comparison 
should not be skewed in advance. The average index over the post-MTEF period is 47 percent 
compared to 53.8 percent over the 2004-2006 period.  
The analysis cannot be limited to a mere comparison of these statistics. Hence, 14 ministries are 
considered and the average (relative) variances between their initial and executed amounts are 
calculated and compared as a percentage of the planned amount for the 2007-2009 or 2008-2009 
post-MTEF period and the 2004-2006 pre-MTEF period. The unilateral sign tests and the unilateral 
Wilcoxon test for matched samples have been used.    
 
Table VI.7: Test on budget variances (authorization) before and after MTEF adoption  
Sign Test N=14 Matched Wilcoxon Test N=14 
Negative differences c       6    Negative rankings        6 
Positive differences            8  Positive rankings        8 
          Average ranking+:     7.63    Average ranking-
: 7.33 
  Z                           -0.53 a 
p-value                           0.39b    p-value                   0.31  
Source: Authors' calculations based on Government data. 
Note: a) based on negative rankings; b) binomial distribution used; c) Difference = Pre-MTEF 
variance – Post-MTEF variance. The number of tied rankings is zero. 
  
The results of these two tests (Table VI.7) lead to the conclusion that the average relative budget 
variances of the 14 ministries during the post-MTEF period were generally equal to those obtained 
over the last three years preceding MTEF implementation.  
It is also important to gauge the impact of producing a sectoral MTEF (SMTEF) on overall 
predictability. Hence, average relative variances will be calculated and compared for a sample of 
seven ministries covered by an SMTEF for the 2007-2008 period.  
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Table VI.8: Test on budget variances (authorizations) before and after MTEF Adoption 
(Ministries under MTEF since 2007/2008) 
Sign Test N=7 Matched Wilcoxon Test N=7 
Negative difference c       2    Negative ranking        2 
Positive difference            5  Positive ranking        5 
          Average ranking+:     4    Average ranking-: 4 
  Z                           -1.01 a 
p-value                           0.22b    p-value                   0.18  
Source: Authors' calculations  
Note: a) based on negative rankings; b) binomial distribution used; c) Difference = Pre-MTEF 
variance – Post-MTEF variance; the number of tied rankings is zero;  
 
The results in Table VI.8 lead to the conclusion that, during the 2008-2009 period, the average 
relative budget variances of the seven ministries under SMTEF in 2008 were generally equal to 
those obtained over the last three years preceding MTEF implementation. To conclude the impact 
of SMTEF implementation on overall budget variance trends during the MTEF period, the same 
method was applied, as a placebo measure, to ministries which, right up to 2010, had no SMTEF. 
The results of the tests also revealed average relative variances for ministries without MTEF that 
were generally equal to those of the pre-MTEF period.  
After noticing that ministries under SMTEF did not experience an improvement in budget 
predictability in terms of overall execution from 2004-2006 to 2008-2009, a comparison was made 
between the relative budget variances of ministries with an SMTEF and those without an SMTEF. 
Indeed, it is equally important to assess the predictability status of ministries covered by an SMTEF 
compared to the other ministries. 
This was done by applying a Mann-Whitney/Wilcoxon test followed by a Kolmogorov/Smirnov 
test on the average budget variances during the MTEF period (2008-2009) between two groups, 
G1 and G2, composed respectively of ministries under an SMTEF since 2007/2008 and ministries 
without an SMTEF until 2010. These tests (Table VI.A.5 and Table VI.A.6) show that the average 
relative variances of Group G1 are equal to those of Group G2. Compared to ministries which are 
not yet covered by an SMTEF, ministries under SMTEF since 2007/2008 do not have a smaller 
average relative variance. Hence, hypothesis H8 has not been proven. 
 
In summary, the test results obtained in terms of predictability are as follows: 
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 The average relative budget variances of the 14 ministries tested in the post-MTEF period are 
generally equal to those obtained over the last three years preceding MTEF implementation; 
 The average relative budget variances of the seven ministries under SMTEF since 2007 or 
2008 in 2008-2009 are generally equal to those obtained over the last three years preceding 
MTEF implementation; 
 For ministries not covered by an SMTEF until 2010, the average relative variances of the 
period corresponding to MTEF adoption in Senegal are generally equal to those of the period 
preceding MTEF implementation; and 
 Compared to ministries which are not yet covered by an SMTEF, average relative variance for 
ministries under SMTEF since 2007 or 2008 are not smaller. 
 
From these results, it can be concluded that overall budget predictability did not improve after 
MTEF implementation, and that the impact of SMTEF adoption by ministries is not significant 
overall, as regards predictability. Research hypothesis H1 has not been proven.  
 
VI.4.3. Sector allocation   
 
The MTEF is also evaluated in terms of its sectoral resource allocation. The idea is to find out 
whether MTEF implementation leads to a redeployment of budget appropriations to priority 
sectors. These sectors cover domains that are government priorities. They were identified through 
the memorandum of economic and financial policies of 30 May 2008, the PRSP and documentary 
research. The memorandum identifies social and infrastructure sectors as priority domains.  
The PRSP identified new priorities related to transport infrastructure and energy to boost growth. 
In its projections, the MTEF allocates the same volume of resources to the ministries as the budget, 
although its allocations deviate from those of the approved budget and executed budgets for certain 
ministries. MTEF second and first year allocations to various ministries under SMTEF tally with 
budget allocations. These budget allocations indirectly reflect the priority given to various sectors 
after budget execution (as shown in Tables VI.A.1 and VI.A.2 in the annex). Hypothesis H9 is 
relatively proven. 
Besides, the data and documents show that the first year of finalized budget programming for 
ministries under SMTEF tallies with the budget but does not always tally with the programming 
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exercises for the first SMTEF years. Most of the budget programming exercises for ministries 
under SMTEF for the second and third years tally with SMTEF projections. Budget execution also 
follows this ranking of ministries according to allocation amounts.  
It can also be noted that programming exercises for priority sector allocations for the years within 
the same MTEF are not always on the increase. This may not mean the priority given to a particular 
sector/ministry has diminished; it could stem from the projections of available resources provided 
by the macroeconomic framework. 
Having found that the resource allocation priorities of the MTEF approach match those of the 
budget, albeit with sometimes huge variances for second year projections, it would be interesting 
to see whether the effective amount of allocations to priority sectors increased in the MTEF period 
compared to the previous period. 
Hence, the shares of these sectors before and after MTEF adoption are compared. The Mann-
Whitney/Wilcoxon test for independent samples is applied to effective (authorized) amounts as a 
percentage of the total budget executed for the various priority sectors. 
 
Table VI.9: Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test on priority sector share trends 
Variable  
Sectors         
 Pre    Post 
n1       n2 
Average 
ranking 
Pre    Post    
Mann-
Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon 
W    
P-value        Decision 
at 5% 
Health b 3       4 6        2.5    0   10 0.03 Rejection 
of H0 
Education 3       4  4.7   3.5    4   14 0.31 Non-
rejection 
Transport 3       4 4         4    6   16 0.57 Non-
rejection 
Environment & 
Sanitation b 
3        4 
 
6         2 
 
   0    
 
  10 
 
0.03 
 
Rejection 
of H0 
 
Energy a 3        4 2        5.5    0       6 0.02   Rejection 
of H0  
ICTs b 3        4              6    2.5    0             10 0.09           Rejection 
of H0 
Note: The tested variable does not show any tied rankings; b) decline in share; a) increase during 
the MTEF period. The zero hypothesis is H0: The share of sector S before MTEF adoption is equal 
to its share after MTEF adoption. 
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The test results (Table VI.9) show that the MTEF did not generate a redeployment of resources to 
priority sectors such as health, education, transport and environment/sanitation compared to the 
pre-MTEF period. Allocations to the posts/telecommunications and ICT sub-sector did not also 
increase with MTEF implementation. Only the energy sector share increased in the overall budget. 
Although the overall education sector share in the budget did not change after MTEF 
implementation, the shares of the health, ICT and environment sectors declined in the overall 
budget. Therefore, during the MTEF period, the Senegalese Government's budget choices did not 
favor certain sectors deemed to be priorities. Hence, hypothesis H2 has not been proven.  
However, this general finding can be put in context by considering the factors that could account 
for the non-deployment of resources to these sectors between the two periods. Such factors include 
the completion of certain major projects prior to MTEF implementation (e.g. the ‘Jaxay’ flood 
victims’ resettlement plan of 2005, the Independence programme, the public transport bus 
procurement project, the review of the electoral register, the rehabilitation of the national road 
network.). 
Despite the stability or decline in the amount of allocations to sectors such as education, health 
and transport compared to the pre-MTEF period, there was progressive deployment to priority 
sectors since the effective implementation of MTEF in 2007.  
The following table presents the annual growth rate, from 2007 to 2010, in the share of allocations 
to these various sectors as a percentage of the overall executed budget.  
 
Table VI.10: Percentage variation in sector expenditure 
Sectors\ Fiscal Years 2008-2007          2009-2008 2010-2009 
Education 30.8 %                      8.5 % 13.5% 
Health -4.2%                         1.1% 26.2% 
Transport 9.2%                       66% 7.7% 
Environment/ Sanitation 16.21%                     15.6% 59.6% 
Source: Calculations based on Government data 
During the MTEF period, the government increasingly gives priority to the education, environment 
and transport sectors. Redeployment in favor of these sectors is progressive. To a certain extent, 
this can be attributed to the MTEF because a correlation was previously observed between MTEF, 
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budget and execution priorities. Hypothesis H5 is therefore proven. Furthermore, it is not possible 
to state that MTEF led to redeployment of resources to these sectors compared to the pre-MTEF 
period because the sectors sometimes record larger shares, as evident in the test results provided 
in Table VI.9.  
 
VI.5. Conclusion   
  
Results-oriented management is stated in terms of budgetary programming with the adoption of a 
mid-term spending framework or budget program by several public administrations worldwide. 
Several government services in Africa have reviewed their approach to budgeting in order to 
address the problems that bedevil their budget systems. The MTEF emerged as a tool for improving 
budget management performance. This tool of budget programming is designed for improving 
budget discipline and predictability as well as ensuring a connection between the budget 
formulation process and development strategies. Truly effective in Senegal in 2007, this tool has 
been evaluated in this study, with a focus on its generic objectives. 
As in most African countries, the analysis shows that despite a few achievements, certain 
objectives could not be attained. Predictability did not improve overall for ministries with or 
without an SMTEF. There was no redeployment of resources towards most priority sectors 
compared to the pre-MTEF period. Nevertheless, since the MTEF was instituted, there has been a 
steady increase in allocations to certain priority sectors like education, the environment and 
transport. Also noteworthy are the linkages between the budget programming exercises for the 
years within the same MTEF versions and between those of the years in versions produced in 2009 
and 2008. This shows that budget programming exercises are conducted based on the 
programming exercises for previous years. Budget discipline, evaluated through the primary 
balance, did not significantly change after MTEF adoption.  
The main challenges that government authorities in most of African countries must address are 
completion of the establishment process with the institution of a comprehensive MTEF, 
compliance with approved budgets by the ministries, improvement and extension of SMTEF to 
ministries without such framework. What is important is focusing on the efficiency and efficacy 
of public expenditures. Despite the spread of the MTEF approach in Africa due to the increased 
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political will of states, regional institutions and partners, there are still numerous challenges to be 
addressed before the countries can fully benefit from the potential generated by MTEFs.   
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Appendix  
 
Table VI.A.1: Second year MTEF allocations, budget allocations, and executed allocations 
Tested link   MTEF share 2008, 2009 
R budget share 2009  
  MTEF share 2008, 2009  
  R execution share 2009 
Number of ministries 
concerned 
       9               9 
Spearman’s Rho ρ       0.68                0.76 
p-value ρ       0.02**                0.008 *** 
Kendall’s tau τ       0.55                0.61 
p-value τ       0.02**                0.01**  
Decision   Rejection of H0            Rejection of H0 
Source: Authors. 
Note: **) Significant correlation at 5% threshold; ***) Significant correlation at 1% threshold.  
 
Table VI.A.2: Comparison of projections, budget and actual 
Tested link       MTEF share 2008, 2008  
   R execution share 2008 
Number of ministries concerned                10 
Spearman’s Rho ρ                0.69 
p-value ρ                0.01 ** 
Kendall’s tau τ                0.60 
p-value τ                0.008***  
Decision                Rejection of H0 
Source: Authors. 
Note: **) Significant correlation at 5% threshold; ***) Significant correlation at 1% threshold.  
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Table VI.A.3: Budget expenditure category trends before and after MTEF adoption (as 
percentage of GDP) 
Variable
s 
Total 
expenditu
re 
Recurrent 
expenditu
re 
Salaries 
and wages 
Transfers 
and 
subsidies 
Debt 
interest 
Capital 
expenditu
re 
Basic 
balance 
(net of 
HIPC, 
MDRI) 
Primar
y 
balanc
e 
 
Pre-
MTEF 
22.1 13.59 5.72 3.34 1.28 8.13 0.94 -0.33  
Post-
MTEF 
31.16 18.98 7.25 5.59 0.94 12.01 -0.97 -3.5  
Source: Authors. 
 
Table VI.A.4: Revenue trends (as percentage of GDP) 
 Pre-MTEF Post-MTEF 
Total revenue and grants 20.3 26.5 
Budget revenue 18.1 23.5 
      Tax revenue 17.2 22.4 
      Non-tax revenue 0.87 1.1 
Grants 2.2 2.9 
Source: Calculations based on Government data.   
 
Table VI. A.5: Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test on average relative budget variances 
(authorizations) between G1 and G2, 2008-2009 
Variable           Average 
ranking    
G 1      G2 
n1=7   n2=7 
Mann-
Whitney U 
Wilcoxon W    P-value        Test result 
at 5% 
Average 
relative 
variances  
7.86     7.14  22 50 0.40  Non-
rejection of 
H0 
Source: Authors' calculations based on Government data. 
Note: The variables tested do not show any tied rankings. Zero hypothesis H0: Average relative 
variance of ministries under SMTEF since 2008 = Average relative variance of ministries without 
an SMTEF until 2010.  
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Table VI.A.6: Kolmogorov Test on average relative budget variances (authorizations) 
between G1 and G2, 2008-2009 
Variable           Negative 
differenced 
Positive 
difference 
Absolute 
difference 
Kolmogorov
-Smirnov Z    
P-value        Test result 
at 5% 
Average 
relative 
variances  
-0.28 0.14      0.28 0.53 0.96  Non-
rejection 
of H0 
Note: d) the differences correspond to the most extreme differences; the test is bilateral. 
Source: Authors 
Figure VI.A.1: Overall Expenditure and Overall Revenue Trends  
 
 
Source: Authors    
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This dissertation consists of 5 contributions that address various aspects of policy-growth-poverty 
linkages and budget allocation from an economic perspective by using quantitative methods. The 
results obtained in this dissertation contribute to better understand how policies translate into 
growth and in turn, into achievement of policy goals like poverty reduction.           
               
Government Expenditures, Health Outcomes, and Marginal Productivity of Agricultural 
Inputs: The Case of Tanzania 
 
This contribution estimates empirically the impact of the changes in specific sub-categories of 
health expenditures at the district level on health status among farm households and the resulting 
effect on the marginal productivity of agricultural inputs, using the most recent nationally 
representative data for Tanzania. The study controls for heterogeneity of individuals, measurement 
errors on the health variables and endogeneity through the combination of a general structure 
covariance model and a two-stage residual inclusion method. The results highlight the fundamental 
importance of health. Farmer productivity is positively linked to health status of farm households 
that is impacted differently by different categories of government expenditures on health services. 
Efforts should be made by the government in this direction to avoid loss of agricultural 
productivity that can result from illness, especially with malaria. The analysis conducted in this 
contribution could be expanded to include other types of disease as well as more categories of 
expenditure in the health sector. Expenditures in other social sectors can also be included in future 
work.                              
An interesting analysis could be to run simulation at the macroeconomic level to assess the poverty 
impacts and long-term growth generated from the changes in the composition of health 
expenditures. This can be done by using a dynamic CGE model linked to a household 
microsimulation model. The parameters estimated in this paper can be inputted into a CGE model 
with the health sector disaggregated according to the sub-categories of health expenditures.  
Besides, the work can also be applied using other health indicators such as calorie intake, Body 
Mass Index (BMI) that might be more accurate manifest variables for the latent variable of 
household health status.              
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Catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for health and poverty nexus: evidence from Senegal 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the determinants of catastrophic household out-of-pocket 
health spending and its implications on poverty using Senegal as a case study. Quantification of 
these factors is necessary because it can provide a key to understanding household poverty and the 
problem of the health system in order to give useful insights to policy makers.       
This study shows evidence that some households are affected by catastrophic out-of-pocket health 
expenditures and warrants the necessity for the government to assist them financially. Results also 
show that national poverty estimates should be considered as slightly overestimated when the 
impoverishing effects of catastrophic expenditures are not considered. A future research agenda 
could be to explore how the same idea could be applied to payroll taxes or any other expenditure 
that risks impoverishing households, but is unfortunately considered in the calculation household 
total expenditures often used as a proxy for household income.   
          
Out-of-pocket health payment: a catalyst for agricultural productivity growth, but with 
potentially impoverishing effects 
 
This contribution provides an empirical evidence on the role of health investments in productivity. 
It also explores the long-term impact of policies assisting household against the catastrophic out-
of-pocket health payments, taking the specific case of Senegal over the period 2011-2020. The 
simulation results indicate that policies reducing the cost and promoting consumption of health 
goods have a significant and positive impact on the agricultural sector growth and important 
spillover effects on the rest of the economy. It is essential to have an efficient health care system 
that does not put the entire financial burden of health services on households, especially the poor 
and most vulnerable groups, such as rural and urban agricultural households. The model could be 
extended to a life cycle model allowing households to smooth their health investment over time. 
The general equilibrium price substitution and income effects, the consumption and the saving are 
important to determine whether households spend more or less in health goods. However, we 
believe that it would be more realistic to include stochastic and parametric uncertainty in the 
behavioral demand for health care. A first attempt was done in this direction with the inclusion of 
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a discrete error term in the equation of the household demand for health, allowing to simulate 
response to exogenous health shock.      
                
     Identifying key sectors and key policies of a PPG-strategy: A linked PIF and CGE-
approach 
This contribution estimates the impact of spending on policy programs on the growth and poverty 
reduction by combining empirical and expert data. A Policy Impact Function (PIF) is specified for 
each sector in each country and its parameters are estimated using conventional methods. The 
calculations of marginal budget productivity of public spending have shown that it is more costly 
to promote technical progress in the non-agricultural sectors compared to the agricultural sector. 
Besides, the application of the method to Senegal reveals that agricultural sectors appears to be 
more promising in generating poverty reduction. Beyond Agriculture, considerable potentials are 
found in some non-agricultural sectors.                   
The paper assessed the impact of desegregated agricultural policy programs within CAADP on 
sectoral productivity growth, while keeping economic investment in non-agricultural policies at 
the aggregated level. Further work will be to look at specific kinds of non-agricultural expenditures 
like health spending as treated in chapter II and IV. In fact, we could extend the work to other 
types of investment in human capital like education and social safety nets.        
The CGE elasticities and multipliers might be overestimated due to the assumption of perfect 
mobility of the labor made in the model. The movements of workers from the rural to urban areas 
in order to be engaged in the expending non-agricultural sectors are often subject to high non-
linear transaction costs that are not integrated in the model. Likewise, the withdrawal of workers 
from non-agriculture sectors to the simulated growing agricultural sectors might not be too realistic 
for all labor types. Poverty reduction might also be overestimated because of the equal income 
distribution resulting from additional growth within the different household types in the CGE 
model. In the real world, the growth is often in favor of the richest households. The model could 
be extended to better integrate market imperfections and more realistic distributional effects of 
income growth.                                       
Furthermore, the empirical application of the Bayesian Alternative to Maximum Entropy could be 
extended by providing an estimation of the standard errors of the parameters. This could be done 
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by proceeding in a manner similar to the approach used in Robillard and Robinson (1999) which 
specifies a set of values for the support distributions of the error terms.    
Finally, the results of the simulation need to be interpreted with caution. The simulations do not 
integrate at the ends the other factors that can affect growth like prices and weather shocks in the 
agricultural sector. The estimated policy impact functions are partially based on prior information 
from experts’ views that might be too optimistic in evaluating the efficiency of public spending. 
 
Harmonized Budget Programming Reforms in Africa: Senegal’s experience with MTEF 
 
The Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) emerged in order to improve the budget 
management and allocation in many countries in Africa, including Senegal. This contribution 
revisited the recent development of the tool in Africa and conducts a midterm review using non-
parametric statistics and with a particular interest in Senegal. The results show that predictability 
did not improve overall for ministries, the MTEF did not improve the budget discipline, and no 
increase of the resources allocated to priority sectors has been significantly observed compared to 
the previous period. However, some achievements has been noted such as a coherence of budget 
projections for the corresponding years in the rolling three-year programing method and an 
observed steady increase in the allocation to priority sectors since the MTEF has been adopted. 
This study provides a pioneer work for the evaluation of the MTEF in Senegal, but the limitation 
in the number of observations constitutes a weakness as the tool is quite recent. In further work, 
more rigorous impact assessment techniques could be employed to better evaluate the potentials 
and the achievements of this instrument. The analysis could also be done using an economic 
classification of the budget. However, doing this will require an effort to match budget spending 
on policy programs and economic sectors as the MTEF is only done to this date at the ministry 
level. While waiting for such extension, this first study shows evidence that efforts should be made 
in order to fully benefit from the potential generated by the MTEF and therefore achieve more 
effective management.        
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The research conducted in this dissertation can help governments, policy analysts and all 
development planners, especially in Agriculture, to fully understand the potentials for poverty 
reduction. This can help reduce the political performance gap with an efficient understanding of 
policies supporting Agriculture like the CAADP. This research can provide guidance for an 
efficient implementation of pro-poor growth strategies, particularly the evaluation, and the follow-
up of the ongoing policies. The results shed light on the identification of strategic agricultural 
policy programs, sectoral priorities, and indirect agricultural policies in the health sector in order 
to foster sustainable economic growth and promote poverty reduction. The findings should also be 
of interest for both academics and stakeholders. The proposed Policy Impact Function is an 
appropriate tool for explaining the current political performance gap and analyzing current and 
future investment plans.   
This dissertation brings valuable contributions to the literature on health and agricultural 
productivity nexus, budget allocation, and agricultural investment options. Furthermore, the 
consideration and the evaluation of the characteristics of the political actors like their specific 
political beliefs helped integrate country specific conditions in the economic analyses.     
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